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Abstract
Linguistic Variation from Cognitive Variability:
The Case of English Have
Muye Zhang
2021

In this dissertation, I seek to construct a model of meaning variation built upon variability
in linguistic structure, conceptual structure, and cognitive makeup, and in doing so, exemplify
an approach to studying meaning that is both linguistically principled and neuropsychologically grounded. As my test case, I make use of the English lexical item have by proposing a
novel analysis of its meaning based on its well-described variability in English and its embedding into crosslinguistically consistent patterns of variation and change.
I support this analysis by investigating its real-time comprehension patterns through behavioral, electropsychophysiological, and hemodynamic brain data, thereby incorporating dimensions of domain-general cognitive variability as crucial determinants of linguistic variability.
Per my account, have retrieves a generalized relational meaning which can give rise to a conceptually constrained range of readings, depending on the degree of causality perceived from
either linguistic or contextual cues. Results show that comprehenders can make use of both
for have-sentences, though they vary in the degree to which they rely on each.
At the very broadest level, the ﬁndings support a model in which the semantic distribution
of have is inherently principled due to a uniﬁed conceptual structure. This underlying conceptual structure and relevant context cooperate in guiding comprehension by modulating the
salience of potential readings, as comprehension unfolds; though, this ability to use relevant
context–context-sensitivity–is variable but systematic across comprehenders. These linguistic and cognitive factors together form the core of normal language processing and, with a
gradient conceptual framework, the minimal infrastructure for meaning variation and change.
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1

1.1

The problem of meaning variation

Language, at its core, is a set of pairings between a sign and a meaning. These pairings are
typically understood to stand in a one-to-one relationship and be stable between individuals,
across speech communities, and over time. Crucially, these pairings are mutually exclusive
within the system, such that if a given sign refers to a given meaning, both cannot refer to
or be referred to by other signs or meanings. In fact, the value of the entire system is derived
from this Saussurean principle.Yet, in the context of actual human communication, this one-toone relation rarely holds.The sign-meaning linkings, packaged with morphosyntactic structure,
form lexical items, the atoms of the language system, and readily enter into many-to-many
mappings where the same sign can refer to multiple meanings, and the same meaning can be
referred to by multiple signs. I begin this dissertation with a brief introduction to one welldiscussed example of a one-to-many mapping from English.

1.2

The puzzle of English have

The case of English have is a perfect test case for enumerating a neurocognitively grounded
model of linguistic meaning variation because it (a) shows breadth in the meanings it can
convey, (b) is situated in a crosslinguistically consistent semantic domain, and (c) is a highly
frequent lexical structure in the language.1
Have’s semantic variability is a well-known phenomenon in the literature (Lyons, 1967; Ritter and Rosen, 1997; Myler, 2016, a.o.). As shown in (1), have-sentences show a semantic distri1

Have is the second most frequent verb in the English language, following be, and is among the top ten most
frequent lexical items overall, according to both the Oxford English Corpus (OED Online) which represents
British and American English with eight additional global English varieties, as well as the Contemporary Corpus
of American English (Davies, 2008). Its centrality to the language allows for more generalizable insights on the
behavior of lexical items in meaning variation.

2

bution beyond the canonical possession relations it is associated with.
(1)

Some of the many meanings of have from Myler (2016)
a.

John has a Playstation 3. [Ownership]

b. John has a sister. [Kinship]
c.

John has blue eyes. [Body part]

d. The stadium has two pubs ﬂanking it. [Locative]
e.

This table has four sturdy legs. [Part-Whole]

f.

John has a cold. [Disease]

g.

John has a great deal of resilience. [Attribute]

The encoding of both locative and possessive meanings situates have in one of the most
well-studied semantic domains, that of locative, possessive, and existential meanings (Kahn,
1966; Freeze, 1992; Beavers et al., 2010; Koch, 2012). Crosslinguistically, typologists have
observed rampant lexicalization of these two types of relations with a single marker (Clark,
1978; Freeze, 1992; Aristar, 1996; Heine, 1997; Tham, 2004) as well as systematic trajectories
of change within this domain (Deo, 2015a); this morphological syncretism is suggestive of an
underlying conceptual syncretism between locative and possessive meanings. Beyond its ability to encode these relational meanings (between two entities); it also participates in causative
(2a), experiencing (2b), light verb (2c), auxiliary (2d), and modal (2e) constructions (have, OED
Online, 2015).
(2)

a.

The Federalist party had him before the bar of the house and tried to expel him.

b. He knew that she had no joy in their union.
c.

Harry had an operation.

d. Too much political change has lowered morale.
e.

You will have to enter the username and password that corresponds to your account.

The most up-to-date linguistic analyses of English have take have to be a semantically null
identity function; the variability in the meanings of DP1 -have-DP2 sentences is due to DP2 3

internal syntactic heads that encode the speciﬁc relational meaning (Ritter and Rosen, 1997;
Harley and Jung, 2015; Myler, 2016). For example, for a possessive sentence such as She has
a Playstation 5, the possessive reading comes from a silent PossP; have merely provides the
two-argument structure that connects the ﬁrst DP with the second. These analyses attribute
the semantic variability to the fact that this identity function can compose with a theoretically unlimited number of silent functional heads, aligning with the proposal that nominals
must be either inherently or type-shifted to be relational to enter into a relational meaning
(Barker, 1991; Partee, 2000). While this analysis uniﬁes have with the copula be, a goal of auxiliary selection theory (Freeze, 1992; Kayne, 1993), it does not address the question of why
have has the meaning variation it does, nor why have-type lexical structures crosslinguistically
convey meanings of location and possession. That is, by proposing that a theoretically unlimited number of functional heads are the source of the meanings of have-sentences, these
proposals shift the compositional burden from the lexical semantics of have to a source outside the scope of the formal account of have’s syntactic and semantic composition. They
show how the semantic variability observed can be derived within the formal system, but do
not explain the origin of semantic variability itself. Crucially, the key aspect of this family
of accounts is that have contributes no semantic content to the meaning of a sentence; it
serves, instead, as a syntactic structure that connects two DPs–a “transitive” form of a copula, as it were. Other proposals that do attribute some degree of semantic content to have
and have-like lexical items crosslinguistically attempt to structure this variability by proposing
categories that are not well-characterized, formally or otherwise, such as stereotypical versus
non-stereotypical relational meanings (Karvovskaya, 2018). Furthermore, there is anecdotal
(Belvin and Den Dikken, 1997) and experimental (Zhang et al., 2018, 2022) evidence for variability in the acceptability of locative have-sentences without prepositional phrases, which
others have claimed to be categorically ungrammatical (Ritter and Rosen, 1997; Harley and
Jung, 2015; Myler, 2016). Overall, the existing approaches toward characterizing this one4

phonological-structure-to-many-meanings phenomenon have offered formal descriptions of
the compositionality of have-sentences, but have not explained why this set of meanings–and
their underlying conceptual structure(s)–are lexicalized with a single phonological structure,
not only in English, but also in languages across the world (see §3.4). What are the semantic
and conceptual constraints on the silent functional heads or relational nominals that can enter into a meaning conveyed through a have-sentence? What about the meanings themselves,
and their relationships between one another, allow for their capturing by a single phonological structure? To address these questions, as well as the goal shared across all proposals of
characterizing the meanings of have, I take a cognitively contextualized linguistic approach.

1.3

My approach: situating linguistic behavior in the cognitive system

The case of English have-sentences serves as a perfect window into the nature of meaning
variation–a property of a neurocognitive embedding of the linguistic system: its lexical boundaries are sufficiently variable and under question, and its primary meanings emerge from a rich
conceptual domain known to show crosslinguistic variation in lexicalization. Altogether, the
“too many meanings problem” that has been ascribed to it appropriately lends itself to a cognitively grounded investigation of meaning variation as an inherent property–the status quo, as it
were–of the human language system. I hope to show that my approach, using evidence from
crosslinguistic patterns of lexicalization patterns and diachronic trajectories, non-linguistic
properties of the human conceptual system, real-time comprehension proﬁles, and measures
of inter-speaker/comprehender variability, in addition to ﬁne-grained linguistic analysis, can
shed light on the nature of the meanings of have themselves and provide an analysis that explains not only how the meaning of a have-sentence is composed, but also why these meanings
of location and possession are lexically associated in language after language.
5

I now turn toward explicating a framework of language in a cognitive context that provides a possible way to understand this phenomenon as a natural manifestation of the human
language system.

1.3.1

The nature of the substance of meaning

What is the substance of meaning and how can it be understood such that lexical items can
manifest one-to-one or many-to-many mappings with it?
When I refer to meaning, I am referring to conceptual structure, the mental substance that is formed through the encoding of perceptual experiences into memory (see Jackendoff, 1983; Pustejovsky, 1995; Jackendoff, 2002; Wiese, 2003; Culicover and
Jackendoff, 2005; Jackendoff, 2007; Pustejovsky, 2011, a.o.). These memorized situations are
rich sensory experiences embedded within physical and psychological contexts, meaning that
they contain not only direct sensory percepts such as light, sound, temperature, among many
others, but also the enrichment of these direct percepts by cognitive percepts. These cognitive percepts are evaluations of the direct sensory percepts, such as the evaluation of a series
of patterns of light striking the retina, a series of sounds entering the cochlea, and perhaps a
series of tactile and olfactory percepts, into a speciﬁc mental representation–one that speakers
of English might associate with the sound/sign sequence symbolized by the orthographemic
sequence “cat”. Some other cognitive percepts, based on evaluations of various conﬁgurations
of sensory percepts, are the chunking, labeling, or naming of individuals, objects, entities,
events, as well as the evaluation of animacy, causality, familiarity, and even grammaticality.
Lexical items are therefore conventionalized associations between a physical pronunciation
and a chunk of conceptual structure (complete with both direct sensory and evaluated cognitive percepts), following a number of theoretical linguistic frameworks’ treatment of the relationship between linguistic structure and conceptual structure, namely conceptual semantics
(Jackendoff, 2019) and two-level semantics (Lang and Maienborn, 2019), among others. These
6

lexical items are bidirectionally powerful: they enable us to manipulate this mental substance
introspectively and manipulate the mental substance in other individuals’ minds.
These associations, however, are incomplete and imperfect for two principal reasons. The
ﬁrst is a cognitive limitation on the memorization or encoding of the direct sensory percepts.
These sensory percepts rely on direct physical and chemical stimulation and cannot be faithfully encoded in a memory, which means that the memory of a situation will always be incomplete with respect to the sensory detail of direct perception. The second is that the lexical
system is not nearly enumerated enough to provide a perfect matching of one sign to every
perceptual detail of a memory; lexical items can only trap subsets or simpliﬁcations of or generalizations over the substance of meaning. The relative informational richness of conceptual
structure is indexable by lexical structures, albeit with limited resolution, but it cannot be
quantized perfectly by those lexical structures (see Fodor, 1975; Jackendoff, 1985; Lakoff, 1987;
Pinker, 1999; Murphy, 2002, a.o.). This informational asymmetry is what manifests the
phenomenon of meaning variation: what about the rich experiential mental substance associated with ‘cat’ is being referred to in any given situation? It could be a speciﬁc property,
such as its soft fur, quiet purr, anthropomorphized aloofness, or the whole network of properties: a sentence like I have two cats could refer to the entire situation beyond the physical
entity (and all of its direct sensory percepts itself), such as the periodic purchasing of food and
litter, the omnipresence of residual hair, or the inability for allergic friends to visit.
How, therefore, could the association of a lexical form and a chunk of conceptual structure
emerge? To illustrate one possibility, we start with a parent-child dyad: the parent points to
a visual scene, directing the attention of their baby, and utters a sign (and thereby a lexical
structure). The baby memorizes this visual scene as the referent of that sign (and thereby
that lexical structure); it contains a whole host of smells, feels, sights, as well as individuated
objects, and perhaps even cognitive percepts like animacy (driven by heuristics such as the
presence of eyes, which are already individuated objects evaluated from the raw visual signal).
7

The next time the baby interprets] that sign (and thereby that lexical structure), the scene
may be slightly different. Assuming a well-intentioned parent, the baby removes the smells,
feels, sights, objects, and other percepts that were present in the ﬁrst scene but not the second
from its association with that lexical structure. Over time, the degree of sunlight, the bird or
siren sounds, the furniture, and carpeting are all removed, leaving only a single individuated
object and all of its aforementioned related percepts standing in the association relation with
the lexical structure ‘cat.’ The resulting pan-situational reliability of the term ‘cat’ is what allows
it to be a useful tool for communication.

1.3.2

Lexical meaning and context as two sides of the same coin

The primary consequence of this asymmetric mapping is that meanings are rich and that
lexical items can refer to either a subset or the entirety of an experiential memory
when deployed: meanings are inextricably attached to their contexts because (a) a lexically
sanctioned “meaning” will always include a rich experiential context and (b) the context can
help identify the relevant component of the entire meaning for a lexical item’s intended communicative purpose. The honing of a sufficiently pan-situationally reliable pairing is typically
incomplete: take the example of the English word ‘smoke’ and the rich chunk of conceptual
structure to which it can refer, as in (3) from Jackendoff (2012).
(3)

a.

The ﬁre gave off a lot of smoke.

b. The ﬁre smoked a lot.
c.

Bill smoked the cigar.

d. Bill smoked the ﬁsh.
e.

Do you have a smoke?

f.

Let’s smoke them out.

Here, the single lexical structure provides some degree of pan-situational reliability in that
it can correctly communicate these situations, in contrast to a situation involving, say, a baby
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and a cat. But, it does not sufficiently distinguish between these six contexts for its use. The
single lexical structure is cluing the comprehender into a rich conceptual structure through
which the context is honing down on a speciﬁc aspect; this relationship between lexical and
conceptual structure has been explicitly addressed in the Two-level Semantics framework (see
Bierwisch and Schreuder, 1992, et seq., and Chapter 5 of this dissertation). The optimization
of the “right” degree of pan-situational reliability can be taken to be an issue of ﬁnite memory:
what is the right degree of semantic ambiguity that each lexical structure can have before
the system is inefficient? Clearly, the fact that articulatory gestures that cue the lexical item
‘smoke’ can ambiguously refer to these six situations, at the very least, suggests that in this case,
ﬁve potential lexical-structure-sized memory units can be conserved. So, this setup between
optimizing between speciﬁcity and generality can be seen as the efficient capitalization of a
rich conceptual structure and a ﬁnite memory system.
In sum, the whole point of this exposition is to motivate the question: where does “lexical
meaning” end and context begin? In the framework I have explicated above, there is not
necessarily a clear line between lexical meaning and contextual meaning; composite lexical structures are tools to hone in on a suﬃciently speciﬁc chunk of conceptual structure for a given communicative intent. I take the view that there is a constant tradeoﬀ between lexically conventionalized and contextually speciﬁed meaning; the act of linguistic comprehension is therefore an active narrowing down of
a large chunk of conceptual structure by lexical and contextual triangulation, using
the smaller chunks of conceptual structure referred to by speciﬁc lexical structures deployed
in a communicative context. This means that some lexical structures can have the illusion of
being maximally pan-situationally reliable (and therefore context-independent) resulting from
a high degree of use, but in actuality, are as richly context-dependent as any other. For example, while comprehending the lexical item ‘cat’ in isolation may generate a visual image and
a constellation of conceptual features for most comprehenders, the speciﬁc visual image gen9

erated emerges from that speciﬁc comprehender’s individual memory, but the entire relevant
conceptual structure chunk is still brought to attention for communicative use.
The context itself must be reconceptualized from the standard linguistic view: it is not an
accessory to lexical structures, but inextricable from the comprehension of any lexical structure. This view of context and linguistic communication, however, enriches it with quite a
number of linguistic, conceptual, cognitive, and even social factors. Out of this highly interactive milieu comes a number of questions. What are the factors that contribute to and create
meaning variation? How do they interact with and constrain one another and relate to other
forces that affect language use? Moreover, relating to the substance of meaning itself, how can
we understand the units of meaning? That is, what constitutes “one meaning” such that there
can be multiple meanings referred to by a single linguistic structure? What is the relationship between linguistic meaning and conceptual meaning, and where does linguistic semantics
(and potentially Semantics2 ) ﬁt into this system? And ﬁnally, how do the factors contribute
to meaning variation interact with meaning in real-time processing? These are the main questions of interest in this dissertation, roughly corresponding to Part 1 and and Part 2, though
they have different degrees of operationalization and therefore exploration.
2

By using the capital form here in contrast, I am referring to model-theoretic semantics (Zimmermann, 2019),
the dominant framework through which lower-case semantics, as the general scientiﬁc study of linguistic meaning,
is carried out.
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1.3.3

Meaning variation, as lexical underspeciﬁcation, is a property
of the system

Meaning variation is by no means an unbroached frontier of linguistic inquiry, though there
is diversity in the precise research questions different efforts have sought to address.3 , 4 The
primary disciplinary area that has sought to characterize and understand meaning variation is
the sociolinguistic variationist tradition (see Eckert, 2016, for a recent overview of this framework), particularly as ‘sociosemantic variation’ (Hasan, 1989) or socially driven semantic variation (Tredici and Fernandez, 2018). One fundamental tenet of the language system, in this
body of work, is that of underspeciﬁcation: a given form’s ability to encode multiple meanings or serve multiple purposes, as described previously. Accordingly, speciﬁc meanings for
an underspeciﬁed form can emerge only as a function of their use in context, which allows
for the “binding of language to social action” (Eckert, 2016), setting up a linguistic capacity
that is inherently ﬂexible, variable, and thus creative and communicative. The primary focus
of this effort is, however, largely complementary with my purpose here: these approaches
seek to characterize and understand the way different lexical forms encode social meaning–
information that communicates aspect of a speakers’ identity or situation in a social structure.
This social meaning is understood to be separate from the conceptual structure content, or
3

There is a large literature on lexical-semantic variation of the inverse (relative to the topic here) kind, which
relates to the plurality of lexical items that can exist, particularly across varieties of the same language, to refer
to a given item. This is a case of one meaning and many markers, such as the use of the word cooler in the United
States to describe a insulated container for storing cold consumables in contrast to the use of the word chillybin to describe that very item in New Zealand. Lexicographers have found a plethora of largely sociohistorical
reasons for this multiple-marker system, such as in the case of the soda/pop distinction in the United States (von
Schneidemesser, 1996), and connect the proliferation of these terms to interactions of sociocultural and linguistic
factors, particularly in multilingual communities (e.g. Adegbija, 1989).
4
Instead, the focus in this dissertation is on the situation in which one marker can encode or refer to many
meanings (Deo, 2015a). This is largely related to the phenomenon described as polysemy, as in the case of the
examples in (3), in which one marker can convey several related meanings. I do not use the term polysemy here
for a few reasons, the principal one being the inherent dependence on the memorized listing of multiple forms,
which may or may not be conceptually structured or constrained by capacity limitations. As discussed in Chapter
2, a polysemy account for meaning variation is not sufficiently explanatory to account for the phenomenon as a
whole.
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linguistic or conceptual meaning, that is directly captured in the process of lexicalization, as
described above.5
Other efforts to understanding meaning variation have also been made through computational modeling, particularly for characterizing the relationship between quantiﬁed lexical
forms and quantiﬁed word meanings (‘senses’) (see Eger and Mehler, 2016; Kulkarni, 2017; Tahmasebi et al., 2018; Schlechtweg and Walde, 2020). While such models may elucidate properties of the dynamics of lexical items competing for conceptual structure representation, they
rely on measures of semantic relatedness that are quantiﬁed through emergent colocation frequences and other inductive techniques that “black-box” the structure and function of the
mind. Therefore, they do not address the question of how the cognitive system generates
meaning variation, so I consider these approaches to be complementary but distinct from
mine here due to this fundamental divergence.
Finally, within more traditionally conceived linguistic disciplines, meaning variation, broadly
construed, has been studied in the crosslinguistic differences in how language-speciﬁc lexical
structures encode semantic categories such as the mass/count distinction (Chierchia, 2010) or
property concepts (Francez and Koontz-Garboden, 2015). The extension of this instantiation
of meaning variation naturally extends into meaning change, with a correspondingly wide array of proposals ranging from completely random and asystematic (Litty et al., 2016, a.o.) to
crosslinguistically universal trajectories of change constrained by the properties of the linguistic (and presumably cognitive) system (Traugott, 1980; Dahl, 1985; Bybee, 1994; Heine, 1997,
a.o.). These approaches, however, often still maintain a strictly quantized conceptual meaning system, exempliﬁed by the seven property concepts deﬁned by Dixon (1982), such that
language-speciﬁc lexical structures can map onto them in one-to-one relationships. Each of
5

Though, the division between conceptual meaning and social meaning is of course already porous and likely
a mere construct put in place for “simplicity” of the act of studying them. This discussion leads naturally into
understanding language and linguistic structures to be communicative resources and tools, a view that does not
permit the setting aside of different theoretically imposed divisions in the study of meaning (Wiese and Rehbein,
2016).
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these approaches described above addresses necessary components of the overall setup; while
they acknowledge other implicated factors, they are often not focused explicitly on capturing
the conceptual and cognitive rooting of linguistic meaning, due to research scope, methodological capability, or theoretical framework.
In sum, I deﬁne meaning variation, for present purposes, to be situations in which a single
lexical structure encodes a superﬁcially multiple number of non-identical chunks of conceptual structure, independent of the additional social meaning that can be communicated additionally through the use of the lexical structure. These situations have often been designated
with a “problem” status because they violate the premise of one-to-one sign-meaning correspondences However, the cognitive embedding of the language system that I have described
here shifts this perspective of meaning variation from being a problem to being a fundamental
property.

1.3.4

Committing to a cognitively grounded linguistic analysis

My approach toward understanding the relationship between linguistic semantic variation and
variability in the underlying cognitive system stems from the constraint of a psychological reality of language in linguistic modeling and theory. This constraint has two major consequences
for the model of meaning variation: (a) each aspect of the analysis will be both motivated and
constrained by cognitive principles and prioritize psychological plausibility and parsimony,
and (b) each component of the model will be testable using neuropsychological methods and,
crucially, falsiﬁable.
The above discussion has presented the relationship between lexical structure and conceptual structure: that conceptual structure is associated with a phonological structure to form a
lexical item, and therefore lexical semantic content is rooted in conceptual structure and the
behavior of this lexical item formation can serve as a psychological tool to study conceptual
structure.
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What sets this project apart is its cognitively constrained approach, which has two major
ramiﬁcations for the investigation of linguistic meaning: (a) a real-time processing proﬁle and
(b) accounting for systematic cognitive variability. The ﬁrst ramiﬁcation means that a linguistic analysis must generate predictions for real-time processing, the processes by which individual language users produce and comprehend the linguistic structures under investigation.
Speciﬁcally, how are the meanings constructed in real-time? These processing predictions
must then also be testable and falsiﬁable through real-time processing methods. The second
ramiﬁcation means that variability must be taken to be intrinsic to the way that human language systems work. If variability is intrinsic to the cognitive system and language emerges
from the cognitive system, then known dimensions of cognitive variability should contribute
to and affect the processing of language. Through this dissertation, I hope to not only propose
a neurocognitive model of the real-time processing of have-sentences emerging from a linguistic analysis, but also to substantiate this model with multi-modal evidence and incorporate
into it quantiﬁable measures of cognitive variability.
I now return to the speciﬁc linguistic phenomenon through which I investigate the relationship between linguistic, conceptual, and cognitive variability–English have-sentences–and
map out the major components of the research.

1.4

The origin of variants: three ingredients for meaning variation and change

Understanding meaning variation as an inherent property or natural phenomenon allows for a
more cognitively broad approach toward understanding its properties. I take this phenomenon
to emerge from variability in at least three components of the language system in its neurocognitive embedding: lexical, conceptual, and cognitive. Instead of tabling the property of
variability due to difficulty in operationalizing it, we can create a more ecologically valid un14

derstanding of the language system by incorporating variability as a degree of freedom by implementing higher-dimensional models. So, in order to address the question above about the
factors that contribute to meaning variation and their interactions with each other, I present
a model centered around these three types of variability within the language system as the
ingredients for a neurocognitive model of meaning variation.

1.4.1

Context-dependent lexical meaning

The ﬁrst level of variability is at the level of lexical structure, speciﬁcally manifesting as contextdependent lexical meaning, which is lexical meaning that is continuous or connected with its
contextual implementation. As described above in the ‘cat’ example, lexical items appear in
larger morphosyntactic, physical, and social contexts associated with complete communicative
acts; these contextualized lexical items are produced and comprehended by individuals, who
designed them with speciﬁc goals and interlocutors in mind. Recognizing these contextual
factors can help hone down the intended communication from the rich conceptual structure
chunk identiﬁed by a speciﬁc lexical item.
To implement this for the case of English have-sentences, in Chapter 2 I propose a novel
analysis of English have and have-sentences in which have encodes a generalized relational
meaning that encompasses locative and possessive meanings that is disambiguated by the degree of causality perceived in a given situation. The lexical analysis speciﬁcally sanctions the
role of context in the lexical meaning itself as a key contributor to the disambiguation between
the possible readings of the generalized relational meaning.

1.4.2

Conceptual gradience

The context-dependence of lexical meaning serves the variability in its underlying conceptual
structure, which is inherently gradient due to the rich set of gradient percepts that create it, in
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contrast to a view of conceptual meaning as a memorized list of atomic units. This means that
often-atomized linguistic categories, such as locative or possessive relations, or even causality,
are grown out of gradient distributions of underlying percepts rather than being categorical
and homogeneous.
To implement this for the case of English have-sentences, in Chapter 3 I propose a gradient
conceptual infrastructure (GCI) that organizes all the conceptually possible relational meanings in a structured fashion, which in turn gives rise to its attested crosslinguistic typological,
diachronic, and developmental patterns. Its gradience emerges from the intersection of two
independently studied conceptual features.

1.4.3

Cognitive variability

The use of a context-dependent lexical meaning with a communicative purpose is constrained
by the properties of a given communicator’s cognitive system, which is inherently variable
across populations along a number of dimensions. Accordingly, linguistic variation is rooted,
at least in part, the variable cognitive style of a speaker/comprehender, speciﬁcally in how an
individual is able to make use of contextual information to facilitate downstream processing.
To implement this, in Chapter 4 I motivate a cognitive dimension of variability targeting
an individual’s ability to make use of contextual information and identify an independently
arising psychometric tool to quantify it. The ability is linguistic context-sensitivity, deﬁned as the
capacity of a neurocognitive linguistic system to identify and integrate information from the
communicative context required by the lexical meaning of a given expression in that context
(Zhang et al., 2022).
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1.4.4

Meaning variation emerges out of the real-time implementation of the three ingredients

These three ingredients together serve as the origin of meaning variation; the actuation of
variation takes place during the real-time implementation of context-dependent lexical meanings by individual speaker/comprehenders, whose different degrees of context-sensitivity differentially highlight different parts of the broader conceptual structure invoked by the lexical
structure used. That is to say, conceptual structure identiﬁed by lexical structures and context cooperate in real-time by modulating the salience of possible readings of an ambiguous
have-sentence; the way that individuals are able to do this contextually guided comprehension
process gives rises to structured variation in the meanings associated with the lexical item have.
This model of meaning variation is neuropsychologically grounded, allowing for neuropsychological research techniques to assess its viability. In particular, the linguistic analysis of the
meaning of have generates real-time processing predictions that can be tested, grounding the
linguistic behavior of the lexical item into the actual function of the psychological system.

1.5

Structure of the dissertation

The layout of the dissertation follows from the layout of the three ingredients for a model
of meaning variation and their interaction during real-time language processing. In Chapter 2, I delineate the semantic repertoire of have and propose a linguistic analysis of have as
a generalized causal relation meaning, which can be disambiguated by explicit lexical or contextual strategies; I also present Study 1a, which shows that bare locative have-sentences are
acceptable to native speakers with the right context, the ﬁrst evidence supporting this analysis.
In Chapter 3, I model the underlying conceptual structure as a continuous space using two
conceptual features underlying the perception and evaluation of causality, and show how this
gradient conceptual infrastructure accounts for widespread crosslinguistic lexicalization and
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grammaticalization patterns of relational meanings. Crucially, have is situated as yet another
crosslinguistically regular linguistic instantiation of this conceptual meaning, rather than an
anomalous problem of meaning variation. In Chapter 4, I introduce a dimension of cognitive variability, linguistic context-sensitivity, that predicts the degree to which comprehenders
show the contextual facilitation of have-sentences (Study 1b), and a novel psychometric tool
for quantifying this variability.
In Chapter 5, I then tie together the three ingredients of a model of meaning variation
compositionally and outline the real-time processing predictions generated from the linguistic
analysis. In Chapters 6 and 7, I present two real-time processing studies that bear out the
predictions of my analysis in that the comprehension of locative have-sentences is a standard
semantic contextualization operation and not one of syntactic repair Studies 2 and 3. Furthermore, the degree to which individual comprehenders performed this semantic contextualization correlated with their scores on the measure of linguistic context-sensitivity. In Chapter 8, I present results from a neuroimaging that further illuminate the processing proﬁle of
have-sentences as a normal process of lexico-conceptual composition paired with semantic contextualization, as well as ground the linguistic representation of location and causality in neural
function (Study 4). Furthermore, in both brain measures, comprehenders showed variability
in the degree to which they relied on compositional or contextualization for comprehending
these have-sentences; the degree of context-sensitivity predicted divergent speaker-strategies
in assessing the boundary between and making use of lexical and contextual meaning.
In sum, the dissertation shows that the phenomenon of language and meaning variation is
rooted in the structure of the mind. Lexical structures identify rich conceptual structures in an
underspeciﬁed way, by virtue of their respective natures. Individuals deploy these structures
in context with communicative intent; the formulation and interpretation of this composite
message is subject to their individual cognitive styles and degree of context-sensitivity. Only
through the variable real-time implementation of these linguistic structures can meaning vari18

ation emerge. The contributions, uniqueness/novelty, and takeaways of this dissertation all
stem from the neurocognitive grounding of this linguistic model of meaning variation.
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Part I
Ingredients for a model of meaning
variation
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2.1

Introduction

In this chapter, I introduce the ﬁrst component of the model of meaning variation, which is
a context-dependent lexical semantics. I present data illustrating the meaning variability observed in English have-sentences as well as the key analyses proposed thus far to account for
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such variability (§2.2). In this milieu, I situate my own lexical-semantic proposal in which English have lexicalizes a single relational meaning that captures the degree of causal potential between two entities (§2.3). Crucially, this proposal predicts that the meaning of a have-sentence
is context-dependent; I support this prediction with an experimental study showing that relevant context can facilitate otherwise dispreferred readings of have-sentences (§2.4). I discuss
the linguistic consequences of the main implications of how the act of communicating a havesentence is an active contextual-modulation strategy. This last discussion leads to the second
and third components of the model of meaning variation: a gradient underlying conceptual
structure, which constrains the lexical semantics (Chapter 3), and systematic variability within
a speech community in how individuals make use of context (Chapter 4).

The (too?) many meanings of English have

2.2

While the verb have is typically understood to be the canonical device to express possession
relations in English, it is well-known that have’s meaning is highly variable. In (4-6), I present
a few examples from some recent linguistic investigations of English have, labeled with their
respective authors’ categorizations, to illustrate this point.
(4)

From Ritter and Rosen (1997)
a.

John has a hat on today. [Locational]

b. John has a sister. [Inalienable possession]
c.
(5)

John has a new car. [Alienable possession]

From Sæbø (2009)
a.

The vinyl shop has all the latest releases on vinyl. [“the ‘true verb’ have”]

b. My father has the farm next to the pub. [“the ‘true verb’ have”]
c.

America has enough enemies as it is. [“existential have”]

d. You have a rich daddy and a good-lookin’ mama. [“existential have”]
23

(6)

From Myler (2014)
a.

John has a Playstation 3. [Ownership]

b. John has a sister. [Kinship]
c.

John has blue eyes. [Body part]

d. The stadium has two pubs ﬂanking it. [Locative]
e.

This table has four sturdy legs. [Part-Whole]

f.

John has a cold. [Disease]

g.

John has a great deal of resilience. [Attribute]

Myler (2016) describes such lexical semantic variability as a “too many meanings puzzle,”
characterizing the distribution of have-sentences as “a possession construction that can convey a myriad of unrelated meanings, like kinship, body parts, permanent ownership, abstract
attributes, etc.” He extends this puzzle to other languages, noting that such variability is observed crosslinguistically with have-type possessive devices. In my view, such widespread patterns suggest a re-framing of the situation from a different perspective. What are the situations that can be described using have-sentences and why do they cluster together in a way that
matches have’s counterparts in languages across the world? I now address the ﬁrst question by
identifying an exhaustive list of the ways in which have is used in English, and a unifying lexicalsemantic analysis for them. The second question about underlying conceptual infrastructure
that organizes these meanings will be addressed in Chapter 3.

2.2.1

The possible meaning space of have

The purpose of the following section is to delineate the boundaries of a possible meaning space
for have, by identifying a comprehensive list of its uses. Furthermore, I take the assumption
that all such meanings are conceptually licensed uses of have, and that all of them must be
accounted for in any given lexical analysis.
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Synchronic meanings of have-sentences
I begin by presenting, in (7) the main categories of have sentences, as identiﬁed by the Oxford
English Dictionary:
(7)

Principal denotations of have (have, OED Online, 2015)
a.

To come into possession of, and related senses

b. To experience, and related senses
c.

To keep, hold, or maintain (with respect to a state or action), and related senses

d. To cause to come or become, and related senses.
e.

As an auxiliary verb, used with the past participle of another verb to form the perfect.

f.

With to-inﬁnitive, in senses corresponding to MUST V.

The ﬁrst category is noted explicitly in the OED entry to encompass “a range of senses,
from permanent possession (as in I have a house) to temporary access to something, whether
owned or not (as in do you have a pen?).” Within it, I identify ﬁve sub-categories, based on
well-described conceptual and linguistic relations, such as alienable vs. inalienable possession
and location; the ﬁnal set is presented below in (8), alongside the most recent examples in the
OED entry.
(8)

From the Oxford English Dictionary (have, OED Online, 2015)
a.

Part-whole - Ordinary interest, interested calculated on the basis of a year having
only 360 days.

b. Kinship - I also had four sisters, which means I grew up with the right attitude
towards women.
c.

Ownership- I’d like to have a really good job, a nice car, a nice house.

d. Control - I’ll bet she has her spice rack arranged in alphabetical order.
e.

Location/proximity - I thanked him and told him he had a dog turd on his shoe.

f.

Experience1 - I had weird dreams last night.

1

I include in this category the so-called ‘light verb’ uses of have, e.g. have a chat, have a bath based on the
OED organization; light verbs have been analyzed differently in terms of their semantic composition, in that
they contribute Aktionsart to a deverbal noun (see Wittenberg and Piñango, 2011; Wittenberg et al., 2014).
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g.

Causative - The Federalist party had him before the bar of the house and tried to
expel him.

h. Auxiliary (perfect) - Too much political change has lowered morale.
i.

Modal (deontic) - You will have to enter the username and password that corresponds to your account.

The diachronic context
In order to understand any possible structure within the set of have-sentences, I turn to potential diachronic evidence. The various meanings of have are typically understood to have
entered the language relatively wholesale during the later Old English period (Hayase, 2000;
Abend, 2006); within Modern English, they do not show any sort of diachronic patterning.
The earliest attestations of have, as ‘to grasp/hold’ lie in the 9th century AD, and are restricted
to direct physical contact and manual control. By the end of the ﬁrst millennium, however,
the full range of possessive-related, causative, light verb, and modal uses are documented in
have-sentences (Traugott, 1999; Cameron et al., 2018). The loss of the direct physical contact
constraint follows known patterns of semantic bleaching in a variety of domains (Deo, 2015b).
The auxiliary uses of have do not have a clear origin, but may have entered the language after
the Norman conquest of 1066, which marks the beginning of Middle English and the inﬂuence of Romance through Anglo-Norman. The OED notes that have is connected to both
the German habban and the Anglo-Norman/Old French aver, which shared some possessive
meanings but was a key auxiliary verb; the period of Norman occupancy is understood to have
contributed semantic inﬂuence from aver to habban, giving rise to the contemporary semantic
variability of have. Figure 2.1 shows the oldest attested example for each of the meaning types
in (8), contextualized in the timeline with key landmarks in the development of the English
language.
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Figure 2.1: Timeline of ﬁrst attestation of each have-sentence meaning from the OED.
Overall, I take the relative stability in the semantic variability of have-sentences over the
past millennium to indicate the “core-ness” of these meanings of have; that is, it is not the case
that any one meaning emerged clearly out of another as a recent development.2 I return to
this point later on in the chapter, in §3.2, when discussing well-described diachronic grammaticalization pathways that encompass these meanings. Without a clear diachronic pattern to
structure the meaning variability, I turn to other evidence to identify possible sub-groupings
within this set.

2.2.2

A taxonomy of meanings

The ﬁrst step toward understanding the variability across a single lexical item’s meanings is by
identifying major groupings within the set. The ﬁrst taxon I identify is the widely reported
location-possession-existence (LPE) group of meanings (Lyons, 1967), motivated by two linguistic distinctions. At a comparative level, languages across the world encode the notions of
2

That said, the mere existence of these readings at a speciﬁc historical point does not necessarily rule out
the possibility of a diachronic trajectory: Fuchs (2020) shows a diachronic pathway based on changes in the
relative frequency of usage, rather than the absolute presence or absence of a reading at some point in time. This
approach is a possible avenue of future work into the diachronicity of English have.
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location and possession using a single morphosyntactic form (Clark, 1978; Freeze, 1992; Stassen,
2009, a.o.). This crosslinguistic lexical conﬂation, manifested as morphological syncretism, is
attested in Indo-European, Finno-Ugric, Australian, Dravidian, African, Sino-Tibetan, and indigenous American languages (Aristar, 1996; Heine, 1997; Tham, 2004); such a widespread
pattern of syncretism suggests that these LPE meanings could be connected at a deeper, conceptual level, rather than a genetically descended linguistic mechanism (Clark, 1973; Jackendoff,
1990; Clark, 2004; Koch, 2012). At a syntactic level, have’s LPE meanings share a core NP-VNP structure, with an optional PP, whereas have’s other uses have two verbs (Causative - I
had my kid walk the dog, Auxiliary I have walked the dog, and Modal I have to walk the dog). The
Experience/light verb use of have does not directly take another verb, but the second NP in
the construction represents some sort of event (I had a party, I had a bath), consistent with
the understanding that light verbs take as their complement a deverbal noun, which is a noun
with the meaning of a verb (Wittenberg and Piñango, 2011). More generally, the distinction
between have’s LPE and other meanings is whether its complement is a conceptual entity or
event.
Relational uses
I will refer to the so-called location-possession-existence (LPE) meanings as relational uses
of have, as they directly specify the relationship between the two entities in a have-sentence.
Starting from Lyons (1967), much work has investigated the lexicalization patterns of these
meanings in English, which revolve principally around have and be, with the former expressing
locative and possessive relations, and the latter expressing locative and existential relations.
While Lyons (1967) notes that the speciﬁc contribution of have as a lexical item is not clear
in English, similar forms in Latin, Russian, Mandarin Chinese, and numerous other languages
illustrate the larger idea that the expression of location, possession, and existence are inextricably connected in many of the world’s languages. This analytical difficulty has not yet been
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resolved in subsequent efforts to propose a single syntactic structure for have (Myler (2016)
describing Freeze, 1992; Kayne, 1993; Harley, 1997; Stassen, 2009, a.o.).
While these relational meanings have often been categorized into subgroups like alienable possession, part-whole, or location, these readings are not always clearly categorizable.
I present in (9) a number of these relations between a variety of nominals using the English
genitive ’s, the other canonical possessive device in the language.
(9)

a.

Sue’s chair is broken. (in a waiting room)

b. Sue’s chair is broken. (in her office)
c.

Sue’s school is down the street.

d. The chauffeur’s car is in the shop right now. (the car driven by the chauffeur)
e.

Sue’s car is in the shop right now. (the car owned by Sue)

f.

Sue’s cat is sick.

g.

Sue’s haircut is really striking.

h. Sue’s hair is turning gray.
i.

Sue’s unborn baby is kicking a lot these days.

j.

Sue’s heart is mildly hypertrophic.

k. Sue’s liver is taking a beating from all her drinking.
l.

Sue’s daughter is very independent, she wants nothing to do with Sue.

m. Sue’s daughter is her best friend.
n. The car’s hood is dented.
These minimally differing sentences illustrate porous boundaries between the categories
of, say, control vs. ownership, incidental proximity vs. non-incidental proximity, alienable
possession vs. part-whole, etc., illustrating lexical ambiguity within this cluster of meanings.
The takeaway from these examples is that there may be a gradient relationship between locative and possessive meanings (where does location end and possession begin?), in contrast to
the way that relational have seems to differ categorically from auxiliary or light verb have.
Notably, have has not been described to permit the expression of existential relations. Here,
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(10a-b) show a direct mismatch between the use of be and have with expletive subjects for an
existential, while the “transformationally related” (Lyons, 1967) have-sentence seems to convey
a locative relation. The difference between existence and location has been a topic of debate
also for philosophers of language (Kahn, 1966).
(10)

Existential have
a.

There is a bear in the meadow. vs. *There has a bear in the meadow. vs. The meadow
has a bear (in it).

b. There are bears (in North America) vs. North America has bears.
However, have-type verbs across the world’s languages, like Mandarin you (11-12), typically
do permit a parallel structure for existential and locative relations. (Koch, 2012)
(11)

Existential you
a.

you yi ben shu
you one CL book
‘There is a book.’

(12)

Locative you
a.

zhuozi- shang you yi ben shu
table- on
you one CL book

b. you yi ben shu zai zhuozi- shang
you one CL book at table- on
‘There is a book on the table.’
Accordingly, I take the unavailability of the be-like existential have-sentence3 to result from
an English language-speciﬁc lexical requirement for two non-expletive arguments, rather than
a conceptual division between the existential and locative meanings. In contrast, the have-type
3

This distinction is also related to an information structural parameter–the rheme/theme distinction–which
I discuss below in Section 2.3.
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verb you in Mandarin, which does not require the same argument structure, accommodates all
three LPE forms.
It is clear that the lexical item have shows meaning variability within this group of relational
meanings; I take this meaning cluster to be the “core” meanings of have, similar to ‘the “true
verb’ have” meanings described by Sæbø (2009). Moving forward, I focus on these relational
uses of have (excluding existentials) here in Chapter 2.
Non-relational uses
I take the non-relational have-sentences to be secondary; I brieﬂy describe these meanings
here.
Causative have-sentences, shown in (13), take the form NP-have-NP-VP and convey a situation where the subject compels through some means the object to perform some action (Ritter
and Rosen, 1991).
(13)

Causative have, reproduced from Ritter and Rosen (1991)
a.

Sheila had Ralph pick up the kids.

b. Margaret had Dennis wash the car.
c.

Brian had George call up the reserves.

These causatives are sometimes separated into adversative (14) and benefactive4 (15) uses,
though the boundaries between these and so-called experiencer have-sentences (16) are not
well-deﬁned or understood (Tantos, 2009).
(14)

Adversative: The breakup had me upset for a whole month.

4

There exists a discussion in the literature regarding the relationship between possession and benefaction
(Pinker, 1989; Croft, 1991; Goldberg, 1995; Heine, 1997; Lichtenberk, 2002); while some claim a direct grammaticalization pathway from benefaction to possession, others take the two meanings to be separate, and connected
through mechanisms like metaphor. For the purposes here, I retain the separation of causative/benefactive havesentences from core possessive have-sentences.
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(15)

Benefactive: The driver had the car washed for me.

(16)

Experiencer: The biologist had all her mice die on her.
Moreover, well-reported light-verb uses of have (17) are not clearly distinguishable, semanti-

cally, from experiencer have-sentences, though of course their syntactic forms differ. Crucially,
light-verb have seems to only be able to convey a passive experiencer role, unlike, say, make (18)
(Wittenberg and Piñango, 2011; Wittenberg et al., 2014).
(17)

a.

Harry had an operation/accident/massage.

b. *Fanny had a kick/stab/punch/kiss at Gerry.
(18)

a.

Harry made an order. (=gave)

b. Harry had an order. (=received)
The remaining two uses of have-sentences both directly take as a complement another verb
form: have is used to express perfective aspect independent of tense (19), with a past participle
of another verb (Falk, 2008), as well as a deontic modal,5 with an inﬁnitival form of another
verb (20).
(19)

Auxiliary have
a.

I have already eaten today.

b. I had already eaten.
c.

I will have left by the time you get here.

5

There also exists a discussion in the literature regarding the relationship between possession and modal
necessity (Bjorkman and Cowper, 2016; Cowper and Hall, 2017), arising from parallels in their syntactic and
semantic composition algorithms. Again, for the purposes here, I retain the separation of these modal uses from
the core relational have-sentences, and take up this question in Chapter 4.
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(20)

Modal have
a.

I have to eat lunch before 1pm today. (=must)

Again, these kinds of have-sentences I take to lie outside of the core LPE meaning space,
which is shared by have and have-type verbs crosslinguistically.

2.2.3

Approaches toward lexicalizing meaning variability

Turning back to the “core” relational (locative-possessive) have-sentences, we see a clear example of a one lexical structure-to-many meanings mapping. Though it may be difficult–Myler
(2016), as the most comprehensive recent analysis of have, describes this as a “too many meanings” problem–the puzzle lies in understanding how to account for such a pattern in a principled way. Generally, there are two logical approaches to understanding any one-to-manymapping problem: underspeciﬁcation, which involves outsourcing the complexity or plurality
in meanings to another system and maintaining a single lexical entry, or overspeciﬁcation,
which involves postulating multiple lexical entries to cover the multiple meanings
Both kinds of approaches have been explored in the literature, though a better characterization of the existing work is perhaps by degree of underspeciﬁcation. By this, I mean that
all approaches recognize the meaning variability of have-sentences and the broader locationpossession-existence domain, but place the variability “burden” in different areas: either increasing the number of phonologically identical lexical forms, or conversely, the number of
external (to the lexical item) sources of these meanings. These proposals range from a single,
completely meaningless have that acts simply as an identity function for a wide array of predicates to a theoretically unlimited number of different lexical items, sharing the same phonological form have, that each express a different meaning. The former proposal family (described
in §2.2.3 below) represents the dominant or status quo account by virtue of the history, recency,
and depth of its constituent proposals.
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Directly below, I brieﬂy summarize the two poles of this spectrum, as well as a few proposals that lie in key intermediate positions–this characterization serves a similar purpose as the
monosemist-polysemist-homonymist idealization of multifunctionality presented in Haspelmath (2003). I note, however, that these proposals by and large are not necessarily investigating the source of these meaning clusters in English and across languages, and instead, have
separate foci, such as identifying a common syntactic structure for English auxiliary verbs or
characterizing typological variation within this domain. Accordingly, some of the differences
in the proposals are due to questions external to the meaning variability problem. The purpose
of this summary is to provide a context for my approach, which is a reframing of the question
as addressing the underlying source and motivation for these meaning clusters, rather than
addressing the speciﬁc algorithmic mechanisms for composing have-sentences syntactically or
semantically. I take this former question to be the primary focus of this chapter: why do locative and possessive relations get encoded by English have and have-type verbs across the world’s
languages? What about the meaning of have enables it to convey this cluster of meanings?
Unlimited meanings, unlimited (related) lexical entries
At one end of the spectrum lies the overspeciﬁcation approach, which has sought to enumerate
the plurality of meanings of have-sentences and of the location-possession domain. This approach takes as its fundamental assumption that the process of lexicalization will inherently result in one-to-many meaning mappings, and can capture either cases of related (smoke: to cook
a ﬁsh using smoke vs. to inhale smoke produced by a cigarette) and unrelated (bank: the piece of
land abutting a river vs. the ﬁnancial entity) meanings. This overspeciﬁcation, in fact, is rather
a case of one-to-one speciﬁcation; each meaning associated with a have-sentence is assigned
a separate, but potentially related, lexical entry (21). While Jackendoff (1983) describes the
possibility of an underlying shared infrastructure for relational (location-possession-existence)
meanings, later work and conversation has made it clear that his view takes have to be a case of
34

simple polysemy, where the actual lexical meanings are stored in separate lexical entries that
share a common phonological form (Jackendoff, 1997, Jackendoff, 2019, personal communication).
(21)

a.

Sue haslocative a hat on today.

b. Sue haskinship a sister.
c.

Sue hasownership a new car.

This analysis derives from attempting to characterize the semantic variability of havesentences, and does not address issues of economy and parsimony in language, as the cost
to polysemy and homonymy is increased demands on contextualization during real-time production and comprehension as well as on the long-term memory aspect of the mental lexicon.
Crucially, it does not address the question of the underlying conceptual infrastructure that
would permit and/or promote such lexical polysemy–it only states that have is polysemous:
speciﬁcally, that there is a proximity have, a part-whole have, a locative have, etc. (Jackendoff,
2019, p. c.).
Four meanings, one lexical entry
In a similar way, a number of other approaches have characterized a more intermediate case,
whereby have in English and have-type sentences across languages are able to lexicalize in different ways four discrete categories of meanings: ownership, possession, location, and existence
(Clark, 1978; Bickerton, 1981; Koch, 2012). In this case, these four meanings are ontologically
separate but connected through metaphor; that is, possession can be thought of as metaphorical location, in the same way that spatial adpositions are often harnessed within a language
to describe time. Speciﬁcally, the proposal here is that these meanings form a composite semantic space, reproduced from Koch (2012) in Figure 2.2, whereby adjacent meanings can be
lexicalized within a language, and that typological variation follows from such an underlying
layout (Clark, 1978; Bickerton, 1981).
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Figure 2.2: A semantic space for ownership–possession–location–existence (Koch, 2012).

OWNERSHIP LOCATION
POSSESSION EXISTENCE
These proposals are typological investigations of relational meanings and seek to map out
the possible crosslinguistic patterns of lexicalization for these meanings. While they do shed
insight on the ways in which different languages lexically conﬂate meanings associated with
have-type sentences, again, they do not directly address the question of what about the content
of the meanings themselves allows such lexical groupings. That is, they take the entire space
to represent relational meanings, but rely on metaphor alone to explain how the meanings are
related and take the crosslinguistic patterns to result from descent or contact. The takeaway
from these approaches is a more constrained conceptual inventory for the meanings of havesentences than the Jackendoffian approach described above.
One meaning, one lexical entry
The next family of proposals is a stronger instantiation of the aforementioned idea: instead
of four categories of meanings, these approaches conceptualize all the relational meanings as
modiﬁed or marked forms of location, represented roughly as x is at y (Heine, 1997; DeLancey,
2000; Baron and Herslund, 2001).6 What differentiates the readings of speciﬁc have-sentences
are the “relative salience” of the two arguments, an evaluation made based on argumentinherent and contextually relevant properties, like animacy (Heine, 1997, 2001). However, each
of these proposals breaks down the single meaning into categorical components: Baron and
Herslund (2001) proposes three sub-categories of the larger locational meaning while Heine
6

While Payne (2009) presents data showing complete lexical categoricalization between locative and possessive meanings in Maa (Nilotic) and argues therefore for at least two categories of meanings, I consider her
proposal to lie in this family, as complete lexical categoricalization is not necessarily indicative of an underlying
conceptual division, as I will discuss further in Sections 2.3 and 2.6.
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(1997) proposes eight. In my view, though these proposals claim to have one underlying meaning, they in fact deﬁne a categorical number of meanings which, in the case of Baron and Herslund (2001), are not clearly locational. For example, the second of the three sub-meanings for
the local relation have is characterized as “the object noun denotes part of the subject noun’s
possessions (e.g. house —Charles), which is typically the case when the subject is animate and
the object is a non-relational noun.” As a result, they do not address the actual uniﬁcation of
these meanings, and instead, provide another set of precise characterizations of the various
meanings of have-sentences.
Status quo: no meaning, one lexical entry
At the other end of the spectrum lies a group of proposals that takes a single lexical entry
for have, but eliminates the meanings of have-sentences entirely. The semantic elimination
approach is motivated by the fact that have, and have-type verbs cross-linguistically, is used as
an auxiliary verb alongside the copula be. These approaches have sought to identify a uniﬁed
syntax and semantics for auxiliary verbs in structure-building, rather than trying to account for
the meaning variability of have-sentences, and represent the dominant theoretical framework
for the discussion of have-sentences by virtue of representation in the literature.
Noting that auxiliary verbs do not contribute their own semantics to a sentence (and instead, are the carriers of tense, aspect, and modality morphology), Freeze (1992) and Kayne
(1993), among others, claim that have is a semantically null copula with an extra argument position representing a location–essentially a transitive form of be. I hereby name this family of
proposals the “transitive copula” account for English have. This enriched “transitive copula”
refers to a syntax that is derived from the structure of a copula and adds some other information, e.g. another functional projection, that adds only syntactic structure and is radically
underspeciﬁed with respect to semantics.7 Hoekstra, in Cinque and Kayne (1994), names have
7

I employ this nomenclature also to underscore the semantic emptiness of this family of accounts.
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explicitly as the transitive form of be. Similarly, Ritter and Rosen (1997) reduce the lexical
item to a copula that permits the insertion of an extra argument as a second functional projection. In this analysis, the auxiliaries be and have differ minimally in the number of functional
projections; have consequently permits the expression of transitive predicates.8
The basis for a transitive copula analysis of have in English stems from have’s properties as
an auxiliary: Kayne (1993), à la Benveniste (1966), analyzes haveaux as an evolutionary parallel to
haveposs and concludes that the alternation between the two auxiliaries (have and be) in English
is determined by the properties of its participial clause complement. Though both auxiliaries
are semantically underspeciﬁed, English have is equivalent to the copula be with an abstract
preposition (expressed through a copular feature, [+LOC]) (Freeze, 1992), as in (22).
(22)

Larkee-kee paas kuttaa hai.
[Hindi]
boy.OBL-GEN PROX dog COP.3SG.PRES-[+LOC]
The boy has a dog.
The have as be+LOC analysis connects to the location-centric approach of the aforemen-

tioned proposals, but again does not explain nor account for why possessive meanings can be
expressed with a be+LOC structure.
Further work in this line of thought has gone further to semantically eliminate the meaning of have, by proposing that have is completely meaningless (λx.x, according to Myler (2016)).
Consequently, the various meanings of have-sentences derive from a series of silent functional
projections in the syntax, speciﬁcally in the domain of the second DP in a have-sentence (Ritter and Rosen, 1997; Sæbø, 2009; Harley and Jung, 2015; Myler, 2016). Myler (2016) proposes
that the underspeciﬁed have takes the syntactic form of a light verb (little-v) that differs minimally from the light verb be by the placement of a missing argument of the vP complement in
8

Crucially, I do not take this transitive copula nomenclature to imply that have participates syntactic behaviors,
like passivization, that are part of transitivity as a whole, but use the name solely to refer to this “extra syntactic
argument relative to be” approach advanced by this family of approaches.
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the Spec position of VoiceP. This argument is able to “house” a covert functional projection
that contributes the speciﬁc meaning to a have-sentence. For example, ownership-type have
sentences get their meanings from a silent PossP, locative-type have-sentences get their meanings from a silent or overt locative PredP, and control-type have-sentences get their meanings
from a silent or overt “with x” PredP, to name a few (Myler, 2016).
The three representative proposals presented below in Table 2.1 can be generalized to a
have=be+x type, where x represents an additional argument or feature added to the structure
of be, hence the ‘have = transitive be’ transitive copula nomenclature.9
In a sense, this spectrum has come full circle to match with the ﬁrst proposal of unlimited
lexical entries, in that both posit a theoretically unlimited number of linguistic units to capture
the multiplicity of meanings. Myler’s framing of the puzzle of have, the “too many meanings
problem”, suggests that, in his view, there is no reason whatsoever to account for this variability in the use of a single lexical item, have, and no principled way to do so. He states in
2014, regarding his work and its precedents, “All of these [too many meanings] problems are
eliminated if have is instead taken to be meaningless. The further an analysis pushes the idea
that have is meaningless, the more successful it turns out to be.” (p. 260).
9

For my own proposal of a syntactic structure for have, see §2.3.2.
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Table 2.1: Syntactic structures for Have
Syntax of Be

Syntax of Have
IP

IP

I′

XP

I′

XP

Source

I

I YP

[+LOC]

YP

Freeze
(1992);
Kayne
(1993)

F1P
F1′

XP

F2′

YP

F1′

XP

F2P

F1

F1P

F2 asdf

F1 YP

Ritter
and
Rosen
(1997)

VoiceP

Voice{}

Argi of Comp Voice{D}

vP
v
be

voice′

DP

VoiceP

vP
v
have

Comp

Comp
One Argi missing

PP/ApplP

Note: Key differences between the syntactic
representations of be and have are in bold.
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Myler
(2016)

2.2.4

The value of meaning

The meaning of location, possession, and existence, expressed through have-sentences in English or otherwise crosslinguistically, are universal to the human language system and have,
commensurately, been investigated in a variety of ways with a variety of goals. Here, I have
provided a brief characterization of a spectrum of proposals based on their consequences for
the behavior of lexicalization (which is not the majority’s intended goal), and not based on the
details of each theoretical framework.
I do not consider any of these proposals to be wrong; instead, I take them to be addressing
different questions with different goals, resulting in consequences for other lines of inquiry
probing the same linguistic phenomena. In particular, one consequence of the uniﬁcation of
have and be, and consequently the bleaching of have, from Freeze to Myler is a purported erasure of an entire body of detailed accounting of locative, possessive, and existential meanings
and the ways in which they are lexically encoded. Because the variability emerges from to an
unspeciﬁed number of different covert syntactic structures that compose with the identity
function have, it remains to be understood why these meanings do indeed cluster together
in have-sentences in English, and in similar sentences cross-linguistically. Speciﬁcally, if have
is a transitive copula with the semantic denotation λx.x, why is it the case that it expresses
meanings of only existence, location, and possession types? These complete underspeciﬁcation approaches ignore the systematic meaning patterns that do exist, as a byproduct of the
pursuit of a different goal.
Most importantly, none of these accounts provides an explanation for the distribution of
have’s many meanings, the seemingly gradient relationships between them, or makes predictions about how speakers and comprehenders use these sentences (since these were not part
of their respective agendas). My view of the human language faculty is that its principal goal
is to communicate meaning–lexical, linguistic, social, and otherwise–to our peers. I take the
meanings themselves to have a level of import distinct from the speciﬁc structures through
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which meaning can be conveyed, and accordingly, place the focus back on the meaning of the
lexical item have.
Instead of attempting to account for the semantic distribution of have as a by-product of
its syntactic representation (and concluding there is no semantic content), I focus my investigation of the meaning of have and have-sentences on the meaning of have and have-sentences
themselves. That is, instead of casting the puzzle of English have as a “too many meanings”
(for one lexical item to convey) situation that does not clearly deﬁne the many meanings, I ask:
what about these meanings themselves (versus other meanings) allows them to be captured by
a single lexical item?
More broadly, I see two larger issues that remain unsolved. The ﬁrst is the issue of categoricality vs. continuity–how many discrete categories do you need in order to account for
a potentially gradient meaning continuum, without overburdening the model? This is a parsimony optimization problem. The second is understanding the cost of storage and implementation of these discrete units: what are the cognitive implications of acquiring and storing
a theoretically unlimited number of covert syntactic heads or related lexical entries both to
the memorial component of the mental lexicon and to the real-time implementation of expressions of relational meanings? In my proposal, I hope to address both of these issues by
providing a conceptually grounded analysis of the variability in the meanings of have-sentences
and a cognitively grounded account of how they interact with their linguistic contexts.

2.2.5

Approach: Conceptual uniﬁcation

My analysis for English have-sentences represents a new approach toward understanding their
observed variability: rather than arguing for a speciﬁc set of categorical meanings, my approach seeks to understand why and how these many readings are connected as a single, uniﬁed
meaning. Instead of outsourcing the variability in meaning to covert syntactic conﬁgurations
or accumulating them through polysemy, I will show how these readings are lexically and
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conceptually structured in a way that explains the semantic variability observed in English
have-sentences and situates it as a regular language-speciﬁc instantiation of a crosslinguistically
frequent phenomenon, rather than an anomalous semantic puzzle.
This approach lies generally within the “one meaning, one lexical entry” family of proposals described above, except that instead of proposing a set of sub-meanings within one
“location” meaning, my view is that have (a) contributes a generalized meaning that is
adaptable to a variety of situations but in a systematic way, rather than being completely vacuous, and (b) lexicalizes a uniﬁed, underlying conceptual infrastructure
for relational meanings. In a nutshell, I propose that have has a uniﬁed meaning of a causal
potential relation between two entities, and that the resulting readings of have-sentences are
conceptually principled and crosslinguistically consistent. In contrast, the status quo, transitive
copula account proposes that have is completely meaningless and that the readings of havesentences are not systematic or uniﬁable but, instead, are determined by language-speciﬁc
covert syntactic mechanisms.
Accordingly, my proposal comprises three main components. The ﬁrst (§2.3.1) is a uniﬁed
lexical semantics for have which (a) captures in a conceptually uniﬁed way the relational meanings of have-sentences as a generalized causal potential relation and (b) also accounts for the
non-relational meanings of have-sentences. The second (§2.3.2) is a lexical item representation, capturing the sound, form, and meaning of have, rooted in a processing model that gives
rise to predictions about the psychological reality of have-sentences. And the third (Ch. 3) is
the conceptual infrastructure that underlies the uniﬁed relational meanings. Directly below,
I present my lexical-semantic analysis of English have.
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2.3

Proposal: a uniﬁed meaning for English have

I now present a lexical-semantic analysis of English have that reconsiders the “too many meanings puzzle” as a conceptually uniﬁed single generalized relation between two entities. This
analysis lies within the “one meaning, one lexical entry” family and takes the various labels for
different readings of have-sentences to be ﬂavors of a single meaning: the relation or degree
of causal potential between two entities. This uniﬁed meaning can be speciﬁed with either explicit linguistic material or contextual information or implicit world knowledge; my account of
have’s “too many meanings” takes these meanings to be systematically related and conceptually
organized and consequently expressible by have in an ordinary way. In contrast, the transitive
copula account of have takes these meanings to be uncharacterizable using a single overt syntax for have and therefore uses covert syntactic mechanisms along with an identity function
to explain the observed semantic variability. While the target semantic variability is shared
across both accounts, fundamentally, the proposals differ in what meaning is associated with
the lexical item have: my proposal is that have has one generalized meaning characterizing
the relationship between two entities, while the transitive copula account takes have to be a
completely meaningless identity function.
The section is organized as follows: ﬁrst, I present a lexico-semantic conceptual structure
(LCS) representation of the word-meaning of English have, that shows how have lexicalizes
the degree of causal potential between two entities, that is, the locative-type and possessivetype meanings associated with have. Next, I present a representation of the entire lexical item,
consisting of sound, morphosyntax, and meaning information, and the consequences for a realtime and cognitively grounded implementation of have, that is, what are comprehenders doing
when they encounter a have-sentence? The transitive copula account for have, in contrast, does
not make predictions about how humans compose and comprehend have-sentences. Then, I
introduce a test case for the two competing accounts, namely locative have-sentences without
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a locative prepositional phrase, which I call “bare” locative have-sentences. I conclude with
an operationalized setup for an acceptability judgment study that assess the competing claims
on these test sentences, which I detail in the next section.

2.3.1

The meaning of have: a lexico-conceptual semantic analysis

I present a lexico-conceptual semantic analysis of have which shows how the various meanings
of have-sentences are organized around a generalized relation of the potential for causality
between two entities. Crucially, this analysis illustrates the units of meaning that must be
understood for the use of a have-sentence.
Conceptual causality as the basis of have
The key component of this analysis of have is a causative component. In this section, I highlight a handful of works from a large and incredibly rich literature on the nature of causality,
its manifestation through language, and its conceptual and psychological basis.
First off, what is the evidence for causality in have-sentences? The ﬁrst sign is the productive use of causative have-sentences (Butters and Stettler, 1986; Ritter and Rosen, 1991;
Inoue, 1995), as in (23), reproduced from (13) above, which show semantic equivalency to the
corresponding causative make-sentences. These sentences can also surface in a structure more
similar to that of the relational have-sentences, as in (24).10
(23)

Causative have
a.

Sheila had Ralph pick up the kids.

b. Margaret had Dennis wash the car.
c.
10

Brian had George call up the reserves.

See Gilquin (2003) for even further description of the wide range of possible causative have-sentences.
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(24)

a.

Sheila had the kids picked up.

b. Margaret had the car washed.
c.

Brian had the reserves called up.

While I describe these sentences as being outside of the relational domain, there is a longstanding claim that possession is rooted in causality, speciﬁcally, that possession is caused or
controlled location (Seiler, 1973; Hagège, 1993; Heine, 1997; Baron and Herslund, 2001; Stassen,
2009; Le Bruyn et al., 2016), as stated succinctly in Evans (1995): “X [the possessor] can expect Y [the possessee] to be in the same place as X when X wants, and X can do with Y what
X wants.” In fact, Belvin (1993) apply this idea directly to English by claiming that causative
have and possessive have are the same, in that have denotes a control relation which is dependent on the properties of the entities involved; these properties can give rise to the causative,
experiencer, and possessive relations encoded by have (see Belvin and Arnaiz, 1994; Belvin,
1996; Belvin and Den Dikken, 1997). The setup in which entities in a have-sentence carry information involving causality and control is paralleled in type-shifting accounts of possessive
sentences (see Barker, 1991; Vikner and Jensen, 2002; Storto, 2005, a.o.).
How does linguistic causality connect with conceptual causality? The conceptual semantics framework (see below) represents lexical causality as two connected events, “Event1 is
perceived as causing Event2 ” (Jackendoff, 2019), which is implicated in a variety of causative
constructions and corresponds to the traditional periphrastic causative construction in (25b,
25c, or 25d versus 25a). The surface structure of the last sentence corresponds most clearly
with the bi-eventive conceptual representation of causality.
(25)

Periphrastic causative have, from Levin and Hovav (1994)
a.

Antonia broke the vase.

b. Antonia made the vase break.
c.

Antonia caused the vase to break.

d. Antonia caused the breaking of the vase.
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What is the psychological basis of causality and its bi-event conceptual representation?
Causality is the percept that in a sequence of events, the ﬁrst event causes the second. The
key component of causality itself is temporal precedence, which stems most basically from
perception of a self-initiated movement followed by a second movement. The self-initiated
movement is understood to be emerging from a causal agent. Representing causality and causal
perception is a core cognition operation (Spelke and Kinzler, 2007; Carey, 2009), meaning that
it is not unique to human cognition, and presumably is the single primary cognitive capacity
universal to all organisms with nervous systems. The bi-eventive representation of causality
is in fact grounded in most elementary behavior of neurons through the principle of Hebbian
learning (spike-timing-dependent plasticity),which is commonly quoted as “Cells that ﬁre together wire together,” indicating that neurons that co-activate will develop a connection that
facilitates this co-activation over time. However, this maxim is slightly misleading, as even
Hebb himself stressed the importance that while one cell needs to “take part in the ﬁring” of
another, the basic mechanism is only triggered if the ﬁrst cell activates slightly before, and crucially not simultaneously, as the second. All this is to say that the psychological perception and
conceptual representation of causality emerges from the cellular level and manifests through
numerous aspects of the cognitive system beyond language, (see Scholl and Tremoulet, 2000,
a.o.).
How does conceptual causality give rise to linguistic causality? The connection between
causal motion and linguistic causality could play out as follows: causal motion and the potential for causal motion is interpreted by the cognitive system as agency, agency is lexicalized
or grammaticalized through animacy marking or is directly understood to be a property of a
subset of entities (namely humans and most animals), and animacy contributes to a possessive
readings of ambiguous relational markers (see §3.4), as the alienable/inalienable distinction is
often connected to animacy requirements. While this pathway is but one instantiation, the
connection between linguistic causality and conceptual causality is clear (see §3.3 for further
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discussion on the relationship between linguistic structure and conceptual structure).
This brief background on a causal component in have-sentences touch upon numerous
existing and future avenues of crossdisciplinary research, though the majority of them will not
be further discussed. The takeaway is that there is evidence for a conceptual component of
causality in the lexical meaning of have; the status of this component will resurface at numerous
points throughout the dissertation.
A conceptual semantics framework
Following Jackendoff (2019) (a summary of the framework detailed in Jackendoff, 1983, 1987;
Pinker, 1989; Jackendoff, 1990; Pustejovsky, 1995; Jackendoff, 2002, 2007; Pinker, 2007), I propose a uniﬁed lexico-semantic conceptual structure (LCS) for English have. These formalisms
from conceptual semantics are a tool to represent how domain-general conceptual structure
is lexicalized into linguistic units, and how the different components of a lexical meaning are
rooted in conceptual structure and connected together. Crucially, these LCS diagrams indicate what must be understood for a given meaning, not necessarily what must be said. The combinatorial units are few and compositionally simple:

SITUATIONS (EVENT

by conceptual functions (ACT/BE/GO/CAUSE) and take as arguments
MANNER

or

STATE)

are headed

THING, PATH/PLACE, PROPERTY,

or SITUATION.

The representation of the meaning of have
To start, I present the LCS of a prototypical locative relation (incidental proximity), which is
represented as an inherently transient situation of an

EVENT-type

(26). Speciﬁcally, this LCS

represents the meaning of an incidental proximity sentence as an “event at time t of a thing
being at a place.”
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(26)

LCS of incidental proximity (e.g. The book is on the table.)
Eventt
BE

PATH

THING

(the book)
AT

PLACE

(on) (the table)
The LCS of have can be built simply by nesting the LCS of location in the standard CAUSE
frame (27), which represents the meaning of a causal situation as “Event1 is perceived as causing
Event2 .” This LCS frame is independently motivated and is the canonical representation for
any causal component.
(27)

LCS CAUSE frame
Situation
CAUSE

Event2

Event1
ACT/GO/BE

THINGi

ACT/GO/BE

THINGj

The nesting of the incidental proximity (location) LCS into the CAUSE frame creates a uniﬁed LCS for representing all relational meanings, including possessive meanings (28). In this
LCS, the possessor is the causal Event1 actor, and a possessee is the Event2 actor. Speciﬁcally, this LCS represents the meaning of possession (THINGi has
THINGi

does causes THINGj to be in a speciﬁc location.”
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THINGj )

as “something that

(28)

LCS of possession (e.g. Sue has a book.)
Situation
CAUSE

Event2

Event1
ACT

THINGi

(Sue)

BE

PATH

THINGj

(a book)
AT

PLACE

Thus, what a fundamental possession relation means is not only locative at its core, but also
the obligatory control of a possessor over a possessee (and its location), coinciding with the
“enriched location” account of possession (e.g. Kayne, 1993). Below, I present a generalized LCS
for have (29), which shows the possible conﬁgurations for expressing the range of relational
meanings. The crucial component of this structure is the incorporation of both possessor and
location roles in the meaning of a have-sentence.
(29)

LCS for relational meanings in a have-sentence.
Situation
CAUSE

Event2

Event1
ACT

THINGi

(possessor/
controller)

BE

PATH

THINGj

(possessee/
controllee/
located)

AT

PLACE

(location)

This is the LCS representation that I propose for English have; retrieval of the lexical item
have retrieves this lexico-semantic conceptual structure representation.11 ,12 If this structure is
11

I describe the mechanics of the real-time processing of this LCS representation in Section 5.3.
Here, I provide the beginnings of a formal implementation with the broader goal of demonstrating notational
equivalency. Semantically, I deﬁne have as a relational meaning in which there is a core locative component as well
as a variable R for an additional relational meaning, as in (30). This machinery is a straightforward manifestation
of standard locative and relational semantics (see Storto, 2005; Peters and Westerståhl, 2013, a.o.) and also makes
use of an understood and not obligatorily spelled out location ℓ (Francez, 2007; Phillips, 2021, see).
12
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what have retrieves, then it logically follows that have should be able to express the wide variety
of locative and possessive meanings that are well-attested in the literature.
(30)

[[have]] = λye λxe .Loc(ye , ℓ) ∧ R(ye , xe )

I borrow from Karvovskaya (2018) the notion that the two possible relations (location and possession, in this
example) lie in a Horn scale in which Poss(x, y) is an informationally richer meaning than Loc(x, y), because it
entails the locative relation but also gives additional meaning in the form of a causal backstory (e.g. The car is on the
driveway vs. The car is on the driveway because Sue owns it). This presuppositional asymmetry (⟨ Loc(x, y), Poss(x, y)⟩
in the ⟨w, s⟩ form), which is context-dependent, therefore is subject to Heim’s Maximize Presupposition, corroborating the evidence from Study 1a (detailed in §2.4) that for a bare have-sentence, locative readings are highly
dispreferred by native speakers (#The maple tree has a car). Lauer (2016), in fact, argues that MP is in fact not a
normative constraint nor a Gricean maxim, and in fact is best understood as a speaker preference, which aligns
well with the idea of linguistic context-sensitivity and individual-level variability described in Chapter 4. Karvovskaya operationalizes this context-dependence in the assignment function g , which takes a relational variable
and returns a speciﬁc relation, though her instantiation arbitrates between so-called “stereotypical” and “nonstereotypical” possession relations, which are determined by contextual factors. In my proposal, the conceptual
domain for the set of possible relational meanings (R⟨x, y⟩) is deﬁned by the gradient conceptual infrastructure
(GCI) described in Chapter 3, which is a conceptual space organized along two dimensions that, crucially, contribute to the percept of causal potential between the two entities in a relational meaning. The key operation to
identify an R is a causal potential evaluation operation, say, CPE, between any two entities over which a relational meaning could hold. The evaluation of a causal potential between two entities makes use of each entity’s
rich conceptual content that is not necessarily linguistically pre-digested (e.g., into relational or non-relational
types). It draws upon conceptual features such as animacy that could contribute to a causal potential between
the two entities. The output of the CPE operation results in some value that determines the speciﬁc relation
between the two entities. Schematically, a high degree of causal potential between two entities will result in a
possessive (control) relation in which one entity has control over the other. A low degree of causal potential will
result in a locative (incidental proximity) relation. Formally, then, this CPE operation takes a pair of entities
(with minimal semantic pre-digestion, i.e., of type ⟨e⟩) and returns a value, say between 0 and 1, that determines
which R holds over the pair. For the purposes of this derivation, I set the threshold at .5, though in reality, the
multiplicity of possible relations would not follow from a single threshold. This operator is deﬁned in (31).
(31)

a.

CPE : De × De → (0, 1)

b.

λ⟨xe , ye ⟩.CPE⟨xe , ye ⟩

c.

{
λ⟨xe , ye ⟩.CPE⟨xe , ye ⟩

> .5 → Poss⟨xe , ye ⟩
< .5 → Loc⟨xe , ye ⟩

Accordingly, I implement an assignment function g as part of the denotation of have (also corroborating the
context-dependence of have-sentences as shown in Study 1a) that takes a relational variable and entity pair over
which the CPE operator, returns a value, thereby producing a speciﬁc relation (Poss vs. Loc) depending in its
evaluation. This updated denotation is shown in (32).
CPE

(32)

[[have]]g = λye λxe .Loc(ye , ℓ) ∧ g (ye , xe )
CPE

CPE
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Takeaway: have adds causal potential between two entities in a situation
Overall, this conceptual semantics analysis of the meaning of English have gives rise to two
principal takeaways. The ﬁrst, is that the use of the lexical item have enables the inclusion of a conceptual potential for causality in the meaning of the have-sentence.
The second takeaway is an implication of the ﬁrst: because the meaning of a have-sentence
depends on the causality involved, and because causality is a gradient percept (i.e. a percept
of degree and not category), and because the degree of causality involved is determined based
on contextual (i.e., non-linguistic) factors relating to the nature of the participants and their
contextual situation, then the meaning of a have-sentence can be context-dependent.
Right off the bat, the incorporation of the gradient causal potential in this LCS representation allows for the intuitively smooth transition to a (causal) possessive relation from a (nonor less-causal) locative relation (as described in the previous section), rather than necessitating
a metaphoric jump or categorically different functional projections.

2.3.2

The lexical item have: sound, form, and meaning

Here, I present a representation of the entire lexical item have, which comprises information
regarding its phonetic, phonological, and morphosyntactic properties in addition to its meaning. I use the “diamond structure” visualization of a lexical item, as shown in (33) . What this
schematic visualization represents is what an individual must know when that individual uses
that lexical item.
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[stem]verb

(33)

have
/hæv/

[semantic]

[morphological]

lexical item

[syntactic]

[phonetic/
phonological]

In (34), I show the speciﬁc lexical item representation for have. For all speaker and comprehenders, knowing the lexical item have means knowing its phonetic and phonological properties, represented here by the IPA transcription, but also including its articulator/motoric
implementation, acoustic properties, and prosodic parameters. Knowing the lexical item have
also means knowing that have participates in morphological processes as a verbal stem, and
that have subcategorizes for two NPs. Other syntactic adjuncts are possible, but not required.
And knowing the meaning of have means knowing meaning components of the lexico-semantic
conceptual structure described above.
(34)

The lexical item representation predisposes itself for a compositional account for havesentences grounded in the cognitive implementation of language–a concatenation of lexical
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items in real-time with parallel, interactive processing of these different components of the
lexical item. In a nutshell, the comprehension of a have-sentence involves the incremental
constituent-by-constituent composition of Entity 1, have, and Entity 2; crucially, the speciﬁc
degree of causal potential–and therefore the speciﬁc meaning of the have-sentence–is determined as soon as Entity 2 is composed into the larger structure. This determination process
involves considering the nature of the entities themselves as well as relevant information in the
context or relevant explicit linguistic material. Syntactically, the process involves the concatenation of a subject NP, the V, and its NP complement. Again, this visualization emphasizes
that the explanatory burden for the meaning variability of have-sentences lies in the lexicosemantic conceptual structure (the meaning) of the lexical item, rather than its syntax.
One methodological consequence between the two proposals is that the transitive copula
account has not made predictions for real-time comprehension or composition at all, not by a
failure in the quality of the analysis, but by a restriction in the domain of inquiry. The transitive
copula account mechanics are not intended to be models of real-time human comprehension
of have-sentences, but rather highly articulated descriptions of linguistic utterances using a speciﬁc set of analytical tools. Therefore, the real-time comprehension predictions I will describe
are logical extensions into the cognitive domain, rather than ﬁrst-hand claims of the original
accounts. Furthermore, this logical extension is my own extrapolation, based largely on the
analysis in Myler (2016), formulated in order to assess the hypotheses for processing that such
an analysis would make. Other hypotheses which generate real-time processing predictions
could be made from this analysis, which I discuss in §8.4.
So, while my proposal is that have-sentences of all kinds share a standard compositional
process involving semantic contextualization at the point of the second entity, and are therefore equally standard, the derivational approach of the transitive copula account takes nonpossessive have-sentences to be marked and secondary, therefore requiring additional syntactic structure to be comprehended. From a processing perspective, there are two immediate
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limitations: one is that a subclass of these sentences, though well observed, are only possible through post-hoc repair mechanisms, and the second is that these mechanisms require
structure that has no physical realization. While both of these situations can be possible, a
repair mechanism for otherwise standard sentences and silent structure are possible, they require much higher burdens of justiﬁcation. From a processing perspective, a uniﬁed, ordinary,
and What-You-See-Is-What-You-Get account for these sentences is the more conservative
approach of the two. Of course, the relationship between the analytical tools implemented
in the transitive copula account and real-time comprehension remains to be formalized, so it
could also be the case that the real-time comprehension process from the transitive copula
account would differ from my extrapolations here. The linking between these analytical tools
and real-time comprehension must be established in order to truly compare these accounts.
I discuss the details of this process (including the morphosyntactic compositional process) in
§5.3, as well as its relationship to the transitive copula account of have-sentences, speciﬁcally
to motivate the real-time processing studies of the comprehension of have-sentences.
Takeaway: comprehending a have-sentence is an incremental process of disambiguation
The broad linguistic implication of this is that as the nature of the relationship between the
two entities in a relational meaning is perceived to be more causally implicated, then the selection of a speciﬁc linguistic device may change, depending on the device’s semantic restrictions
(i.e., belong in (58)). The narrow linguistic implication for have is that because have lexicalizes
the entire set of relational meanings, have-sentences, which are therefore inherently ambiguous, require additional speciﬁcation, which can come either through explicit linguistic marking
or from contextual support.
Therefore, the overall process of comprehending a have-sentence is a natural process of
incremental disambiguation using contextual information (Swinney, 1979; Altmann and Steed55

man, 1988, a.o.), and therefore relies on the ability to “mine” relevant linguistic context–an
ability grounded in a number of components in the broader cognitive system.

“Bare” locative have-sentences

2.3.3

Moving forward, I take the perspective that since they lexicalize the entire range of causalpotential relations have-sentences are inherently ambiguous. So, how do locative have-sentences,
as in (35), ﬁt into the proposal?
(35)

This table has a cup on it.
In my uniﬁed meaning account, the locative prepositional phrase (PP) serves as the disam-

biguating information that narrows down the possible set of readings by explicitly reducing
the salience of the causality in the relationship between the two entities. By providing information that the relationship between table and cup is one of spatial co-location and given the
nature of the two entities themselves, there is a low degree of causal potential perceived. Crucially, this operation is predicted to take place with either explicit linguistic material, like a
locative PP, or by relevant contextual information.
However, it has been reported that locative have-sentences without a locative prepositional
phrase violate native speaker intuitions (Freeze, 1992; Ritter and Rosen, 1997; Harley and Jung,
2015; Myler, 2016, a.o.), as in (36a). In contrast, possessive have-sentences do not need any sort
of additional material for interpretation, as in (36b).
(36)

a.

The oak tree i has many nests *(in iti ).

b. The oak tree has many branches.
The transitive copula account takes have to be meaningless, and as a mere identity function,
syntactically joins the subject DP with the object DP, which contains a locative PP within
it. Since the locative PP is the sole source of the locative meaning, without it, there is no
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interpretable meaning, since it is claimed that a possessive interpretation (which does not
require a locative PP but does require a covert PossP) is unavailable to speakers.
Because “bare” locative have-sentences are a priori predicted to be part of the standard
wheelhouse, I take their relative unacceptability to emerge from native speaker dispreference,
rather than that ungrammaticality. Corroborating this point, Belvin and Den Dikken (1997)
report that a colleague found these sentences entirely acceptable.
This dispreference could emerge for (at least) two reasons. The ﬁrst is that locative havesentences provide less information about a relational situation than possessive have-sentences;
that is, possessive have-sentences provide more information about the relationship between
the two entities, namely both the location situation as well as the cause for such a location
situation, as in There’s a car on Sue’s driveway because she owns it. For example, there is a
clear progression of acceptability for the “bare” version of (35) with an increasing degree of
backstory (37). What is particularly notable is that the backstory (37d) does not make any
reference to locative or possessive or otherwise relational information, yet still facilitates the
locative relation in the bare have-sentence.
(37)

a.

The table has a cup.

b. The table has a cup on it.
c.

The table has a cup because Sue put it there.

d. The table has a cup because Sue had a party last night and is generally good about
cleaning up but sometimes gets distracted and doesn’t ﬁnish the job.
The second is that bare locative have-sentences compete with more explicit strategies of
communicating a locative relation, like using an existential construction, if focusing on the
located item, or by using the locative PP (Payne, 2009). In this case, the purported dispreference could be the result of a canonical lexical blocking effect (see Rainer, 2016, and references
therein). Presumably, both of these possibilities could be contributing factors to the lower
frequency of “bare” locative have-sentences. While frequency is always a consequence, it in
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turn can have its own effect on the acceptability and processing of linguistic material (see
Adli, 2015, and references therein for a discussion on the relationship between frequency and
acceptability).
In a context-elicitation task, where native American English speakers were asked to provide contextual situations for bare locative have-sentences, we see clear dispreference for the
locative interpretation, and a variety of strategies used to “rescue” a variety of possessive interpretations (Sheen, 2019). Speciﬁcally, in this task, speakers were asked to provide contextual
information, such as the physical or conversational setting, the interlocutors, or the intended
meaning, in response to a series of bare have-sentences of the form NP-have-NP. In (38) I
present two examples of successful locative interpretations for these bare stimuli; in (39-42), I
present several examples in which the speakers used a variety of semantic operations like nicknaming, anthropomorphizing, or metonymizing to “rescue” a possessive interpretation. In
each of these examples, the sentence in italics represents the stimulus item, while the speaker’s
response is directly below in quotes.
(38)

Locative interpretation
a.

The maple tree has a car.
“It could be like, there’s a car under the maple tree. When you say it like that, you’re
trying to like, point out that car, so you’ll say like it’s under the maple tree. The
maple tree has that red car.”

b. The chair has a box that is cardboard.
“Um, someone left their cardboard box on top of the chair.”
(39)

Nicknamed possession
a.

The maple tree has a car.
“Maybe it’s like a super tall dude and his nickname’s the Maple Tree. He’s a big
basketball player, and he’s got a car, and they’re talking about his car.”
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(40)

Anthropomorphized possession
a.

The signpost has a scooter that is pink.
“So...there’s a school where all the signs have to go to learn how to be good signs,
and at the end of school, like, they get to pick which sign to become, so like a yield
sign or a stop sign. But when they go to school, they don’t have a name on them yet,
so they’re all blank, and so this sign rides his scooter, pink scooter to school.”

(41)

Metonymized possession
a.

The Picasso has a painting by Vincent van Gogh.
“I guess it’s like an art museum that’s dedicated to Picasso, or like funded by Picasso,
or just, like, really appreciates Picasso, so named it the Picasso, and they bought a
painting by that other person.”

(42)

Named possession
a.

The saucepan has a cookie sheet that is rectangular.

“I guess The Saucepan is, like, a store that sells cookware, and it would have a cookie
sheet in it.”
b. The notebook has a cup that is white.
“A cup? The Notebook, the movie, has a cup in it that is white.”
These examples show the degree to which possessive interpretations for these bare havesentences are preferred; while some speakers are happy to accept a locative reading, others will
go to somewhat extreme lengths to support a possessive interpretation. I discuss the observed
variability between individual speakers further in Chapter 5.
Linguistically, the setup here for relational have-sentences resembles the case of Mandarin
Chinese you and similar lexical items in other languages; while one lexical device captures the
entire range of relational meanings, explicit additional marking is required to specify subsets
of this range. In (43, I present the case of Mandarin you, typically glossed as exist/have, in which
a locative adposition (shang ‘on/up’) is required for a locative meaning; without it, the sentence
would read as the similarly degraded English the table has a book.
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(43)

Mandarin Chinese
a.

you yi ben shu
exist one CL book
‘There is a book.’

b. wo you yi ben shu
1.sg have one CL book
‘I have a book.’
c.

zhuozi-shang you yi ben shu
table-on
have one CL book
‘The table has a book on it.’

Spatiotemporal restrictors privilege locative readings
These examples represent a larger pattern in which markers that restrict the spatial or temporal extent of the relational meaning privilege locative readings, speciﬁcally by decreasing
the degree of causal potential in the relation. For example, (44) shows a spatial restrictor (a
locative PP, in fact), that delimits the bounds of the possessive relation: that is (44a) with the
spatial restrictor weakens the possessive relation in (44b) by restricting the ownership relation
to one of control. In fact, adding another restrictor, this time a temporal one, weakens the
possessive relation even further.13
(44)

a.

I have the book.

b. I have the book on me.
c.

I have the book on me today.

In another Mandarin construction, we see a similar spatiotemporal restriction phenomenon.
Mandarin zai “at” is also used to encode both locative and possessive meanings, in the same way
as the lexical dative-possessive alternations presented previously. (45a) shows the prototypical
13

Here, the presumed linguistic operation is the generation of focus-alternatives that restrict the proposition
(Rooth, 1985).
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expression of a locative meaning using zai, while (45b) shows the possessive meaning emerging from the animate possessor (wo ‘I/me’), which also requires a deictic (zhe-li ‘here’ lit. ‘this
in’) marker, which is doing a similar spatial restriction as above. In (45c), I show that this restrictor is a grammatical construction requiring standard deictic person-proximity agreement.
Finally, in (45d), I show how use of the progressive marker can further restrict the possessive
relationship in the same way as the temporal restrictor ‘today’ in the English example above
(44c).
(45)

Mandarin Chinese
a.

Na ben shu zai tushuguan-li
that CL book is.at library-in
‘The book is in the library.’

b. Na ben shu zai wo zhe-li
that CL book is.at 1.SG this-in
‘I have the book.’ lit. ‘The book is at me here.’
c.

Na ben shu zai ni na-li
that CL book is.at 2.SG that-in
‘You have the book.’ lit. ‘The book is at you there.’

d. Na ben shu zai wo zhe-li ne
that CL book is.at 1.SG this-in PROG
‘I have the book now.’ lit. ‘The book is PROG at me here.’
In summary, what these grammatically spatiotemporal restrictors are doing is decreasing
the perceived degree of the causal potential or inﬂuence that the possessor has over the possessee by delimiting spatial or temporal boundaries of their relationship. Turning back to the
case of the English locative PP, it could be the case that it is serving a similar restrictor role,
though further work would need to be undertaken to arbitrate between this possibility and
the aforementioned generalized ambiguity speciﬁcation role. If the former were to hold, then
the case of English have would fall in line with crosslinguistic patterns of expressing relational
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meanings.14

2.3.4

Takeaway: the role of context

The principal takeaway from the conceptual and lexical analyses detailed here is that relational
meanings, particularly as encoded by have-sentences, are sensitive to contextual information.
Speciﬁcally, to understand a relational meaning, a determination of the causal potential between the two entities must be made. The perceptual evaluation of this causal potential is
heavily inﬂuenced by contextual information, be it properties of the entities in the relational
meaning or properties of the contextual situation. To illustrate this point further, I present
two examples of English markers that can encode both locative (proximity) and possessive
(control) meanings (46-47).
(46)

Prepositional: with
a.

The keys are with Sue. (control)

b. The keys are with the car. (proximity)
(47)

Verbal: have
a.

The gardeni has strawberries (in iti ). (proximity/containment)

b. Suej has strawberries (in/with heri ). (control/containment)
The control (possessive) reading involving with, a canonically locative marker (46), and
the proximity (locative) reading involving have (47), are less frequent than the cross-linguistic
examples detailed above.
14

One additional avenue of semantic restriction that can lead to a decreased degree of causal potential is the
observed distinction that deﬁniteness makes in the interpretation of have-sentences: Sue has a/the car, in which
the use of the deﬁnite determiner leads to a temporary control reading rather than a (more) permanent ownership
or alienable possession reading. In line with this distinction, Fraurud (2001) presents evidence from Komi and
Urdmurt (Uralic, Russia), Turkish, Yucatec Maya, Turkish, and Amharic that suggests that deﬁnite determiners
evolve from possessive markers, in addition to the well-reported source of demonstratives. Huehnergard and PatEl (2012) present similar evidence in Semitic; Gerland (2014) and Janda (2015) in other Uralic languages. While
not in the scope of this dissertation, the discourse-domain restriction of a deﬁnite article could be a third source
of restriction that decreases the perceived degree of connectedness or control asymmetry and thus “demotes” a
reading from a permanent ownership reading to a temporary control reading.
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While none of the sentences are categorically ungrammatical, the lower frequency–and
higher markedness–result in a greater need for contextual support; with appropriate support,
the semantic ambiguity seems to be entirely alleviated.
(48)

Context: At a rental car oﬃce, Sue is the employee in charge of distributing keys directly
to customers. The front desk employee tells a customer ready to walk to the car:
‘The keys are with Sue.’

(49)

Context: At a large family farm where customers pick their own fruit, a customer asks
an employee if the strawberry patch is located behind the farmhouse. The employee
shakes her head and says:
‘The front garden has strawberries.’

The improvement in acceptability suggests that there is a fundamental role of disambiguating context in the understanding of have-sentences. This is preliminary support for the uniﬁed
relational meaning account over the “copula account”, which predicts categorical ungrammaticality for bare locative have-sentences regardless of contextual content.

2.3.5

Prediction: interpretation of have-sentences are contextually
manipulable

In summary, my proposal for the analysis of have-sentences and relational meanings centers
around a uniﬁed, context-dependent lexical semantics for have. There are two main consequences to the analysis that I have proposed. First, the proposal analyzes the different readings of have-sentences as a single meaning, which is a generalized relation of causal potential
involving two entities (the uniﬁed LCS). Second, the meaning of a have-sentence depends on a
variable degree of causality perceived from relevant contextual information, explicit linguistic
material (like a locative PP), or implicit world knowledge. Together, this means that linguistic variability in have-sentences is a direct result of conceptual variability in have’s underlying
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conceptual structure.
These consequences lead to a series of predictions regarding locative have-sentences in English. Speciﬁcally, (a) locative meanings with English have-sentences are possible, (b) locative
have-sentences are dispreferred, and therefore (c) locative have-sentences need support from
explicit marking or context. Returning to the reported unacceptability of (50), it is clear, from
the perspective detailed here, that the unacceptability arises out of a dispreference for locative
have-sentences without explicit locative marking or contextual support.
(50)

The oak tree i has many nests *(in iti ).

While it is clear that we can use an explicit locative PP to support the locative reading,
leading to a perfectly acceptable have-sentence, it remains to be proven the degree to which
contextual support can facilitate the locative reading of a bare have-sentence. That is, neither
account predicts the unavailability of locative have-sentences, as these are a well-established
construction in the English language. The crucial difference is whether the locative reading of
a have-sentence comes from (a) a generalized relational meaning that is then narrowed down
by relevant context (LCS of have + causal perception), or, (b) exclusively from the locative
PP (λx.x + locative PP). Is the locative PP, therefore, an explicit, conventionalized way to
restrict the ambiguity of a bare locative have-sentence or is it the sole grammatical source of
the locative meaning?
One way to address this question is to investigate whether context can supply the relevant
information or a conducive communicative environment, in the absence of other, more explicit strategies, to facilitate the locative reading of a bare have-sentence. In order to do so, a
supportive context must remove or reduce the cues to causality by either changing the features
of the entities or the properties of the communicative context.
The uniﬁed LCS account predicts that contextual support can indeed facilitate the locative
reading, while the transitive copula account predicts that these sentences are categorically
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ungrammatical and not contextually manipulable, at least without the post-hoc repair of silent
PP-insertion.
Accordingly, I hypothesize that providing a locative relation in the context will provide a
communicative context that facilitates the acceptability of a target bare locative have-sentence
following that context, due to the uniﬁed meaning for English have. This hypothesis is the
direct motivation for the ﬁrst experimental study of this dissertation, published in Zhang et al.
2022, and reported below in §2.4.

Study 1a: Contextually facilitating a locative have-

2.4

sentence
2.4.1

Methods

Linguistic stimuli
Six sets of ﬁve sentences each were designed around a simple locative relationship expressed
with have, as in (51). The have-sentence expressed an incidental proximity relation—the least
constraining interpretation of location.15 The entities were selected from equivalent semantic
ﬁelds such that none were biased towards a possession construal, and all were conceptually
non-composite enough to block any plausible containment reading.
(51)

The maple tree has a car.
Each have-sentence was structured as a conjunction with a context in the ﬁrst conjunct

and the critical target in the second (52).
(52)

[The motorcycle is under the pine tree]context and [the maple tree has a car]target .

15

Incidental proximity presupposes no ontological or conventionalized relationship between the two involved
entities: they are spatially co-located by pure chance or coincidence (e.g. a mirror and a cactus).
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In addition to Locative, two other semantic context-types were provided: Possessive and
Attributive. The Possessive Context-type presented an inalienable part-whole context. The
Attributive presented a non-locative, non-possessive context. Additionally, two control contexts were provided: an Identity, to isolate the the potential effect of identity priming, containing the same syntactic structures as the target sentence but different participants and a
Nonsensical, containing a contextually unacceptable conjunction such as or, so, because, or until.16 All context-types are presented in Table (2.2).

Context-type
Locative
Possessive
Attributive
Identity
Nonsensical

Table 2.2: Sample stimuli set
Context
Conj.
The motorcycle is under the pine tree and
The pine tree has big branches
and
The pine tree is very green
and
The pine tree has a motorcycle
and
The motorcycle is under the pine tree or

Target
the maple tree has a car.

Participants
The participants comprised an in-lab sample and an online sample. For the in-lab sample, 66
native17 speakers of American English were recruited from our university student body. All,
by self-report, had no history of psychological illness, neurological disease, brain injury, or
learning or reading disability, and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The data from
61 participants (35 women & 26 men, ages 18-29, mean 20;10) from the in-lab sample were
included in the analysis; data from the ﬁve others were excluded due to experimenter error.
Additionally, 247 native speakers of American English were recruited through Amazon
16
This context-type is intended to show a categorical distinction between the dispreference of a locative reading of a have-sentence and the true semantic unacceptability of the nonsensical conjunction. This unacceptability
arises from the infelicitous use of these conjunctions, which do not create the parallelism that ‘and’ does. This
lack of parallelism weakens the communicative intent of the entire utterance and therefore dissuades the contextualization operation that could otherwise facilitate the interpretation of the target.
17
Native here indicates that the language was acquired naturally from birth within a family context. Native
acquisition is orthogonal to the number of languages acquired.
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Mechanical Turk (MTurk). All, by self-report and validation through language screening questions, were determined to be native speakers of American English. Through MTurk Filters,
only participants with an IP address in the United States, a history of >1000 successfully completed tasks, and a task-approval rate of >90% were invited to participate. The data from
210 participants (102 women & 108 men, ages 18-68, mean 31;8) from the online sample were
included in the analysis; data from the 37 others were excluded because of missed attention
questions, signifying that they were answering randomly, or failed language screening questions. All participants consented to participate in accordance with our university Human Subjects Committee guidelines.
Design
In-lab participants sat in a quiet room and read sentences on a monitor presented using EPrime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, 2012). Acceptability ratings and response
times were collected on a keyboard. Each sentence was presented in two windows: the ﬁrst
showed the ﬁrst conjunct (context), and the second showed the complete conjoined sentence
(context and target). Participants were instructed to rate the acceptability of all the material on the screen; thus, the ﬁrst rating evaluated only the ﬁrst conjunct (context) while the
second evaluated the entire conjoined sentence (context and target). The windows advanced
with each input, but were capped at 10 sec for the ﬁrst window and 14 sec for the second. The
ratings for the context alone served to verify the participants’ attention, since these ratings
were expected to be ceiling-level. Participants were given a scale of 1 to 7 (7 being the most
acceptable) and no speciﬁc criteria for determining acceptability to ensure no disproportionate attention or bias towards certain features of the sentences over others. Table (2.3) gives an
overview of the paradigm.
Participants were given a practice run to acclimate to the testing environment, the keyboard input, and the text presentation. This practice contained no experimental items, but
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Content
Context
Context + Target
Fixation

Table 2.3: Experimental procedure
Material
Duration & input
The motorcycle is under the pine tree 10 sec or until rating (1-7)
The motorcycle is under the pine tree
and
the maple tree has a car.
+

14 sec or until rating (1-7)
2 sec

10 well-attested syntactically well-formed and ill-formed sentences (i.e., with consistently polarized judgments) to help the participants quickly orient to the scale, and to assess participants’ attention, understanding of the rating system, and proﬁciency in English. Participants
repeated the practice run until they scored 100%; no participant completed the practice run
more than twice. Each participant saw all 30 items in a unique, pseudo-randomized order
mixed with 70 additional sentences of three unrelated types which served as ﬁllers.
Online participants were presented with identical instructions as the in-lab version through
the Qualtrics survey platform. The sentences were presented in the same manner as outlined
above, except that instead of pressing one of seven keys on the keyboard, the participants used
their cursor to select one of seven radio buttons on-screen, which were presented in the same
orientation as the in-lab version. Five attention questions were presented randomly within the
30 experimental items. Though no time limits were given, the average completion time for
the study was comparable to the duration of in-lab participants. Before each session, participants were presented ten semantically complex English sentences (involving circumstantial
metonymy or complement coercion constructions) and asked to explain the sentences’ meanings to validate the participants’ self-reported English proﬁciency.
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2.4.2

Predictions

The uniﬁed lexical meaning hypothesis predicts that context can indeed modulate the salience
of different readings of have-sentences. Speciﬁcally, a facilitatory context should improve the
salience of the otherwise dispreferred locative reading of a bare have-sentence. If this hypothesis is right, then the acceptability ratings for the target sentence in the Locative Context-type
should be signiﬁcantly greater than all ratings in all other context-types.

2.4.3

Findings

Dispreference vs. unacceptability
As a control measure, I ﬁrst analyzed the effect of sensicality to ensure participants were paying attention successfully to the acceptability judgment task. A linear mixed-effects model was
created using the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015) in the R statistical computing environment
(R Core Team, 2018). The model was built using the ﬁxed-effect of sensicality (2 levels: sensical (the Locative, Possessive, Attributive, and Identity Context-types) vs. nonsensical (the
Nonsensical Context-type)), and as random-effects, intercepts for subjects and items in addition to by-subject random slopes for the effect of sensicality. Statistical signiﬁcance (p-value)
was obtained by a likelihood ratio test of the full model with the effect in question against the
null model without the effect in question. Instead of a priori trimming using a three standard
deviation threshold, outlying data points to the model ﬁt were removed, following Baayen and
Milin (2010).
Acceptability ratings, shown in Figure (2.3), revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of sensicality
(χ2 (1)=42.2, n=271, p<.001), suggesting that participants attended and responded to the relation of the context to the target. They also indicate that the dispreference of the locative
interpretation of a have-sentence is categorically distinct from the semantic unacceptability
of the Nonsensical Context-type.
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Figure 2.3: Mean acceptability ratings by sensicality.
Note: Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean.

Contextual facilitation of locative have-sentences
For the main analysis, I analyzed the data from the four sensical context-types for all subjects.
A linear mixed-effects model was built using ﬁxed-effects of context-type (4 levels: Locative,
Possessive, Attributive, vs. Identity). As random effects, random intercepts were included
for subjects and items in addition to by-subject random slopes for the effect of context-type.
Statistical signiﬁcance was obtained in the same manner, through likelihood ratio tests; outliers
were removed in the same way as well.
Acceptability ratings of the sentences with only the sensical contexts showed a signiﬁcant
main effect of context-type (χ2 (3)=101.2, n=271, p<.001). Pairwise t-tests show that the ratings,
presented in Figure (2.4), for the target sentence after the Locative Context-type were signiﬁcantly higher than the ratings for the target sentence after all other contexts (all p’s<.001).
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Figure 2.4: Mean acceptability ratings by context-type.
Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean.

This ﬁnding is consistent with the predictions about the uniﬁed relational meaning: context successfully facilitated the locative reading of the target sentence, resulting in higher ratings for the target sentence and only after the Locative Context-type.

2.4.4

Discussion: Contextual modulation of English have-sentences

A uniﬁed analysis of the LCS associated with English have-sentences underlies the prediction
that comprehenders’ sensitivity to the uniﬁed conceptual foundation for relational meanings
would be experimentally visible in the form of higher ratings to the target sentence only after
the locative context as compared to the non-locative contexts. I assume here that this uniﬁed
meaning is what permits the prototypically possessive verb have to express a locative relation
at all, and additionally, one that is facilitated with relevant context.
The uniﬁed LCS account for have predicted that the right context can facilitate the locative reading of a “bare” have-sentence, by decreasing the degree of causality perceived, and
therefore the salience of the conceptual causal adjunct in have’s meaning. These results are
consistent with this prediction, which was borne out in the the main effect of context-type,
whereby ratings of the target sentence increased only after the Locative Context-type, sup71

porting the uniﬁed LCS account as well as the ability of local linguistic context to make a
dispreferred meaning salient.
The effect of the Locative Context-type was categorically distinct from the effect of the
other semantic contexts; the Possessive and Attributive Context-type ratings were not significantly different from each other. Furthermore, participants were sensitive to only the relevant relational features of the context, as the Identity Context-type, with an identical syntactic
structure, did not improve the rating for the target have-sentence.
In this experimental setup, the true semantic baseline was the Attributive Context-type,
because it provided no content relevant to a relational meaning at all, yet was still a perfectly
acceptable sentence of English (e.g. The pine tree is very green). In contrast, the Identity
Context-type presented an already marginal sentence that did not facilitate the otherwise
marginal target sentence. It is therefore striking that the Possessive Context-type, which provided a non-facilitatory but still relevant context, was equally non-facilitatory as the irrelevant
Attributive Context-type.
These patterns also shed light on the role of context in language processing by leveraging
the LCS for have in which the salience of the causal Event1 depends on the perceived causality
in the situation. Because this LCS is inherently uniﬁed, it follows that have should naturally express both the locative and possessive meanings it has been observed to express. This pattern
is not predicted by the transitive copula account, which analyzes the locative reading of a havesentence to emerge entirely from the presence of an overt locative PP. Instead, the relatively
higher informativity of the possessive reading–captured with the additional causal frame–leads
to an asymmetry in preference relative to the locative reading, which requires backgrounding
of the causal frame to become available. What comprehenders must do to enable the dispreferred locative reading is reduce the salience of the causal frame, a process that is facilitated
by relevant contextual information.
The fact that comprehenders are able to do this contextualization nuances the understand72

ing of what “acceptability” means. In this case, locative readings of bare have-sentences are
taken to be dispreferred due to lower frequency. This lower frequency could have emerged
over time due to an increased demand for contextualization, which is effortful. Alternatively,
the dispreference could be due directly to the increased demand for contextualization: comprehenders will not exert this contextualization effort unless otherwise necessary, though individual degrees of context-sensitivity would modulate this tendency. Overall, this linguistic
setup is consistent with the view that there is more than one reason for why a linguistic structure could be found less acceptable, even in relative terms.

2.4.5

Linguistic consequences of contextually facilitated locative havesentences

Support for a uniﬁed LCS account of the meaning of have
These results constitute the ﬁrst support for both the uniﬁed lexical semantic-analysis of have
as well as the role of context in the comprehension of have-sentences; speciﬁcally, despite
being dispreferred, the locative reading of a bare have-sentence can be made salient through
linguistic context.
This ﬁnding has direct implications for the assumptions regarding the lexical representation of English have. Speciﬁcally, this ﬁnding is not predicted by the transitive copula account
of English have, which forbids locative interpretations without overt locative PPs (Ritter and
Rosen, 1997, p. 308). The results here suggest that the process of comprehending a havesentence is a process of disambiguating a generalized meaning using available means, such as
a locative PP or, as in the present setup, relevant contextual information which decreases
the causality perceived in the relation, thus leading to a locative reading for the target. Consequently, while the transitive copula account is not incorrect about the locative PP contributing
to the meaning of a have-sentence, it is not the case that the locative PP is shouldering the
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entirety of the semantic burden, suggesting that have does indeed have semantic content.
The demonstrated contextual facilitation effect motivates further inquiry into the psychological reality of these sentences: what are human comprehenders actually doing when they
encounter have-sentences? The uniﬁed LCS predictions about the comprehension process
lends itself to a real-time processing investigation because it predicts that there should be
a measurable effect of contextualization in the comprehension of have-sentences speciﬁcally
at the point when the second entity is comprehended and incrementally composed into the
meaning of the sentence. While the transitive copula account does not make predictions about
the psychological reality of comprehension, the real-time processing predictions that would
come from putting the semantic burden on the locative PP are indeed testable. Speciﬁcally,
real-time methods like self-paced reading and event-related potentials could assess whether
there is extra effort required to comprehend “bare” locative have-sentences, and whether this
effort has a semantic nature (as predicted by the contextualization process of the uniﬁed LCS
account) or a syntactic nature (as would be predicted by the syntactic source of the locative
meaning of the transitive copula account). While the observed pattern was predicted by and
more directly supports the uniﬁed LCS account, the evidence does not completely rule out
the possibility of some sort of repair operation, and therefore the transitive copula account
entirely. For example, it could be the case that participants are able to implement a post-hoc
syntactic repair, such as the insertion of a locative PP. Such a possibility adds additional motivation for further work investigating what is actually happening during the real-time comprehension of these locative have-sentences. Are comprehenders contextually determining the
degree of causal potential to arrive a speciﬁc reading for the target, or are they inserting a
locative PP to rescue an otherwise ungrammatical sentence? Real-time comprehension methods can arbitrate between these two possibilities–I describe the speciﬁc predictions for the
real-time processing of locative have-sentences in Chapter 5.
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Syntactic consequences of contextual facilitation
If the contextual facilitation effect is indeed indicating that a locative PP is not grammatically obligatory for a locative reading of a have-sentence, then both accounts face syntactic
consequences, of different sorts.
Following the uniﬁed LCS account, the non-obligatory locative PP falls in line with the
syntactic analysis, which is that have as a verb head subcategorizes for a single NP, with no
further speciﬁcation for other obligatory constituents. In this case, a locative PP can be analyzed as a VP adjunct, which is a standard analysis for spatial or temporal PPs (53a), in contrast
to (53b) where it serves as a VP complement.
(53)

a.

I met Sue in London.

b. Sue lives in London.
Given the contextual facilitation effect, then “bare” locative have-sentences would not receive an ungrammaticality mark, suggesting that locative PPs do behave as syntactic adjuncts,
in line with omission and locality tests for argumenthood (54).
(54)

a.

[Context] The table has a cup.

b. #The table has on it a cup.
However, it is important to note that the uniﬁed LCS account does not make a ﬁrm prediction on whether this locative PP is serving as a VP adjunct or an NP adjunct; the account
merely predicts that the locative PP is a syntactic adjunct that can help disambiguate the generalized causal potential meaning of a have-sentence. The more conservative approach is to
analyze it as a VP adjunct, given that it is contributing disambiguating information to the relation encoded by the verb, supported by substitution, coordination, and movement tests for
constituency (55)
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(55)

The table has a cup on it.
a.

The table has one on it. > #The table has one.

b. The table has a cup and a plate on it. > #The table has a cup on it and a plate.
c.

It is a cup that the table has on it. > *It is a cup on it that the table has.

In contrast, the transitive copula account for the syntax of have is that there is always
a functional projection in the second NP of a have-sentence that is the sole source of the
meaning of the have-sentence (Myler, 2016); this XP is then connected to the subject NP with
the identity function that is have to give rise to the ﬁnal interpretation of the sentence, as in
(56).
(56)

a.

Locative: The table [has [a cup [on it]P P ]N P ]V P .

b. Possessive: The table [has [[four legs]P ossP ]N P ]V P .
The contextual facilitation effect as well as the argument and constituency tests above do
not align straightforwardly with the transitive copula account for have. Put more directly, this
account relies on the claim that “bare” locative have-sentences are categorically ungrammatical, though this claim is not supported with robust evidence (Ritter and Rosen, 1997; Harley
and Jung, 2015; Myler, 2016). The ﬁndings in this study show that this claim does not match
actual acceptability judgments from a large sample of English speakers. Consequently, the
meaninglessness of have is therefore cast into question.
While this account does not make predictions about the psychological reality of havesentences, there would be additional compositional mechanisms required (such as a LocPP
insertion syntactic repair operation), which requires a higher bar of evidence to justify. Is
it not impossible to account for unvoiced syntactic structures, though, again, justifying their
existence requires additional evidence in the face of a more conservative and parsimonious
analysis. I return to this question in Chapter 5 in discussing the predictions for the real-time
processing of have-sentences.
76

2.5

Conclusion

The study presented here is the ﬁrst to show that English have-sentences can be modulated by
context. Speciﬁcally, relevant contextual content can facilitate otherwise dispreferred locative
readings of bare have-sentences, which had previously been analyzed as being categorically
ungrammatical, due to the lack of an overt locative prepositional phrase. These ﬁndings are
consistent with the uniﬁed LCS account of English have, which takes have to bear a generalized
relational meaning that captures the degree of causal potential between the two entities in a
have-sentence. These ﬁndings challenge the status quo, transitive copula account of English
have, which takes have to be a semantically null identity function, in which an overt or covert
functional projection within the domain of the second DP in the have-sentence is the sole
source of the meaning of a given have-sentence.
The crucial takeaway is that contextual information can disambiguate the generalized
meaning of a have-sentence into a speciﬁc reading. In line with the uniﬁed LCS account, the
generalized meaning can be disambiguated by both contextual information as well as explicit
linguistic material, such as a locative PP. These two strategies for individuating speciﬁc readings for have-sentences both work by affecting the fundamental causal perception operation,
which helps determine the relationship between two entities; operationally, this is carried out
by modulating the salience of the conceptual causal adjunct. Moreover, these strategies in communicative have-sentences are also part of a set of communicative strategies or preferences that
individual speakers and comprehenders can employ to help deliver their communicative intent,
that is, a speaker could choose to use context or a spatiotemporal restrictor (like a locative PP)
or a causal backstory to deliver a precisely speciﬁed have-sentence. Contextual modulation
is therefore part and parcel of an overall communicative strategy. I take up the question of
systematicity or tendencies in how different individuals choose to rely on contextual support,
speciﬁcally, in Chapter 4. The ﬁndings here give preliminary support to the idea that these
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three kinds of variability, linguistic, conceptual, and cognitive, are intrinsically connected–a
speciﬁc framework which I further discuss in Chapter 5.
Moving forward, while the results of Study 1a (discussion above notwithstanding) show that
context can facilitate an otherwise dispreferred locative reading for a bare have-sentence, it remains to be understood the semantic breadth of the contextual facilitation capability. What
are the boundaries or limits for readings of have-sentences? How are these meanings semantically organized in a conceptually principled way? While the uniﬁed LCS analysis posits a subset
relation between locative and possessive meanings (LOCATIVE ⊂ POSSESSIVE), the LCS does not
further explain the uniﬁed conceptual basis for the set of relational meanings.
Moreover, one major consequence of the uniﬁed LCS account is that have’s variability is
a crosslinguistically regular variability phenomenon, rather than being a crosslinguistically idiosyncratic puzzle. How does the meaning of have relate to other have-like lexical items and
locative, possessive, and relational meanings in other languages? These are the questions I address in the following chapter, which details my proposal for a conceptual infrastructure that
organizes the entire set of relational meanings in a cognitively grounded way.
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Conceptual gradience: a
multidimensional conceptual space for
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3.1

Introduction

In this chapter, I introduce the second component of the model of meaning variation, which
is a multidimensional conceptual space that serves as the infrastructure for the entire set of
possible relational meanings that a have-sentence can convey. In §3.2, I describe the design features, cognitive grounding, and the mechanics of the conceptual infrastructure. Crucially, this
infrastructure, organized by two dimensions of causal perception, serves as the possible set of
conceptual relations that can be lexicalized by lexical items such as English have; I describe
the consequences for this LCS-conceptual infrastructure connection in §3.3. The gradient infrastructure also makes predictions for the behavior of have and have-type lexical items across
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languages, over time, and through development; I outline the predictions for and evidence
from typology, diachrony, and acquisition in §3.4. I conclude the chapter with a discussion
of English have-sentences as a crosslinguistically regular instantiation of the interaction of
lexical and conceptual variability, in contrast to the anomalous “too many meanings” puzzle
perspective of the transitive copula account, and motivate the ﬁnal ingredient of the model:
inter-comprehender cognitive variability.

3.2

Modeling the set of relational meanings in a gradient
conceptual infrastructure

In light of uniﬁed LCS analysis of the meaning of English have, I move forward with a working
model for the organization of such a uniﬁed and gradient conceptual structure for relational
meanings. This conceptual structure model forms the infrastructure over which linguistic
markers can lexicalize locative and possessive meanings; that is, it delineates and organizes the
meanings that have-sentences and crosslinguistic corresponding markers can encode. While
previous accounts have sought to sort the many readings of have-sentences (as well as locationpossession meanings crosslinguistically) into a range of categorical, conceptually linked bins,
there has yet to be a convergence on an optimal resolution for the set of relational meanings.
This optimal resolution problem is especially evidenced in cases where single relations
seem to elude categorization, as in (57), from the OED entry for have, or the continuum presented in (9).
(57)

Let me have men about me that are fat. (1616)
Often, these categories depend on the focus of the investigation, which may not rely on a

precise characterization of the different relational meanings: for example, Sæbø (2009) deﬁnes
one set of meanings for have as “the true verb have” while Karvovskaya (2018) deﬁnes “stereo81

typical” and “non-stereotypical” possessive meanings. One major consequence of the transitive
copula approach is that there are no constraints (speciﬁcally postulated) for the meanings of
have: relational meanings are derived independently from the entity-pair of a have-sentence
and manifest through a theoretically unlimited set of functional heads. This view takes the
situation of have-sentences as being completely separate from the constraints on and organization of relational meanings, since have itself does not impose selectional restrictions as an
identity function.
The key idea is that there are two layers: the operationalization of the lexical item have
itself as well as the operationalization of the possible meanings or ﬂavors of meaning that are
encodable by have. I take the perspective that characterizing the relational meaning space is
a vital part of understanding the behavior of have-sentences by deﬁning the possible parameter space over which it can lexicalize. The lexicalization behavior of other relational markers
crosslinguistically can also further inform our characterization of the underlying conceptual
space. With respect to the larger goal of this project, characterizing the lexical or linguistic
structure as well as the underlying conceptual structure is necessary to spell out the overarching model of meaning variation.
In this section, I lay out a model for a gradient conceptual infrastructure for the family
of relational meanings that seeks to address the parsimony optimization problem described
earlier as well as the intuition for examples like (57) where the understood meaning of a sentence is relatively clear, but the precise categorization remains ambiguous–would it be locative,
control/alienable possession, kinship, existence, or something else? Below, I introduce the semantic map approach, which is the primary extant approach for capturing crosslinguistic patterns of shared meaning, as motivation for the two principal design features of my proposed
gradient conceptual infrastructure.
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3.2.1

Design features

No discussion of a spatially organized system of describing a set of related meanings would
be complete without discussion of semantic maps (Haspelmath, 2003), which are a way of
describing the patterns of linguistic markers across languages. While Haspelmath was the
one to popularize the notion of semantic maps, its intellectual origins lie in Anderson (1974,
1982) and Croft et al. (1987), and it was also developed in Kemmer (1993), Stassen (1997), and
Van Der Auwera and Plungian (1998). Croft (2001) uses the term ‘conceptual space’ roughly to
describe a similar idea, and differs from the use of the term in this work. The idea of semantic
maps resembles the polysemy networks of Lakoff (1987), Langacker (1988), and Sandra and Rice
(1995), among others, though these structures are language-speciﬁc and do not necessarily seek
to describe presumably universal conceptual structure.
The principal goal of semantic map visualizations is to reveal a universal conﬁguration of
functions and the patterns in which language-speciﬁc markers lexicalize these functions. For
example, Figure 3.1 shows the proposed semantic map for typical functions of dative markers.
Lexical markers from different languages are represented with enclosed shapes that delineate
which functions are permitted; for example, English to encapsulates the ‘direction’, ‘recipient’,
‘experiencer’, and ‘purpose’ functions, while French à is used for the ‘direction’, ‘recipient’,
‘experiencer’, and ‘predicative possessor’ functions.
Figure 3.1: A semantic map of typical dative functions from Haspelmath (2003)
predicative possessor

external possessor

direction

recipient

beneﬁciary

purpose

experiencer

judicantis

The primary beneﬁts, as described in Haspelmath (2003), are to allow crosslinguistic comparability, to identify universal semantic relationships, and to make predictions regarding di83

achronic trajectories within each map. These goals are aligned with the goals of this project
as well and inform the below design features. However, two main limitations exist with this
approach. First, this type of semantic map still relies on categorical distinctions and therefore
faces the same type of categoricality vs. continuity problem for modeling an apparent continuum. Second, Haspelmath makes a clear statement regarding the arbitrariness of the functions
in the space: he states that “their spatial orientation are not signiﬁcant and is purely a matter of
representational convenience,” further clarifying that deriving the functions’ relative position
on the map is “of course totally utopian,” suggesting that the categorical functions, though
groupable, do not form a larger organizational structure. This claim implies that the pursuit
of such larger organizational structure may be fruitless.
Zwarts (2010) points out that inherent in Haspelmathian maps are actually two components: a lexical matrix and a conceptual structure or space. Lexical matrices are simply charts
depicting which of the component meanings each language’s lexical marker is able to encode,
whereas conceptual spaces are geometrically ordered sets of meanings. Haspelmath’s maps
are based primarily on the lexical matrices, which, by the aforementioned representational
convenience, are implicitly hypothesized to reveal systematicity in the underlying conceptual
structure. Conversely, it is possible to deﬁne conceptual structures and then map lexical matrices on them from language-external measures: one clear successful example is the deﬁnition
of color terms, where lexical items are mapped onto a conceptual space deﬁned by physical
properties of color, like hue, saturation, and brightness (Berlin and Kay, 1991). In fact, Regier
et al. (2007) report that crosslinguistic lexical matrices represent optimal partitions of this
physically irregular space. For other situations, in contrast, externally derived measures for
organizing the conceptual space do not provide insight on the organization of lexical items
within or across languages: the human body itself provides a language-external physical structure over which body-part markers can be interpreted. Anatomical distances in this physical
structure alone, however, cannot satisfactorily explain lexical clustering patterns, for example,
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why some languages use the same words for ﬁngers and toes, suggesting that our conceptual
space for the human form incorporates structure beyond its purely anatomical physicality.
The two principal limitations of Haspelmathian semantic maps in addressing the issues I
have laid out for this present work are as follows:1 lack of true gradience and lack of externally
sourced structure. These gaps therefore represent the two principal design features I hope to
incorporate in my proposal for a gradient conceptual infrastructure for relational meanings.
Continuity/gradience
The principal design feature of this conceptual space is its conceptual continuity or gradience.
Such gradience is required to capture the incremental ambiguities as well as the intuitive labeling difficulty for a variety of relational meetings. A gradient space can also help address the
parsimony optimization problem of deﬁning an appropriate number of categorical bins in a
continuum. For example, I present in (58) a series of relationships using the English genitive
marker, which can also encode a broad range of relational meanings: the relevant question is
where to draw the boundaries between alienable possession, control, part-whole, etc., and all
the categorical bins that have been proposed. Speciﬁcally, for (58a-b), both could be classed
as locative or control relationships, though there is no explicit linguistic cue for either. This
set of examples illustrates how the set of relational meanings might be better understood as a
spectrum that depends on the degree of causal potential. Presumably, Sue has more control
over the chair in her office than the chair in a waiting room–she could easily have the former
chair removed, sold, or repaired, while her inﬂuence over the latter is less direct.
(58)

A spectrum of relational meanings
a.

Sue’s chair is broken. (in a waiting room)

b. Sue’s chair is broken. (in her office)
1

These limitations are not necessarily limitations for his research goals; they are problems that limit the
applicability of standard semantic mapping approaches to the current question.
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c.

The chauffeur’s car is in the shop right now. (the car driven by the chauffeur)

d. Sue’s car is in the shop right now. (the car owned by Sue)
e.

Sue’s cat is sick.

f.

Sue’s haircut is really striking.

g.

Sue’s hair is turning gray.

h. Sue’s unborn baby is kicking a lot these days.
i.

Sue’s heart is mildly hypertrophic.

j.

Sue’s liver is taking a beating from all her drinking.

k. Sue’s daughter is very independent, she wants nothing to do with Sue.
l.

Sue’s daughter is her best friend.

Crucially, while some changes in degree of causal potential could cause a “jump” between
categories, like (58c-d), and some do not, like (58k-l). This suggests there are non-lexical requirements for justifying the subcategories of this relational meaning spectrum. Myler (2016),
as the most recent representative of the transitive copula account, posits a theoretically unlimited number of individual nominal-internal functions to account for the different readings, for
example, sibling-of, part-of, or body-part-of (p. 367), to name a few. The critical question, then,
is what are the constraints on positing these theoretically unlimited number of categories?
Without explicit lexical distinctions, the cognitive burden of learning and memorizing a vast
number of these categorical semantic relations is quite great, suggesting this is not the most
parsimonious or psychologically plausible way to account for the semantic variability in havesentences. In contrast, the uniﬁed relational meaning allows for a single conceptual device to
account for this variability and places the burden on lexicalization on each language, rather
than on the underlying cognitive system.
Cognitively principled structure
While Haspelmath discounts the possibility of identifying structural dimensions for such a
conceptual space that emerge independently from the lexical clustering patterns themselves–
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perhaps due to the target ﬁelds for mapping–I propose that the behavior of relational-meaning
markers crosslinguistically reveal two possible domain-general conceptual dimensions that can
structure this space that emerge from the central causal component for relational meanings, as
described in the uniﬁed LCS analysis. These dimensions are independently motivated components of causal perception, which is one of the most fundamental operations of the human (and
nonhuman, to some degree) cognitive system. Using these dimensions will ground a languagedriven lexical matrix into the structure of the mind in a more direct way.

3.2.2

Organizing conceptual dimensions

Here, I describe the two conceptual dimensions that will structure the gradient conceptual
infrastructure proposed to underlie the meanings of location and possession. Given the spectrum of externally derived structural relevance described by Zwarts (2010) (color vs. body-part
examples), I identify organizing conceptual dimensions that are both inherently connected to
the relational meanings themselves and grounded in the core of the domain-general cognitive
system.
First and foremost, relational meanings are inherently about the connection or relationship
between the two entities involved. Part-whole relations, typically categorized as inalienable
possession, describe the strong, sometimes permanent, usually physical connection between
two entities, while a correspondingly strong, semipermanent, social connection between two
entities forms a kinship relation, which is also typically categorized as inalienable possession.
Locative relations, on the other hand, also describe the spatial conﬁguration or relationship
between two entities, contiguous or not. Accordingly, one potentially useful conceptual dimension is therefore connectedness.
Second, the role of animacy has been described in-depth as being a crucial parameter for
synchronic and diachronic patterns in relational markers (Kuryłowicz, 1964; Aristar, 1996;
Myler, 2016, a.o.). Speciﬁcally, animacy asymmetries between the ﬁrst and second entities
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in a relational meaning give rise to readings of control or asymmetric inﬂuence (Falmier and
Young, 2008), especially in the case of ownership or control relations (i.e., the stepwise ambiguities in the early-stage Marathi trajectory or the lexical ambiguities as in the case of French
dative or possessive à). Therefore, the second conceptual dimension I propose is control
asymmetry.
As it happens, two of the most fundamental, domain-general operations in the human cognitive system align perfectly with these two principal components of relational meanings I
have just described: perception of “oneness” and perception of animacy/agency, respectively
(Carey, 2009). The former is the core cognition operation that individuates continuous sensory input into discontinuous objects or units (object individuation), while the latter is
the core cognition operation that ascribes causality and thus agency from sequential events
(causal perception). Both of these operations have been shown to be developmentally primary (learned ﬁrst/innate, Bowerman, 1974; Richardson and Kirkham, 2004) and perceptually
automatic throughout the lifespan (happens obligatorily, Gopnik et al., 2004).2
The mechanism that unites the relational meanings and the cognitive system is therefore
that of causal perception, which is not only a fundamental cognitive operation, but the key
component of the uniﬁed LCS account for the meaning of have. Directly below, I describe
in detail the way that these dimensions are (a) inherent to relational meanings, (b) grounded
in the domain-general cognitive system, and (c) useful for organizing the range of relational
meanings.
Connectedness
The grounding of the conceptual dimension of connectedness lies in the cognitive operation
of object individuation. Object individuation is an innate and automatic cognitive operation
2

While not in the scope of this dissertation, understanding how perceptual, conceptual, and statistical processes feature into perception of “oneness” and causality throughout the lifetime, and how these percepts guide
and are guided by language use and development is a rich domain for future research.
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that allows us to parse into chunks (objects/entities/units) a continuous sensory input, and has
been primarily investigated in the visual modality (Strawson, 1964; Spelke et al., 1995; Xu and
Carey, 1996; Krøjgaard, 2004). The output of this operation is a percept of connectedness–the
degree to which various components of a scene can be understood to form a unit. What this
means is that the fundamental cognitive operation returns an output value ranging from lowconnectedness to high-connectedness. Entities perceived as separate or less connected are
then thought less of as a unit, while entities perceived as together or more connected can be
conceptually grouped into a unit. One important property of such unithood is inextricability,
the degree to which components of a unit can be separated while remaining “themselves” still.
Connectedness and inextricability are useful conceptual dimensions to evaluate relational
meanings because they capture the spectrum of connectedness from incidental proximity to
part-whole relations. Speciﬁcally, incidental proximity relations like The red car is next to the
blue truck have a low degree of connectedness, while part-whole relations like Sue’s liver have
a high degree of connectedness. From the inextricability lens, separating the red car from
the blue truck would not result in a change of unithood, while separating Sue’s liver from Sue
would constitute a major change resulting in most of Sue and a disembodied liver. To highlight
the gradience, a parallel situation involving Sue and her hair would represent a less dramatic
change, indicating a slightly lower degree of connectedness or inextricability. In between, an
ownership (alienable possession) relation like I own a three-bedroom house would have an intermediate degree of connectedness–the house and its owner are not as inextricable as a human
being and their liver, but constitute more of a unit than two vehicles incidentally co-located.
Control asymmetry
The other conceptual dimension for the gradient infrastructure is grounded in the cognitive
operation of causal perception. Causal perception is the fast, automatic, stimulus-driven inferencing process that leads to the perception, feeling, or interpretation of causality (Heider and
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Simmel, 1944; Michotte, 1946; Scholl and Tremoulet, 2000). One key component of the causal
perception process is the detecting of features associated with animacy, like self-generated
movement or eyes, among others. Animacy is a cognitive evaluation that is known to be gradient (degree of animacy rather than ±animate) and shows variability across individuals (Scholl
and Tremoulet, 2000; Prasada, 2003; Falmier and Young, 2008). A high degree of perceived
or understood animacy will result in a high degree of agency and therefore causal potential in
an event or scene. That is, entities that are perceived as animate are ascribed as having more
causal potential to affect other entities or participants in a scene, while entities that are perceived as less animate or inanimate are associated with less ability to affect other participants
in a scene. Therefore, what this means is that the fundamental cognitive operation will return
an output value ranging from high potential to control or affect others (more animate) to less
potential for control (less animate). Crucially, for this conceptual dimension, the asymmetry in
degree of perceived control/causal potential is the important measure for relational meanings.
That is, the difference in control potential–or the relative control–is the key distinction. For
example, the degree of control asymmetry between two adult twins may resemble the same
degree of control asymmetry between the two adjacent mugs on a table (both having no control asymmetry), even though the absolute degree of animacy or control potential may differ
between the entity pairs.
Control asymmetry is a useful conceptual dimension to evaluate relational meanings because it captures the degree of affectedness that is inherently understood in situations of control, ownership, or generalized possession. Speciﬁcally, incidental proximity relations like The
red car is next to the blue truck have a low degree of control asymmetry. Part-whole relations
like Sue’s liver are also characterizable as having a low degree of control asymmetry since, for
this example, it is unclear whether Sue has more control over her liver than her liver has over
her. In contrast, ownership or control relations show the greatest degree of control asymmetry, especially in cases where the animacy difference is maximized, as in the case of an adult
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human with an inanimate object, like Sue has a porcelain vase. Intermediate degrees of control
asymmetry can be achieved by pairing two animate entities with differing degrees of animacy
such as Sue has an orange cat or The mother cat has a newborn kitten.

3.2.3

A gradient conceptual infrastructure for relational meanings

Using these two conceptual dimensions, I construct a Cartesian space that represents the
gradient conceptual infrastructure (GCI), as presented in Figure 3.2. Here, I present it with
several relational meanings placed in their respective regions of this space; the dotted line indicates roughly where the conceptually salient–or even possible–relational meanings are located
within this space.
Figure 3.2: The gradient conceptual infrastructure underlying relational meanings.

This model distinguishes different forms of relational meanings by relative values of perceived connectedness and control asymmetry; it does not create discrete categories for different degrees of connectedness relations. For example, locative-type relations tend to have
low connectedness and low control asymmetry, and are therefore represented by the lowerleft region in the space; inalienable possessive-type relations tend to have high connectedness
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and low control asymmetry values, and are therefore represented by the lower-left region in
the space. Alienable possessive-type relations are characterized by greater degrees of control
asymmetry, and are therefore represented by the upper region in the space. The possible relations communicable by a have-sentence lie in this gradient conceptual infrastructure. The
categories of meaning are therefore epiphenomenal: they are perceived to be categorical due
to varying lexicalization patterns in English and other languages. For example, belong and own
would lexicalize the chunk of this conceptual space characterized by high degrees of control
asymmetry and medium degrees of connectedness. Crucially, these categories serve only as
heuristics for more easily describing certain types of relations; the underlying conceptual representations are not categorical.
Gradient manipulation of the conceptual properties in a relation
To illustrate the gradience of this space, I will present two examples in which manipulating
conceptual properties in a gradient way can change the relationship between the two entities in
a relational meaning and consequently change, within a language, the lexical marking strategy
used to communicate it.
Property of the situation: Conventionalized structure

Take, for example, the lower-

left region of low connectedness and low control asymmetry, which is typically understood
as locative-type relations. This region includes relations like the incidental proximity of two
leaves on the ground during autumn, a car and a truck parked near each other in a ﬁeld, or a car
parked next to a tree. By subtly manipulating the properties of the contextual situation, differences in the perceived relational meaning can emerge: for example, a car and a truck parked
near each other, in a parallel orientation, in a parking lot, or a car parked next to a tree because
of the shade it provides on a hot summer day. In these examples, the incidentality of the entities’ co-location is reduced, which in turn strengthens the perception of connectedness (i.e.,
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participation in a larger unit). Situational enrichment with information about conventionalized or known relational structures and motivations can thus change the perceived relational
meaning.
Property of the entities: Animacy

Manipulating the properties of the entities involved

can also give rise to changes in an interpreted relational meaning: as described in previous
examples, the difference between a proximity (locative) and a control (possessive) relation is
often determined by the animacy of the possessor/location. For example, as shown in (65), reproduced below as (59), the use of an animate possessor (the ﬁrst person pronoun) in (59a) gives
rise to a control/possession relation using the same locative adposition kade as the inanimate
location in (59b).
(59)

Marathi (Deo, 2014, p. c.)
a.

Mazh-ya-kade pustak
ahe.
1.SG.OBL-near
book.NOM be.3.SG.PRES
‘I have the book.’

b. Granthalaya-kade pustak
ahe.
library.OBL-near book.NOM be.3.SG.PRES
‘The book is near the library.’
However, upon closer scrutiny, categoricality vs. continguity problem resurfaces in the
domain of animacy.3 What counts as animate and what counts as inanimate? While animacy
accepted to be a domain-general concept evolutionarily privileged in cognitive systems (Caramazza and Shelton, 1998; Castelli et al., 2002), a categorical boundary between animate and
inanimate remains elusive (Thorat et al., 2019; Balas and Auen, 2019). Though a thorough investigation of the conceptual foundations of the perception of animacy lies outside the scope
of this project, two parameters seem to be of particular import in determining animacy from
3

For discussion the Animacy Hierarchy in linguistics, see Sorlin and Gardelle (2018).
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a human perspective: internally generated motion and conceptual proximity or relatability to
the human mind and body.4 Take these examples of entities on a cline of internally generated
motion (60) as well as relatability to humans (61). Applying the lexically ambiguous kade or
French à frames of “X-kade is a stone” or “the stone is à X,” it is not obviously clear where to
draw a boundary for the resulting locative vs. possessive readings.5 Moreover, a distinction
can even be drawn within human beings between babies and adults, in which the relationship
between an entity, say, a book, and a baby might be understood to be more locative than the
relationship between the same entity and an adult.
(60)

Internally generated motion
a.

(61)

Rock

a.

b. Moss
c.

c.

d. Vine
Jellyﬁsh

f.

Butterﬂy

g.

Slug

Slug

b. Mosquito

Tree

e.

Relatability to humans

Trout

d. Snake
e.

Chicken

f.

Cow

h. Sloth

g.

Cat

i.

h. Dolphin

Cat

Ultimately, this gradience is the crux of the issue with relational meanings. Where is the
boundary between a proximity-type relation and a control-type relation? A gradient conceptual infrastructure allows us to characterize these relations without needing to make speciﬁc
determinations for category membership; consequently, we can understand the existing proposed categories as a natural cline of relations, rather than a puzzling set of lexically coincident
4

Another important factor is relative size. Cognitive scientists of all disciplines have long observed that
relative size between objects can inﬂuence the perception of their relation: this is known as the ﬁgure-ground
organization or distinction (Thiering, 2011; Wagemans et al., 2012).
5
The test frame also has its own inﬂuence on the ﬁnal reading of the sentence, since a critical component of
evaluation is relating the entities together. Accordingly, choosing “a pebble” as the locatum/possessee, compared
to “a book” or “a mobile phone” changes the evaluated break between animate vs. inanimate.
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patterns. Crucially, it is also clear that the resulting relation depends on a variety of conceptual
features associated with the entities and context of a relational meaning.

3.3
3.3.1

The LCS-CS connection
Lexicalization of conceptual structure

One way to model the conceptual connection between location and possession (and all relational) meanings is by using a gradient space constructed from conceptually relevant but
language-external cognitive dimensions. By understanding relational meanings as a uniﬁed
but gradient space, this account addresses the issue of parsimony optimization: accounting
for an underlyingly continuous representation using categorical bins.6
The key connection for this model of meaning variation is that between the uniﬁed lexicoconceptual semantic structure presented in Chapter 2 and this gradient conceptual infrastructure (GCI), as a speciﬁc model for the conceptual strucutre underlying relational meanings.
What the LCS represents is the linguistic packaging of a chunk of conceptual structure with a
physical signal (auditory or visual) by linguistic conventionalization. This linking may include
morphosyntactic combinatorial information, but the vital unit is the sound/sign-meaning pairing, as represented by the lexical item structure shown in §2.3.2. This packaging process is
referred to as lexicalization (Jackendoff, 1983, 1997, 2019): the expression of systematic con6
One methodological point that has theoretical consequences is that these categories within the body of relational meanings serve as analytic tools for linguists; they help us describe in speciﬁc and systematic ways the
meanings that lexical markers like have can encode. While useful for the precise description of linguistic patterns,
these categories cannot be understood to be the ontological substance of meaning; they remain interpretationdriven externally imposed structures onto the less-easily tractable stuff of thought. If each set of category divisions, which are created for study-speciﬁc purposes, is taken to be the actual substance of meaning, then it is
easy to see such a situation as a “too many meanings” problem to be addressed by eliminating the entire space.
To avoid such a bathwater-baby situation, it is important to remain cognizant of the purposes, limitations, and
the scope of any given analytic tool.
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nections between semantic and conceptual constituents through lexical items.7 , 8 , 9

3.3.2

English have lexicalizes the entire gradient conceptual infrastructure

I take English have to be simply a case of lexicalization over this conceptual infrastructure.
That is, English have can refer to the whole range of relational meanings represented by the
GCI: location, possession, and every relation in between. From this perspective, have does
not seem to encode “too many” meanings, but precisely the meanings expected, especially
locative-type meanings.
The LCS of have, reproduced below in (62), lexicalizes the gradient conceptual infrastructure by packaging the causal dimensions of a relational meaning between two entities into the
causal adjunct and locative core.
7

The term lexicalization has many theoretical and operational instantiations; Thomas (2013) characterizes at
least two types: synchronic and diachronic, with the Jackendovian type belonging to the former. This lexicalization idea refers to the way that conceptually related meanings are expressed through linguistically related lexical
items and broadly concerns the mapping between these levels of representation. Diachronic lexicalization, on
the other hand, is understood to be the process of word-formation over time through the “atomization” of composed structure into a single, non-decomposable unit; for a survey of topics within this ﬁeld of study, see ten
Hacken and Thomas (2013).
8
While it is an important component of the lexicalization process, I do not further discuss the content of this
chunking process, i.e., speciﬁcally the status and role of syntactic structure in theses lexicalizations. The main
reason is one of operation rather than interest–speciﬁcally, because the syntactic structures of the have-sentences
in question are identical. It remains an interesting question the extent to which the idea of constructionalization
could be applied to have-sentences, particularly in the case of locative PPs; for a comprehensive synthesis on the
spectrum of proposals regarding constructionalization vs. lexicalization, see Lepic (2019).
9
Importantly, however, lexicalization in the latter sense can be understood to be a property of linguistic structures that varies continuously between the poles of complete, invariable memorization (as in the case of, say, the
name of a speciﬁc chemical compound) and complete, variable context-dependence (as in the case of, say, a deictic
eye, lip, or hand movement). This spectrum allows for varying degrees of pan-situational reliability, as discussed
in Piñango et al. (2017), for the case of systematic versus circumstantial metonymy. In Chapter 9, I further discuss
this aspect of context-dependence, as motivated by the neuroimaging results from Chapter 8, as an avenue for
diachronic change emerging from this otherwise “synchronic” (see Thomas 2013) view of lexicalization.
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(62)

LCS for relational meanings in a have-sentence.
Situation
Event2

Event1

CAUSE

ACT

THINGi

(possessor/
controller)

BE

PATH

THINGj

(possessee/
controllee/
located)

AT

PLACE

(location)

This means that the conceptual representations of the entities and their relation are harnessed by linguistic structure into linguistically salient roles such as actor/subject, patient/object,
etc. This packaging, and perhaps translation of sorts, allows for conceptual representations,
as the “stuff of thought” (à la Pinker 2007), to enter into the domain of and be manipulated by
linguistic structures.10
The relationship between the LCS of have and the GCI is a unidirectional one. That is,
the GCI’s conceptual ontology has linguistic consequence: both dimensions of the GCI are
properties or assessments of properties over two entities. This conceptual two-entity requirement is borne out linguistically through the two-argument structure of have. Additionally, the
requirement of a high degree of control asymmetry, indicating a high degree of control by one
entity over another, is borne out linguistically through the designation of an actor (and its consequent language-speciﬁc structure). While the LCS of a lexical item does not inﬂuence the
GCI directly, it mediates a speaker/comprehender’s interaction with the GCI, as its structure
can make salient a subspace of relational meanings from the entire GCI. Linguistically, this
10

Another body of thought and work highly relevant to the lexicalization of conceptual structure discussion
is the Two-level Semantics framework (Bierwisch, 2007; Lang and Maienborn, 2019), which broadly seeks to
bridge compositionality, context-dependence, and conceptuality as the major aims of the predominant analytical approaches for studying linguistic meaning. The fundamental idea is two levels of semantic representation,
Semantic Form (SF) and Conceptual Structure (CS), whereby SF is a subset of CS, that can be characterized
together formally; the mathematical sanctioning of contextual factors and conceptual content allows the Twolevel Semantics framework to account for a variety of semantic phenomena typically restricted to the individual
wheelhouses of model-theoretic semantics, conceptual semantics, etc. I invoke some of its key components in
the formal analysis of have-sentences following from the uniﬁed LCS account, in Chapter 5.
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designation of a subspace is the demarcation of a lexical boundary. However, lexical items
such as have that lexicalize maximally over the entire GCI space bear no inﬂuence on the GCI
itself.
This conceptual space is directly motivated by the gradience between prototypical locativeand possessive-type meanings, as exempliﬁed by the sentences in (63, reproduced from 58),
which show how different degrees of connectedness (a/b, c/d, d/e) or control asymmetry (f/g,
h/i, i/j, k/l) can change the type of relationship between the two entities involved, giving rise to
a spectrum of readings in one meaning space. Here, I present the relationships using the
English genitive marker, which can also encode a broad range of meanings from the conceptual
space; the relevant test for assessing a change in relationship is by using other lexical devices
that do not permit encoding of such a broad range from the space. For example, between
examples (63a-b), the former would not permit The chair belongs to Sue while the latter would, as
belong requires a higher degree of connectedness through the social relationship of ownership.
(63)

Conceptual parameter manipulations
a.

Sue’s chair is broken. (in a waiting room)

b. Sue’s chair is broken. (in her office)
c.

The chauffeur’s car is in the shop right now. (the car driven by the chauffeur)

d. Sue’s car is in the shop right now. (the car owned by Sue)
e.

Sue’s cat is sick.

f.

Sue’s haircut is really striking.

g.

Sue’s hair is turning gray.

h. Sue’s unborn baby is kicking a lot these days.
i.

Sue’s heart is mildly hypertrophic.

j.

Sue’s liver is taking a beating from all her drinking.

k. Sue’s daughter is very independent, she wants nothing to do with Sue.
l.

Sue’s daughter is her best friend.
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This gradient space inherently addresses the limitations in the extant approaches by explaining why have shows constrained variability in this domain (because these are the meanings that are captured by these conceptual parameters) and how the meanings conveyed by
have-sentences seem to show ambiguities in their types (because these are ambiguous, and
therefore contextually speciﬁed readings of a single generalized relational meaning). Crucially,
this analysis is an answer to the one-to-many meaning mapping “problem” described by Myler
(2014, a.o.), by showing that the many so-called “different meanings” are simply conceptually
principled readings of a single, generalized meaning.
The takeaway for the uniﬁed LCS account for English have-sentences is that this gradient
conceptual infrastructure serves as the set of conceptually possible relational meanings which
language-speciﬁc linguistic structures can potentially identify and encode.11

3.3.3

Predictions for typology and diachrony

The setup of lexicalizing over this gradient conceptual infrastructure makes predictions crosslinguistically for how relational markers behave over space and time. This notion of variable lexicalization across languages follows from the framework described in Levin and Hovav (2019),
who investigate “the encoding of conceptual components into a lexical unit” and “the regularities in the way such components are encoded in lexical items and hence distributed across
[linguistic] constituents in particular languages.”
I propose that the gradient conceptual infrastructure setup makes three types of predictions regarding the regularities in how lexical items can encode portions of the space: synchronic, diachronic, and acquisitional. Synchronically, we should observe rampant lexical
11

Technically, the GCI for relational meanings is agnostic to the lexical semantic analysis of the two competing
accounts; it could very much be the case that this relational meaning space is indeed what underlies the theoretically unlimited set of functional heads required to enumerate the semantic variability of have-sentences in the
transitive copula account. However, I take the GCI to be part of the uniﬁed LCS account because it is speciﬁcally
connected through the conceptual dimensions contributing to the causal potential evaluation of the LCS representation. The transitive copula account does not make any explicit connection to the possible infrastructural
principles or constraints for the spectrum of relational meanings.
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conﬂation across languages given a shared relational meaning infrastructure, though additional
lexical devices for identifying speciﬁc sub-spaces within the infrastructure should also be available in any given language. The setup for English have could give rise to an implicational hierarchy in which possessive markers must also encode locative meanings, though this effect could
be, as in the case of English, mediated by lexical blocking strength and contextual support. Diachronically, relational markers that lexicalize a GCI subspace (such as kade) should show
smooth diachronic trajectories through the space, given the underlying gradience of the relations, in contrast to markers that lexicalize the entire GCI (such as à). Furthermore, these trajectories should proceed unidirectionally, from the origin of the Cartesian space outward, due
to the higher informativity of greater degrees of connectedness and control asymmetry. Developmentally, children acquiring language should show a sequentiality of relational meanings starting from location, as the most conceptually basic of relations, and progressing to
control and possession. Furthermore, instantiating the diachronic pattern during acquisition,
children could also show overextension of informationally weaker relational markers (such as
markers of proximity) into the domains of control or possession.

3.4

Crosslinguistic consequences of the gradient conceptual infrastructure

In this section, I present evidence from a diverse set of languages that bear out these predicted
patterns of variation and change made by the gradient conceptual infrastructure for relational
meanings. First, I show synchronic lexicalization patterns in which languages lexicalize over
this entire space, then, I illustrate the smooth, incremental, and unidirectional diachronic
trajectories of locational markers through the space, and conclude with acquisitional stages
corresponding to the conceptual primacy of location and the growth of other relational meanings from it.
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3.4.1

Synchronic conﬂation

Typologists have long observed that possessive meanings are often conveyed with the use of
prototypically locative linguistic material; this conﬂation phenomenon has been described as
syncretism taking place at the morphological level and the lexical item level.12 Directly below,
I brieﬂy present these two patterns as crosslinguistic evidence that result from a gradient
conceptual infrastructure for relational meanings.
Morphological conﬂation: possessives as datives and datives from locative adpositions
The examples in (64-66) illustrate a small sample of clear cases of how the same marker, a
locative adposition, is used to express both incidental proximity (location) and ownership or
control (possession) meanings across a variety of languages.
(64)

French
a.

Le
livre,
c’ est
à moi.
the.M.SG book.M.SG it be.3.SG.PRES at 1.SG
‘I have the book.’

b. Le
livre,
c’ est
à la
bibliothèque.
the.the.M.SG book.the.M.SG it be.3.SG.PRES at the.F.SG library
‘The book is at the library.’
(65)

Marathi (Deo, 2014, p. c.)
a.

Mazh-ya-kade pustak
ahe.
1.SG.OBL-near
book.NOM be.3.SG.PRES
‘I have the book.’

b. Granthalaya-kade pustak
ahe.
library.OBL-near book.NOM be.3.SG.PRES
‘The book is near the library.’
12

See Matushansky (2021) for a comprehensive crosslinguistic comparison of prepositional phrase distributions
within this semantic domain.
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(66)

Mandarin Chinese
a.

Zhe ben shu zai
wo zhe-li
this CL book [is].at 1.SG here
‘I have the book.’

b. Zhe ben shu zai
tushuguan (na-li)
this CL book [is].at library
(there)
‘The book is at the library.’
The use of locative terms in the expression of predicative possession is a well-studied instance of morphological syncretism (Lyons, 1967; Clark, 1978; Freeze, 1992) in which languages
encode the notions of spatial proximity or coincidence and alienable possession using a single
morphosyntactic form. This conﬂation is attested, at least, in Indo-European, Finno-Ugric,
Australian, Dravidian, African, and American indigenous languages (Aristar, 1996; Heine, 1997;
Tham, 2004).
Speciﬁcally, such markers are understood to be the ﬁnal stage of a grammaticalization pathway that begins with purely locative adpositions and ends at dative markers (Deo, 2015a). Dative markers, in turn, have been extensively documented as participating in possessive constructions; this kind of possessive construction is typically referred to as ‘external possession’
which itself has been a topic of much discussion (see Payne and Barshi, 1999, a.o.).13 While
these possessive datives have typically been associated with European languages (Haspelmath,
1999) (see German (67)), more recent work has shown that such possessive dative constructions are well-represented crosslinguistically. Lambert (2010) details the parallel constructions
in Estonian, Korean, as well as Eastern African (Cushitic), Central African (Chadic), Papuan
(Sepik-Ramu), and Southeastern Native American (Muskogean) languages, showing the global
breadth of the use of dative markers for the expression of possessive relations.
13

While much of the focus of external possession has been in relation to syntactic theory, it is noteworthy that
descriptions of the meanings associated with external possession constructions have converged on meanings associated with English have in the location/possession domain as well as causatives, adversatives, and benefactives.
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(67)

dem
Jungen seine
Hände
the.M.SG.DAT boy.DAT POSS.PRN.PL hands
‘the boy’s hands’

Crucially, Kuryłowicz (1964) proposes that the dative is “genetically nothing else than an
offshoot of the locative used with personal nouns.” This claim is later substantiated with
typological evidence by Aristar (1996) that shows a complementary distribution of datives and
locatives depending on an animacy parameter, that is, datives are used with animate nominals
while locatives are used with inanimate nominals.
An even more compelling example of this morphological syncretism is the case of Finnish,
which has one of the most explicitly enumerated nominal case systems that has been studied
extensively (Toivonen, 2000). In the traditional analysis of Finnish, there are six locative case
markers which mark “internal location” (inessive ‘inside’, elative ‘out of ’, illative ‘into’) and
“external location” (adessive ‘on, at’, ablative ‘off ’, allative ‘’onto’) (Setälä, 1898), among others.
Finnish also has a dedicated genitive marker in addition to a comitative marker, though recent
work has cast into question the nature of this genitive, which in addition to expressing possession in the conventional way, shows parallels with other possessive markers like datives as well
as have-type possessive verbs (Mahieu, 2013). Speciﬁcally, even with such a conventionalized
way to express possession, Finnish also makes use of the explicitly locative adessive marker for
possession meanings as well. Notably, this adessive possessive is a commonly used possessive
construction (68).
(68)

Finnish (Mahieu, 2013)
a.

Pekka-n
auto.
Pekka-GEN car-NOM
‘Pekka’s car’

b. Auto
on
Pekka-n.
Car-NOM be.3.SG Pekka-GEN
‘The car is Pekka’s.’
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c.

Pekka-lla on
auto.
Pekka-ADE be.3.SG car-NOM
‘Pekka has a car’ lit.: ‘at Pekka is a car.’

The case of Finnish possession shows that even with explicit and dedicated linguistic resources to mark possessive relations, locatives are still used widely to mark possession as well.14
Overall, the takeaway here is that such widespread crosslinguistic conﬂation of locative and
possessive morphology lends support to the idea that these locative and possessive meanings
are connected at a conceptual level; I take the crosslinguistic ubiquity of this overt linguistic
syncretism to be rooted in an underlying “conceptual syncretism” for these relational meanings.
Lexical conﬂation: possessive verbs for location and possession
The other form of lexical conﬂation within the relational meaning domain is a common verb
used for both locative and possessive (and to some degree, existential) meanings. Such verbs
are the most direct correlates to English have, but typically show more circumscribed sets of
uses. One such example is the Mandarin verb you, typically glossed as ‘have/exist,’ which is
the canonical device in the language used to express all relational meanings. The three examples in (69) show how the three meanings are distinguished by the ﬁrst argument of the verb:
existential predication requires no ﬁrst argument (69a), possession requires any NP/THING
as the ﬁrst argument (69b),1 and location requires an inanimate NP/THING plus a locative
particle as the ﬁrst argument (69c). The second argument for all meanings with you is any
NP/THING. Notably, the same dependence on the conceptual feature of animacy is involved
in the interpretation of these sentences, as observed by Kuryłowicz (1964).
14

Why is this the case? One possible explanation is that communicative systems tend to have bidirectional constructions that allow for focusing of different entities in the construction. This information structural parameter
is the theme-rheme split and will be discussed later in Section ??.

104

(69)

Mandarin Chinese
a.

you yi ben shu
exist one CL book
‘There is a book.’

b. wo you yi ben shu
1.sg have one CL book
‘I have a book.’
c.

zhuozi-shang you yi ben shu
table-on
have one CL book
‘The table has a book on it.’

Another example is American Sign Language, which uses the verb HAVE15 to express possessive relations as well as locative relations in a similar way to Mandarin Chinese, that is, in
requiring the additional speciﬁcation of a possessive relation to give a locative meaning. ASL
is typically understood to have freer word order than Mandarin, consequently the placement
of the locational speciﬁer is less restricted than in Mandarin, where it must follow the location
entity directly.
(70)

American Sign Language16
a.

I HAVE ONE BOOK
‘I have one book.’

b. TABLE HAVE BOOK CL:AIX
table
have book CL:LOC
‘The table has a book on it.’
c.

TABLE HAVE WHAT BOOK CL:AIX
table
have what
book CL:LOC
‘The table has a book on it.’

15

Following linguistic convention, I will use capital letters to indicate signs (linguistic material in the visuogestural modality) in ASL–this convention is parallel to the use of italics to designate words (linguistic material
in the aural-oral modality).
16
Example (70c) uses one of the most prototypical sentence constructions of ASL, the Clausal QuestionAnswer Pair (Davidson et al., 2008), as opposed to the more English-inﬂuenced (70b).
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Such lexical conﬂation is widespread in Tibeto-Burman languages in particular; the Tani
languages of Northeastern India and Southeastern Tibet show conﬂation of these relational
meanings in a slightly different way (Post, 2008): in Mising, a generalized form dung is used for
existence, location, and possession meanings, with possessives requiring a genitive-like marker
(71). This pattern contrasts the Mandarin and ASL data, which require additional speciﬁcation
of the generalized marker for locative meanings.
(71)

Mising (Post, 2008)
a.

sə
PRX

asi
dung
water exist

‘There’s water in this one.’
b. guhatisə
gasumko
tani
dung
guhati=sə
gasum=ko
tani
dung
Guwahati=PRX multiplicity=IND person exist
‘There are many people here in Guwahati.’
c.

Ngokkə
eegə
dung
No-kə=əə
eek=əə dung
1.sg-GEN=TOP pig=TOP exist
‘I have pigs.’

Interestingly, dung is also the verb for ‘sit’, which places this lexical nexus into a crosslinguistically well-attested pattern of locative expressions emerging from positional verbs for ‘sit’,
‘stand’, and ‘lie down’, among others. In Apatani, a closely related Tani language, all three of
these positional verbs (dùu, dà’, and dóo, respectively), are used for locative, possessive, and
existential meanings.
Takeaway: various strategies (degrees of syncretism) for referring to these meanings
Again, the takeaway here is that this widespread crosslinguistic conﬂation of locative and possessive linguistic material, this time at the lexical rather than morphological level, further bol106

sters a conceptual connection between the meanings of location and possession–the “conceptual syncretism” described previously, particularly as predicted by the setup of the gradient
conceptual infrastructure. The breadth of these conﬂation phenomena globally show a systematic lexicalization of these meanings. Though the individual patterns also show variation,
presumably due to language-internal factors, there is no question that the connection between
location and possession expressions lies beyond areal or contact phenomena, and indicates a
deeper motivation for why linguistic structures across the world converge systematically on
expressing location and possessive meanings using overlapping lexical devices.

3.4.2

Diachronic trajectories

I now turn to diachronic patterns of locative and possessive expressions for additional insight
on the conceptual connection between the meanings of location and possession. In this section, I will show a diachronic trajectory, consistent with the setup of the gradient conceptual
infrastructure, that illustrates how these meanings are ontologically connected, and that they
extend unidirectionally in a systematic fashion.
Marathi kade
The morphological conﬂation of locative and possessive meanings is also attested across languages diachronically. The best documented example of this phenomenon is observed in
Marathi, an Indo-Aryan language with over 70 million speakers. Table (3.1) shows how a single
adposition kade moves incrementally through this meaning space over the course of approximately 200 years (Deo, 2008; Deo, 2020, p. c.). The change is actuated by animacy differences
in the subject position, and through alternating expansion and categorization processes, illustrated in (72-74).
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Table 3.1: The diachronic trajectory of the location-to-possession shift in Marathi
Meaning
Loc
Loc
Possalien
Possinalien
Possinalien

Subject
Inanim.
Anim.
Anim.
Anim.
Inanim.

Stage 0
kade
kade
la
la
la

Stage 1
kade
kade
kade/la
la
la

Stage 2
dzəval/ kade
dzəval
kade
la
la

Stage 3
dzəval
dzəval
dzəval/kade
kade/ la
la

Stage 4
dzəval
dzəval
dzəval/ kade
kade/la
kade/la

Stage 5
Z/dzəval
Z
dzəval
kade
kade

In Stage 0, locative readings (72) are exhaustively conveyed through the use of kade, regardless of the animacy of the subject. All possessive readings are communicated through la.
Gradually, kade encroaches upon the meanings of la, such that in Stage 1, there is an ambiguity with only animate agents (73), where both locative (proximity) and possessive (control)
readings are possible. Eventually, the language reaches Stage 2, where locative readings with
animate arguments are no longer possible with kade–it has become the only way to convey alienable possession, and a new marker, dzəval–meaning ‘underarm’–is recruited to convey locative
readings with animate subjects (74). Stage 3 shows an ongoing extension of kade into inalienable
possession (speciﬁcally part-whole and kinship relations) with animate arguments (75).
(72)

Stage 0
a.

ghara-kade
ek vihir
ase.
house.OBL-near one well.NOM be.3.SG.PRES
Near the house is a well.

b. gosaviya-kade mahadaisa ase.
sage.OBL-near Mahadaisa be.3.SG.PRES
Mahadaisa is near the sage.
(73)

Stage 1 (ambiguity with animate agents)
a.

ghara-kade
ek vihir
ahe.
house.OBL-near one well.NOM be.3.SG.PRES
Near the house is a well.
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b. manusa-kade ek kharata
ahe.
man.OBL-near one broom.NOM be.3.SG.PRES
(a) Near the man is a broom.
(b) The man has a broom. (under his control)
(74)

Stage 2 (categorical distinction with animate agents)
a.

ghara-kade
ek vihir
ahe.
house.OBL-near one well.NOM be.3.SG.PRES
Near the house is a well.

b. manusa-kade ek kharata
ahe.
man.OBL-near one broom.NOM be.3.SG.PRES
(a) *Near the man is a broom.
(b) The man has a broom. (under his control)
c.

manusa-dzəval ek kharata
ahe.
man.OBL-near one broom.NOM be.3.SG.PRES
Near the man is a broom.

(75)

Stage 3 (inalienable with animate agents)
a.

majhya-kade phakta nau bota
ahet.
1.sg.OBL-near only nine ﬁngers.NOM be.3.PL.PRES
I have only nine ﬁngers.

b. Ram-kade tin
bahini
ani don bhau
ahet.
Ram-near three sisters.NOM and two brothers.nom be.3.SG.PRES
Ram has three sisters and two brothers.
Crucially, the gradual, incrementally ambiguous trajectory of kade is evidence for a gradient
underlying conceptual connection for the meanings of location and possession, since the factors that drive each change are a conceptual feature, namely animacy, in the ﬁrst argument,
rather than a domain change as would be the case for a metaphorical extension. Further evidence for a gradient conceptual connection is that the location-to-possession trajectory presented here is cyclical: Stage 2 shows the introduction of dzəval into the trajectory, after which
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it follows the same pattern in Stages 3-5 as kade in Stages 0-2. Such cyclicality highlights the
stability of the meanings as conceptual infrastructure for the dynamic lexical markers themselves, which shift due to communicative and social pressures. That is to say, these patterns
reveal diachronic change at the level of the actual linguistic resources used to convey a set of
stable meanings. The meanings of locative and possessive relations are constant as concepts
that humans think and talk about–it is the linguistic devices that they used to indicate the
speciﬁc relations that shift over time.
Takeaway: these meanings are connected in an ordered way
Overall, the Marathi diachronicity follows from the gradient conceptual infrastructure, such
that lexical markers move unidirectionally from expressing locative meanings to possessive
meanings.17 These meanings are locally ambiguous, in that each ‘adjacent’ meaning pair shows
ambiguity, principally due to the conceptual feature of animacy. Deo (2015a) describes a set of
questions regarding any characterization of semantic change, one of which is “What is the logical relation between the meanings of these expressions such that a “path” may exist between
them?” Here, the Marathi data illustrate a subset relation between location and possession,
consistent with the LCS analysis for English have.
Such a gradient representation sheds light on why language after language shows systematic
synchronic overlap and diachronic shifts in the lexical markers used to express these meanings.
The lexical markers, as categorical bins that “chunk” this meaning space, live in states of ﬂux
and stability. On the one hand, minor changes in any of these conceptual features, for this
example–animacy, can push the lexical boundaries of a so-called “proximity” marker into a
marker that expresses a control or alienable possession relation. These lexical boundaries face
17

Regarding English have, though the breadth of relational meanings are well-attested before the beginning
of Modern English and therefore no diachronic patterns have been ascribed to it, the mere attestation of these
readings throughout its history does not necessarily rule out the possibility of a diachronic trajectory, as change
within a class of meanings is often visible only through a more nuanced investigation, such as relative frequencies
of forms (see Fuchs, 2020). This type of analysis is a possible avenue of future research.
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a challenge of maintaining traction in a semantic slippery slope. On the other hand, communicative pressures such as the optimization of economy vs. expressivity (vagueness vs. ambiguity in Haspelmath 2003) combined with cognitive blocking help maintain multiple markers
to cover this space.

3.4.3

Acquisition patterns

Another body of evidence bearing out the predictions from the gradient conceptual infrastructure of relational meanings are patterns of language acquisition and conceptual development.
These patterns again show the unidirectional gradience of the conceptual infrastructure at a
lifespan-internal timescale.
Conceptual development of location-possession meanings
The developmental literature has studied the acquisition of spatial language extensively; Clark
(1973) exhaustively outlines the conceptual dimensions of spatial language acquisition and its
relations to temporal language and the consequent challenges children face when acquiring
these linguistic devices. One particular challenge is the initially exhaustive mapping of linguistic space (“L-space”) onto perceptual space (“P-space”) and the subsequent pruning of distinctions based on the categoricality of the language eventually acquired. Clark (2004) presents
experimental data illustrating this exhaustivity allowing an important conclusion regarding a
shared conceptual basis for location and possession to be drawn.
Through preferential looking time studies, Clark outlines a sequence of acquisition for different spatial relations, which I take to be evidence illustrating the unary nature of relational
meanings. She ﬁnds that as a group, children are earliest in attending to containment relations
(6-7 months of age), and build on this understanding to attend to support relations later (9-14
months of age), though the individual learning trajectories are variable between individuals.
Moreover, children further build on these gradient notions of spatial conﬁgurations to loca111

tive “goal” trajectories by 15-18 months of age. While prototypical possessive relations, such
as ownership relations, are not acquired until an understanding of its societal implications
is gained, the locative relations here reﬂect the differential values of agentive control (as in
(73)) that deﬁne location and possession. The incrementality of this spatial language process
highlights the continuity of the conceptual space; different languages’ lexical categorization
of these relations only subsequently reﬁne the speciﬁc relations. Clark’s key conclusion is that
the acquisition of spatial language is perceptually driven and connected to a conceptual space,
and only later binned into language-speciﬁc categories, in the same way acquisition of vowels
in formant space is understood. Grounding the perceptual experiences of children into a conceptual space prior to a linguistic space enables children to continue perceiving a wide array
of spatial conﬁgurations, even after the linguistic categories are acquired.
Semantic extensions in acquisition
Children (and adolescents) have been widely reported to play a crucial role in language change,
especially along known dimensions of conceptual change, like the space-to-time dimensions
(Slobin, 1977; Kerswill, 1996; Eckert, 1989); that is, innovations and extensions made during language acquisition and development can follow known trajectories of meaning change.
This general phenomenon has been called into question (Sankoff, 1980; Baker and Syea, 1996),
speciﬁcally whether such “innovations” are true innovations or are taken from existing forms
that adults use and are readily available in the child’s linguistic milieu. This so-called counterevidence, however, takes the concepts to which children are innovating new mappings of linguistic form to be the basis of adult language, and consequently, children are not innovating
new meanings, the argument goes. I take the perspective that meanings, particularly relational
meanings for the purposes here, are not necessarily adult forms uniquely, but grounded in the
innate conceptual system. The question relevant to the present discussion, however, is how
the re-mapping of linguistic material to so-called “adult” forms (i.e., the maturing of “adult”-like
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lexical boundaries) can reveal the structure of the conceptual system.
One example of this situation lies again in the case of Marathi kade. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that children over-extend the use of kade along the predicted trajectory, using it even
for inalienable possession by inanimate ﬁrst arguments (possessors), which is otherwise unacceptable by adult speakers (Deo, 2014, 2020, p. c.). In (76), we see kade used with inanimate
“agents” to describe part-whole and kinship relations; these uses represent Stage 4 of the trajectory above. Within these inanimate entities, use with both inanimate but “animized” (facialized) entities, like vehicles, as well as entirely inanimate entities is observed.
(76)

Unauthorized extensions of kade by children
a.

bus-kade muh
nahi ahe,
dat
nahi ahe,
mag ti
ma-la
bus-‘near’ mouth NEG be.3.SG.PRES teeth NEG be.3.SG.PRES then 3.SG.F 1.SG.ACC
kasa kha-un tak-nar?
how eat.GER drop.PROSP
The bus doesn’t have a mouth, doesn’t have teeth, then how will she (it) eat me up?

b. hya ghara-kade lal dar ahe.
this house-‘near’ red door be.3.PL.PRES
This house has a red door.
This pattern of over-extension by children provides corroborating evidence that the lexical
devices in the language used to express relational meanings are identifying portions of this underlying, uniﬁed conceptual space in two ways. Following (Clark, 2004), children begin with
a maximally generalized form-to-concept mapping and later develop language-speciﬁc lexical
boundaries for more speciﬁc relations within the generalized mapping; the use of kade over
the entire relational space by young children suggests an inherent unity in these meanings
such that they are taken to be one at the start–speciﬁcally, that the more causal (and therefore
informationally stronger) reading is part of the more general meaning. Additionally, following the idea that only children can simplify grammars (Halle, 1964; Lightfoot, 1979; Kiparsky,
1982) this so-called ‘extension’ suggests a generalizability of these relational meanings, such
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that children would systematically refer to this generalized concept more economically, that
is, with fewer linguistic markers.
Takeaway: children understand these meanings to be conceptually uniﬁed
Overall, the unidirectional acquisitional incrementality parallels the unidirectional diachronic
incrementality as reﬂexes of the incrementality of the gradient conceptual infrastructure. The
conceptual primary of location as well as its manifestation in pre-linguistic beings is further
support for the import of the conceptual structure setup for the linguistic patterns we can
directly observe.

3.5

Conclusion

In sum, I take the synchronic, diachronic, and developmental patterns described here to be
reﬂexes of the underlying gradient conceptual infrastructure for relational meanings. In particular, the cyclicality of the Marathi trajectory supports the framework of a stable conceptual
infrastructure over which linguistic markers lexicalize while the movement of the mappings
of the lexical markers over the concepts is actuated by ambiguities from related conceptual
features like animacy.
The gradient conceptual infrastructure serves as the conceptual foundation and source for
the possible relational meanings encodable by linguistic devices in the process of lexicalization.
These crosslinguistic patterns tie together the ﬁrst two ingredients of the model of meaning
variation: a ﬂexible linguistic structure that allows access to and encoding of an entire conceptual space (the uniﬁed LCS structure in Chapter 2). The interaction of such lexical structure
with such conceptual structure is the source of how different meaning variants can emerge.
But, how are the possible meaning variants actuated? Individual speakers and comprehenders are the key ingredient for creating these variants from the ﬂexible lexical structure as
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constrained by the conceptual infrastructure. In the next section, I describe one operationalization of how individual users of a language can actuate meaning variation out of this model,
and how these individual-level traits, emerging from independently arising cognitive predispositions, interact with the ﬂexible lexical structure to produce conceptually constrained meaning variation.
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4.1

Introduction

In this chapter, I motivate the ﬁnal component of the model of meaning variation, which is the
construct of linguistic context-sensitivity, deﬁned as the capacity of a neurocognitive linguistic
system to identify and integrate the information in the communicative context prompted by
the meaning requirements of a given linguistic expression in that context (§4.2). Then, I describe two possible sources of individual-level variability in linguistic context-sensitivity, seeking to ground this construct in domain-general cognitive capacities (§4.3). Then, I take up
the ﬁndings in Study 1a, which showed that the locative reading of a “bare” have-sentence can
be facilitated using relevant contextual information, and show that this contextual-facilitation
effect, in fact, is limited to individual comprehenders who show a greater degree of linguistic
context-sensitivity (§4.4). Finally, I describe limitations with my principal index of linguistic
context-sensitivity, the Autism Quotient measure, and propose a new tool constructed from
it as an improved measure for further investigation (§4.5), and conclude the chapter with a
discussion on the implications of including individual-level variability in theoretical accounts
of language and further motivate investigation into the psychological reality of all three components of the model of meaning variation.

4.2

Linguistic context-sensitivity

The way in which individuals within the same speech community use language is systematic
yet variable. Where does this variability come from? Boland et al. (2016) deﬁne two sources for
between-individual variability in language: internal, that is, features of an individual’s cognitive
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system, such as cognitive style, that undergird linguistic choices and processing, and external,
that is, features of the communicative context, such as social dynamics.
The notion of cognitive style is used to describe the generalized ways in which different individuals acquire and process information, which presumably emerge from variability in
their underlying cognitive makeup (Kozhevnikov, 2007; Kozhevnikov et al., 2014). One wellstudied cognitive style phenomenon relevant and operationalizable to language use is contextsensitivity. In its domain-general instantiation, context-sensitivity refers to the capacity of
an individual for recognizing and making use of relevant information from the context. This
construct has been used in cross-cultural psychology to distinguish individuals from ‘Eastern’
versus ‘Western’ cultures (Masuda and Nisbett, 2001; Imada et al., 2013; Martin et al., 2019), in
cognitive psychology to distinguish women from men (Bonanno and Burton, 2013; Goubet and
Chrysikou, 2019), and in clinical psychology to distinguish individuals diagnosed with autistic
spectrum condition (ASC) from matched individuals without ASC (Mottron et al., 2000; Zilbovicius et al., 2006; Chawarska et al., 2012; Baez and Ibanez, 2014; Palmer et al., 2015). In
this latter domain, individuals with ASC are systematically less context-sensitive than their
matched neurotypical peers. This characterization falls in line with the well-established difficulties that individuals with ASC have with language use (American Psychiatric Association,
2013), particularly in the case of pragmatic, or context-dependent, language (Pijnacker et al.,
2009, 2010).
By extension, systematic variability in linguistic behavior has also been found in individuals
exhibiting so-called “autistic” traits, relative to individuals who do not display autistic traits
(Stewart and Ota, 2008; Nieuwland et al., 2010; Yu, 2010; Xiang et al., 2013; Antoniou et al.,
2016; Yoshimoto et al., 2017; Yang et al., 2018; Derrick et al., 2019; Lai et al., 2019). These
two sets of ﬁndings directly relate to the larger motive because they show that individuals
with ASC or autistic traits have difficulty with generalized context-sensitivity as well as with
certain aspects of context-dependent language.
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Consequently, I propose that the construct of linguistic context-sensitivity is a key
contributor to variability in linguistic behavior. Hereafter, I deﬁne linguistic context-sensitivity
as the capacity of a neurocognitive linguistic system to identify and integrate the information
in the communicative context prompted by the meaning requirements of a given linguistic
expression in that context. Speciﬁcally, the meaning requirements are those imposed by the
lexico-semantic conceptual structure of a given lexical item. Accordingly, the primary research
question is whether variability in the domain-general cognitive capacities identiﬁed as “autistic” traits contribute to variability in linguistic context-sensitivity.
Secondarily, I question the role of gender in linguistic context-sensitivity, as gender-group
has been found to correlate with differences in autism diagnoses and manifestations (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Parish-Morris et al., 2017), in context-sensitivity (Goubet
and Chrysikou, 2019), and in “autistic” traits in language (Yu, 2010). Moreover, foundational
work in the sociolinguistic variationist tradition has shown that gender-group correlates with
a variety of linguistic behaviors (Lakoff, 1973; Labov, 1990; Romaine, 2003), though the mechanisms by which socially constructed gender directly contributes to linguistic differences or,
instead, reﬂects other social factors that generate linguistic differences is still an area of active
research (Eckert and McConnell-Ginet, 2013; Talbot, 2019). These patterns beg the question:
do the multiplicity of social factors implicated in gender identity and performance also contribute variability in linguistic behavior through differences in linguistic context-sensitivity?
That is, do differences in gender-group or differences in behavior that are associated with
gender-group but originate from differences in other social factors, like position in a asymmetric social power structure, contribute to variability in linguistic context-sensitivity? These
questions are the focus of the present section.
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4.3

Possible sources of variability in linguistic contextsensitivity

4.3.1

Cognitive factors

One possible source for variability in linguistic context-sensitivity lies in the view that contextsensitivity is a function of cognitive style, in other words, that differences in domain-general
cognitive dispositions lead to certain individuals being more context-sensitive than others.
(Kozhevnikov et al., 2014), who, in an interdisciplinary analysis of different cognitive styles,
identify psychological dimensions as parameters for variability in cognitive style. I take three
of them to be particularly relevant for context-sensitivity, and list them with the contextsensitive pole of the dimension preceding the context-insensitive pole of the same dimension:
(a) integration versus compartmentalization: the ability to see atomic units composing into
larger structures versus seeing units as individual entities; (b) innovation versus adaptation:
the tendency to question convention and propose novel approaches versus accepting established procedures for a task; and (c) intuitive versus rule-based processing: the preference for
ﬂexible/pragmatic versus rigid/conventionalized information processing.
The psychological construct of context-sensitivity has also been explored in the autistic
spectrum condition (ASC) literature, as individuals diagnosed with ASC are widely reported
to show lower sensitivity to context in experimental tasks when compared to matched neurotypical peers, involving not only language processing (Brock et al., 2008; Pijnacker et al.,
2009, 2010) and language learning (Dörnyei, 2005; Dörnyei and Ryan, 2015), but also social
attention (Zilbovicius et al., 2006; Chawarska et al., 2012; Baez and Ibanez, 2014), and visual
and music perception (Palmer et al., 2015; Mottron et al., 2000).
The predominant framework for accounting for these low context-sensitivity effects is the
weak central coherence (WCC) account of ASC (Frith, 1989; Frith and Happé, 1994). The
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WCC account proposes that the source of the behavioral differences associated with ASC is
not an inherent disability per se, but a cognitive style focused on local, rather than global, processing. A local processing style is understood as attending to and focusing on details/atoms
ﬁrst and foremost, while a global processing style is understood as attending to and focusing
on overall conﬁgurations/gestalts ﬁrst and foremost (Navon, 1977; Kimchi, 1992), aligning with
dimension (a) from Kozhevnikov et al. (2014), above. Such a perspective can account not only
for the socio-communicative difficulties but also the heightened perceptual and “savant” abilities associated with ASC (Happé, 1997; Happé and Frith, 2006). The Enhanced Perceptual
Functioning (EPF) account, an alternative to the WCC, also focuses on the idea of a local bias,
though it attributes the bias not to a cognitive style, but disproportionately enhanced abilities at the local, perceptual level (Mottron et al., 2006). Yet another view, detailed in Plaisted
(2001), proposes that the inability to perform more global processes arises from an inability
to generalize (i.e., recognize similarities across stimuli and structure pieces of information together), rather than an asymmetric ability in or predisposition towards local processing.
While arbitrating between theoretical accounts of ASC is not in the scope of this work,
these ﬁndings provide possible explanations for largely overlapping bodies of evidence. In particular, the WCC and EPF accounts converge on the prediction that individuals with ASC
will show greater impairment in their performance of linguistic tasks that demand an integration of linguistic input with the larger linguistic context, in contrast to linguistic tasks that do
not demand such contextual integration. Reported evidence bears this prediction out. Nuske
and Bavin (2011) tested narrative comprehension in children ages 4-7 and found a performance
asymmetry: whereas children with ASC and their age-matched typically developing controls
score similarly on local-processing questions probing details and fact-based recall, the typically developing children show improved global-processing questions probing main ideas and
inferential processing. While the similar local processing scores, in terms of group means,
would seem to support only the WCC, the ASC group showed much higher variability in their
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scores, which is not inconsistent with an EPF approach. This observation, in line with the wellknown heterogeneity of ASC trait presentation, underscores the importance of characterizing
individual-level variability in language behavior.
Crucially, the reconceptualization of ASC as the degree of “local bias” in processing, as a
gradient cognitive style rather than a categorical dysfunction, suggests the existence of a similar bias in non-autistic individuals in the population at large, following the broader autism
phenotype framework (Piven et al., 1997; Constantino and Todd, 2003; Sucksmith et al., 2011;
Bralten et al., 2018, a.o.), which takes characteristics of ASC to be subclinical manifestations of
personality traits in the neurotypical population.1 Indeed, recent work has characterized this
difference in local versus global processing bias for neurotypical populations in the domains
of face perception (Stevenson et al., 2018), object decision/classiﬁcation (English et al., 2017;
Gerlach and Poirel, 2018), susceptibility to optical illusions (Chouinard et al., 2016), motor
control planning (Job et al., 2017), and predisposition to post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms (Hagenaars et al., 2016). Notably for the present effort, a tool that has been developed
to carry out this cognitive style discrimination is the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) questionnaire , which measures the degree of “autistic” traits, as emerging from general cognitive
dimensions of variability, in the general population (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The AQ comprises 50 items in which participants self-report agreement with “I-statements” capturing the
ﬁve principal categories of traits associated with ASC: attention to detail, attention switching,
communication, imagination, and social skills (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). I further detail the
mechanics of this psychometric instrument in Section 4.4.1, but assert here that the utility of
such a gradient tool allows for operationalizing a gradient characterization of “autistic” traits
in the general population.
1

This perspective underlies the recent efforts toward promoting the idea and consequent social movement of
“neurodiversity,” which reframes traits associated with ASC as natural brain variability to be valued, mirroring the
well-established positivity of biodiversity, rather than merely disorders or deﬁcits to be cured or treated (BaronCohen, 2017; den Houting, 2019, a.o).
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This setup for a context-sensitive cognitive style is supported by evidence from linguistic behavior. Speciﬁcally, the AQ has been used as a tool in language studies in neurotypical
populations to index a context-sensitive cognitive style at all levels of linguistic use: phonetic,
syntactic, and semantic/pragmatic. Because context-sensitivity decreases with a higher degree
of “autistic” traits, low AQ scores are taken to indicate high context-sensitivity, while high AQ
scores indicate low context-sensitivity. However, the AQ does not necessarily manifest linguistic context-sensitivity in a uniform way, especially in light of the three possible cognitive
dimensions of linguistic context-sensitivity from Kozhevnikov et al. (2014). To my knowledge,
Stewart and Ota (2008) were the ﬁrst to use AQ in a linguistic task; they showed that high-AQ
(less context-sensitive) participants were less able to use lexical information in discriminating
between ambiguous phonetic strings and attributed this to a bias toward compartmentalization of acoustic and lexical information, in line with dimension (a) above. No differences were
found between high-AQ and low-AQ individuals in their baseline acoustic acuity or lexical
access abilities, suggesting a dispreference toward integrating these types of linguistic information (dimension (a)), or, in my view, possibly an inﬂexibility or unwillingness to use lexical information in an auditory discrimination task (dimension (c)). Subsequently, Nieuwland
et al. (2010) report a correlation between high AQ scores (lower context-sensitivity) and nonattenuated comprehension of pragmatically underinformative statements, suggesting that less
context-sensitive participants were less affected by contextually infelicitous stimuli. Xiang
et al. (2013) report an acceptability judgment pattern whereby high-AQ (less context-sensitive)
participants exhibit less pragmatic interference than low-AQ participants in NPI licensing
constructions—a computation involving syntactic long-distance dependency; this effect, however, was not borne out in real-time processing measures. In both studies, the differences between AQ groups were attributed to an diminished ability to integrate world knowledge with
lexical knowledge (connecting to dimension (a)) and a greater focus on incremental word-byword relations rather than more global, phrase-by-phrase relations (connecting to dimensions
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(b) and (c)).
These reports are cohesive in ascribing differences in using or being affected by contextual
information between high-AQ (less context-sensitive) and low-AQ (more context-sensitive)
individuals and are consistent with the aforementioned accounts of ASC traits. These ﬁndings also advance the view that differences associated with “autistic” traits are not necessarily
deﬁcits, in line with the broader autism phenotype and neurodiversity ideas: high-AQ (less
context-sensitive) participants in Xiang et al. (2013), for example, actually showed less “deﬁcit”
in terms of the NPI interference effect.
In an examination at the phonetic level, Derrick et al. (2019) report that high-AQ participants show poorer multisensory integration abilities, that is, they used the “right” contextual
phonetic information at the “wrong” time. Previously, Derrick et al. (2009) showed, for a
general population, that a puff of air on the skin helps disambiguate /pa/, a syllable beginning
with an aspirated voiceless bilabial stop, from a silent video of a person pronouncing /pa/ or
/ba/, but only when the puff of air occurs between 50 and 100 milliseconds after the visible lipopening. High-AQ participants, however, used the air puff information to disambiguate the
target well beyond that time window, which suggests not necessarily a problem with multisensory integration itself, but rather, not having acquired the typically narrow perceptual windows
of integration in development (Derrick et al., 2019). This ﬁnding nuances the general claim
that individuals with “autistic” traits are less able or unable to use contextual information by
showing that these individuals have difficulty using the right information at the right time.
Pijnacker et al. (2010) present corroborating ERP ﬁndings that high-functioning adults with
ASC show a delayed or less-automatic—but not categorically absent—contextualization effect
during real-time sentence comprehension.

This asynchrony in contextualization ability, not

the contextualization ability itself, could, in fact, be the source of the differences described in
the ﬁrst three studies.
From these reports, at least three possible speciﬁc traits or mechanisms that could underlie
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linguistic context-sensitivity emerge, though I note that the AQ does not a priori distinguish
between them: (a) the detection of variation (baseline perceptual acuity), (b) the actual ability
to make use of the variants, or (c) the willingness to allow for non-canonical variants to guide
downstream processing; these last two align with dimensions (b) and (c) from Kozhevnikov
et al. (2014), above.
Closer to the focus here, Yu (2010) was the ﬁrst to use both gender-group and AQ to index
context-sensitivity, ﬁnding an interaction between the two factors in a phonetic contextualization task. Yu reports that men and high-AQ women overcompensate and normalize coarticulation effects, while low-AQ women undercompensate for these effects, thereby allowing
context-induced phonetic variants to persist and percolate through a speech community. Here,
context-sensitivity is operationalized as an ability to tolerate variation, rather than the ability
to use contextual information. These results nuance possibility (b) above—the making use
of variants—into two sub-mechanisms: the assignment of signiﬁcance and therefore utility
to variants, and the actual ability to use those variants for later processing. I interpret the
undercompensation to indicate an assignment of potential signiﬁcance to these otherwise predictable coarticulatory effects, in that certain individuals leave open the possibility that these
variants could hold meaning, socioindexical or not, and thus do not neutralize them.
In these ﬁndings and in the broader literature, however, the connection between gendergroup and AQ is unclear. The AQ has been shown to correlate with gender-group (Hurst et al.,
2007; Pisula et al., 2013; Lai et al., 2015; Ruzich et al., 2015; Grove et al., 2016), in line with the
clinical correlation whereby men are diagnosed with ASC at a much greater rate than women
(e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 2011). While it could be the case here that gender-group and AQ
simply are capturing similar variability at different resolutions, the underlying causes for the
ASC-gender incidence asymmetry remain an actively studied question. One possible explanation, which casts the gender-group-asymmetry as a methodological artifact, is the idea of
linguistic camouﬂage, a phenomenon whereby some individuals, generally women, mask the
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speciﬁc social or communicative behaviors associated with ASC that diagnostic tools are targeting (Parish-Morris et al., 2017). To sum this up, while the documented relationship between
gender-group and ASC and expression of autistic traits is well-reported, the actual mechanisms
that underlie these correlations remain unspeciﬁed—in the following section, I describe further some possibilities to explain the association between gender-group effects and linguistic
behavior.
Overall, the main takeaway from this body of work is that the AQ questionnaire is an effective tool for organizing individual-level variability in “autistic” traits and therefore represents a
viable instrument to assess a potentially composite cognitive component of context-sensitivity
in linguistic behavior. This support notwithstanding, those studies do not identify the underlying cognitive dimensions of linguistic context-sensitivity nor do they indicate how contextual
information features in language use. So, the question remains: on the assumption that it has
a non-linguistic, cognitive basis, how should linguistic context-sensitivity be understood such
that it can be measured during language use? An answer to this question will shed light on
understanding the cognitive capacities involved in the language contextualization process and
how individual-level variability in these capacities gives rise to variability in language behavior.

4.3.2

Social factors

I include an exploration of gender in this investigation of linguistic context-sensitivity because
of the reported gender-based effects in three of the relevant literatures: ASC and autistic
traits (e.g. Yu, 2010; Baron-Cohen et al., 2011; Parish-Morris et al., 2017), context-sensitivity
(Bonanno and Burton, 2013; Goubet and Chrysikou, 2019), and language behavior (see Talbot,
2019). While the implementation of gender as an experimental factor differs across these bodies of work, my position here is that the underlying human capacity for language is common
to all individuals, regardless of their gender identity or expression. And consequently, though
the outward (and inward) manifestations of gender reﬂect a multitude of sociopsychobiologi126

cal factors (Helgeson, 2015; Polderman et al., 2018; Hyde et al., 2019), I take the existing ﬁndings involving gender-group differences to principally reﬂect social factors, in contrast to the
cognitive factors described in the previous section.
What are some of these social factors, and how do they connect to the relationship between gender and linguistic behavior? It has been proposed an individual’s use of language
is grounded, in part, in the social and cultural conditioning provided by the community into
which an individual is born and where the individual develops. Speciﬁcally, gender category
has been invoked as an organizing factor in an individual’s linguistic development (see Eckert
and McConnell-Ginet, 2013; Talbot, 2019), due to the observation that the way that children
are socialized as speakers/producers and hearers/comprehenders in a speech community can
vary in accordance with their gender identity. In cultures across the world, for example, there
exist prescriptive divides in lexical items, grammatical constructions, and discourse practices
for women and men based on sociocultural or religious norms: one notable case is Japanese
joseigo (women’s language) and danseigo (men’s language), which comprise phonological, lexical,
morphosyntactic, and conversational differences and are learned as early as age 3-6 (Nakamura,
2001).
Early work seeking to categorize the linguistic behaviors of women versus men attributed
linguistic differences as a direct result of gender identity (e.g. Lakoff, 1972, 1973); this operationalization of gender often targets the gender-normative behaviors that women and men
are exposed to during childhood and are reinforced through their lifetimes (the ‘difference’
approach, see Eckert and McConnell-Ginet, 2013). Over time, the centrality of gender in linguistic organization has been further nuanced with the idea that an individual’s gender is not
the only sociocultural source of variability in language. That is, to have a linguistic impact,
gender must be contextualized within other factors like race and sexuality, two dimensions
along which social power manifests asymmetrically across a speech community (Eckert and
McConnell-Ginet, 1999).
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Later research on nonverbal expressions of gender has found that the performance of gender must be understood in the context of additional communicative factors like age, group size,
task, power asymmetry, communicative (facial versus vocal) channel, and gender composition,
which themselves modulate the expression of gender-normative behaviors (see LaFrance and
Vial, 2016). In fact, in the ‘dominance’ approach, so-called “gendered” behaviors are taken to
arise not from socialized (or psychobiological) differences at all, but from the fact that gendergroups typically occupy different positions within social structures, which inherently fall along
power asymmetries (Eckert and McConnell-Ginet, 2013). In this view, behavioral differences
that surface as aligning with gender-groups are actually determined by the different goals and
resources available at each position or level within an asymmetric power structure. For the
purposes of this study, I remain agnostic to the difference versus dominance perspectives of
gendered language, and I take gender-group, as an underspeciﬁed metric, to reﬂect the amalgam of social factors associated with gender identity construction and expression.
The question here is whether those factors are connected to the variability in linguistic
behavior that is associated with linguistic context-sensitivity. Given this setup, there are three
logical possibilities: (a) the social factors manifested as a gender-group difference connect with
variability in linguistic behavior through variability in linguistic context-sensitivity; (b) these
same social factors connect with variability in linguistic behavior, but not through linguistic
context-sensitivity; or (c), these social factors do not connect with variability in linguistic
behavior. Altogether, this approach supports the perspective that human beings’ underlying
capacity to produce and comprehend language may be mediated by social factors, resulting in
behaviors that appear different when measured across any given social variable, such as gender,
race, or sexuality. These behaviors are the substrate for the social variables; it is not necessarily
the case that any behavioral differences identiﬁed result from differences in capacity.
While the problematic nature of any categorization for gender that does not take into
account the gradience of any given individual’s gender identity and performance, particularly
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their participation in gender-normative or otherwise gendered linguistic behaviors is clear,
the absence of a continuous measure to organize this gradient construct of gender renders
the binary grouping still a relevant tool in attempting to understand the role of social factors
in linguistic context-sensitivity, by connecting this study with the documented patterns associated with gender-group, particularly that of Yu (2010). With these limitations in mind, I
adopt the binary grouping of gender as the index for the potential social bases of linguistic
context-sensitivity.

4.4

Study 1b: Individual-level variability in contextual
facilitation

I present here the experimental investigation of the two potential sources of differences in linguistic context-sensitivity using the contextual facilitation effect obtained from Study 1a and
Zhang et al. (2022), with the expectation that variability in an individual’s cognitive style is an
important factor that contributes to the core linguistic operation of interpreting an ambiguous have-sentence in context. The two hypotheses regarding the cognitive and social factors
in variability in linguistic context-sensitivity make distinct predictions. If the cognitive capacities underlying “autistic” traits are a contributing factor to linguistic context-sensitivity, then
AQ scores should signiﬁcantly correlate with inter-comprehender variability in acceptability
ratings of the target sentence in the Locative Context-type. Alternatively, if the social factors
that underlie or manifest as gender expression contribute to linguistic context-sensitivity, then
the two gender-groups should show a difference in ratings for the target sentence in the Locative Context-type. Finally, if both factors contribute to linguistic context-sensitivity, AQ and
gender-group should show respective signiﬁcant interaction effects with context-type.
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4.4.1

Indices of variability

Autism Quotient
I use the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) questionnaire as an index of the cognitive factors
potentially underlying linguistic context-sensitivity. The AQ questionnaire is a self-administered
scale used to determine the degree to which an adult of normal intelligence possesses traits typically associated with ASC (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Although not intended as a diagnostic
measure, it is used clinically and shows consistency in three important psychometric properties: test-retest reliability (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), cross-cultural stability (Wakabayashi
et al., 2006), and heritability (Hoekstra et al., 2007).
The 50-item questionnaire has ﬁve component subscales, each drawn from a unique subset
of 10 questions: Attention Switching (AS), Attention to Detail (AD), Communication (CM),
Imagination (IM), and Social Skills (SS). The scales are oriented such that higher scores signify more “autistic” traits (difficulty in attention switching, higher attention to detail, lower
communicative ability, less imagination, and lower social skills). Among the linguistic studies
using the AQ measure, the way the total AQ measure and its component subscales have been
used is variable: Yu (2010) analyzed the total AQ along with four of the ﬁve subscales (AD, AS,
CM, and IM), while Nieuwland et al. (2010) and Xiang et al. (2013) analyzed the CM subscale
but found the same effect with different sets of subscales.
Such variability in application of the AQ measure aligns with a body of factor analysis research that has shown that the AQ subscales are not independent factors, i.e., they do not
measure distinct dimensions of variability.

Austin (2005) was the ﬁrst to investigate its in-

ternal consistency and found that for a non-clinical sample of 337 individuals, a factor analysis
supported a three-factor solution, comprising “social skills,” “details/patterns,” and “communication/mindreading”; Hurst et al. (2007) replicated the three-factor solution in a separate
non-clinical sample of 1005 individuals. Of particular interest in both studies is the fact that
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although the three-factor solution generally supports three of the ﬁve original subscales, the
loadings are crossed: individual items from all ﬁve subscales contributed to each of the three
factors. Hoekstra et al. (2008) conducted a similar factor analysis on both general and clinical
populations in Dutch, comprising 1416 individuals, and found support for a two-factor analysis: “attention to detail” (comprising only the original AD subscale) and “social interaction”
(comprising the other four subscales, SS, AS, CM, and IM). Subsequent factor analyses (Stewart and Austin, 2009; Russell-Smith et al., 2011; Kloosterman et al., 2011; Lau et al., 2013a,b;
Grove et al., 2016), summarized recently in English et al. (2020) further corroborate these patterns.
Even within the study population, the non-independence of the ﬁve subscales is clear. Figure (4.1), below, shows the correlations between each of the AQ subscales for the study sample.

Figure 4.1: Correlations between the ﬁve component subscales of the AQ.

Note: Density plots are shown for each subscale along the diagonal. SS = Social Skill, AS = Attention Switching,
AD = Attention to Detail, CM = Communication, IM = Imagination. Correlation coefficients are shown above
the diagonal; asterisks indicate a signiﬁcant correlation at the p<.001(***) level.
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While the individual correlations between SS versus CM and SS versus AS seem to be the
strongest, these data are generally supportive of the two-factor analysis reported by Hoekstra
et al. (2008), which isolated AD as “attention to detail” and groups SS, AS, CM, and IM as
“social interaction.” Among linguistic studies, Yu (2010) analyzed, in addition to the aggregate
AQ measure, four of the ﬁve subscales (AD, AS, CM, and IM), but residualized AS and CM by
SS in order to eliminate collinearity, Nieuwland et al. (2010) used the CM subscale but found
identical correlations with the total AQ and the SS and AS subscales, and Xiang et al. (2013)
used only the CM subscale, but found an identical effect with the SS subscale. These treatments add further weight to the non-independence of these subscales, particularly between SS
and CM. Indeed, numerous items from these two scales seem to be intrinsically intertwined:
items such as “Other people frequently tell me that what I’ve said is impolite, even though
I think it is polite,” “I enjoy social chit-chat,” or “I’m often the last to understand the point
of a joke,” which are categorized as CM, could easily be classiﬁed as SS, and vice versa for “I
enjoy meeting new people” or “I am a good diplomat.” Given the statistical collinearity among
subscales as well as the intuitive conceptual overlap between them, I followed the more conservative approach of Stewart and Ota (2008), Yoshimoto et al. (2017), Yang et al. (2018), Derrick
et al. (2019), and Lai et al. (2019), and used only the aggregate, total AQ in the analysis.
Each item is phrased as a sentence in the ﬁrst person (an “I-statement”); the participant
chooses one answer among “Strongly Disagree,” “Slightly Disagree,” “Slightly Agree,” and
“Strongly Disagree.” Here, responses were coded on a 4-point Likert scale (1-4), following
Stewart and Ota (2008); Nieuwland et al. (2010); Yu (2010), as both the degree and polarity of
agreement bear meaning, and thus should not be collapsed, as in the scoring system of BaronCohen et al. (2001). Thus, total AQ scores range from 50-200.
Participants tested in-lab completed the questionnaire on paper; participants recruited
online responded to the same questions through Qualtrics, an online survey platform. Both
versions gave all questions and answer choices in the same order and orientation. For the online
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version, ﬁve “attention” questions were spaced randomly throughout asking participants to
select a speciﬁc answer.
Gender
To connect to existing reports on the role of gender in language variability, namely (Yu, 2010),
and in the absence of a widespread, gradient measure of the dimensions underlying gender
identity, gender-group was used as a binary category to index the social factors sources potentially underlying linguistic context-sensitivity. This variable was collected as a free-response
question, “What is your gender identity?” and coded binarily.

4.4.2

Predictions

The two hypotheses regarding the cognitive and social factors in variability in linguistic contextsensitivity make distinct predictions. If the cognitive capacities underlying “autistic” traits are
a contributing factor to linguistic context-sensitivity, then AQ scores should signiﬁcantly correlate with inter-comprehender variability in acceptability ratings of the target sentence in the
Locative Context-type. Alternatively, if the social factors that underlie or manifest as gender
expression contribute to linguistic context-sensitivity, then the two gender-groups should show
a difference in ratings for the target sentence in the Locative Context-type. Finally, if both factors contribute to linguistic context-sensitivity, AQ and gender-group should show respective
signiﬁcant interaction effects with context-type.

4.4.3

Sample comparison

In order to evaluate the role of individual differences in context-sensitivity, I ﬁrst compared
the participant samples along the two variables of gender-group and AQ. Both samples had
roughly evenly divided gender groups. In terms of AQ, both groups showed similar proﬁles
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overall2 and within their gender groups; their descriptive statistics are presented in Table (4.1).
Table 4.1: AQ descriptive statistics
In-lab population (n=61)
Scale
Gender Mean Range SD
Autism Quotient (AQ)
106.8 85-137 13.1
w
103.2
87-137 11.8
m
111.4
85-134 13.4
Social Skills (SS)
19.84 12-31
5.02
w
18.86
12-29
4.51
m
21.09 15-31
5.36
Attention Switching (AS)
24.64 18-32 3.24
w
24.86 21-30
2.51
m
24.36
18-32
3.97
Attention to Detail (AD)
25.04 15-33
4.50
w
23.79
17-29
3.56
m
26.62 15-33
5.04
Communication (CM)
19.44 10-28 4.49
w
18.93
13-28
4.14
m
20.09 10-28
4.75
Imagination (IM)
17.84 12-27
4.06
w
16.79
12-27
3.99
m
19.18
15-26
3.75

Online population (n=210)
Mean Range
SD
113.0 67-146 17.99
114.2
67-146
20.11
111.8
85-145
15.79
21.91 11-38
6.64
23.69 11-38
7.27
20.33
14-33
5.58
25.21 15-34
4.63
26.44 15-34
5.38
24.11
18-31
3.50
26.29 18-39
5.27
26.06 18-37
5.22
26.50 18-39
5.31
19.82 10-30
5.48
19.94 10-30
5.61
19.72
12-28
5.37
19.74 12-27
4.12
18.12
12-24
4.17
21.17
15-27
3.50

Note: Means across gender groups for each sample are bolded.

While the in-lab women group mean appeared to be slightly lower than the others’, pairwise t-tests corrected using Holm’s method showed no differences between groups in their
mean AQ (p’s>.7). Absence of signiﬁcant differences in gender-group proportion or AQ proﬁle for in-lab group allowed for analyzing the two samples together as one.

4.4.4

Variable contextual modulation of English have-sentences

This analysis follows from the analysis described in Study 1a in §2.4. I describe the model
again, with the interaction terms included: A linear mixed-effects model was built using
2

The 61-member population from the study sample showed the same group means with the 60-member population from the University of Chicago student body reported in Yu (2010).
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ﬁxed-effects of context-type (4 levels: Locative, Possessive, Attributive, vs. Identity), gender (2 levels: women vs. men), AQ (continuous factor), and the two-way interaction terms of
context-type and gender as well as context-type and AQ. As random effects, random intercepts
were included for subjects and items in addition to by-subject random slopes for the effect of
context-type. Statistical signiﬁcance was obtained in the same manner, through likelihood ratio tests; outliers were removed in the same way as well. To investigate the interaction effects,
I used pairwise t-tests and linear regressions corrected for multiple comparisons using Holm’s
method.
Crucially, signiﬁcant interaction effects from the mixed-effects model indicated the presence of individual-level variability along the dimension of context-sensitivity. The same mixedeffects model revealed a signiﬁcant two-way interaction of context-type and AQ (χ2 (4)=10.7,
n=271, p=.030), while the two-way interaction of context-type and gender-group was not significant (χ2 (4)=2.72, n=271, p=.61). While a signiﬁcant three-way interaction was observed, this
interaction was driven by a gender-group difference in the Identity Context-type, one of the
control conditions, rather than by the experimental context-types. Accordingly, I take this interaction to be indicating gender-group variability outside of the scope of the intended contexttype manipulation, and do not consider it further in the analysis.
In order to understand the individual-level variability in the ratings, I started by unpacking
the context-type and AQ interaction. Linear regression models showed signiﬁcant correlations
between AQ and the ratings for the Locative Context-type (β =-.007, t=-2.7, p=.007) and the
Possessive Context-type (β =-.006, t=-2.5, p=.011), indicating that higher AQ scores (which index
lower context-sensitivity) correlate with lower ratings in the relevant context-types, in line
with the predictions. That is, the less context-sensitive an individual is, the less they are able
to use relevant context to facilitate the otherwise dispreferred locative interpretation of the
ambiguous target have-sentence; conversely, individuals with lower AQ scores (which index
higher context-sensitivity) appear better able to use the relevant context to help interpret the
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ambiguous target. Average acceptability ratings for the Locative Context-type as a function
of AQ score are shown in Figure (4.2).

Figure 4.2: Average ratings for the Locative Context-type as a function of AQ.
In order to more clearly visualize the interaction effect of context-type and AQ, and in light
of the small effect size of the continuous AQ factor, the ratings were binarized using the median AQ score of the full sample (MdnAQ =112) resulting in a high-AQ group (n=137, MAQ =124.8)
and a low-AQ group (n=134, MAQ =99.0). The model with the categorical AQ factor instead
of the continuous AQ factor revealed an even greater signiﬁcant interaction between contexttype and AQ (χ2 (5)=31.9, n=271, p<.001). The resulting interaction plot is presented in Figure
(4.3). Pairwise t-tests revealed a signiﬁcant effect of AQ group (low versus high) for the Locative (p=.0098) and Possessive Context-types (p=.016) but not for Attributive (p=.63) or Identity
(p=.65).
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Figure 4.3: Interaction plot between context-type and AQ group.

Note: Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean. Asterisks indicate a signiﬁcant effect of AQ group
within each context-type at the p<.05 (*) or p<.01 (**) level.

Within the Possessive Context-type, a signiﬁcant difference was observed between the lowand high-AQ groups (p=.016) while no such difference is found within the Attributive Contexttype (p=.63), even though the ratings for both context-types are similarly low. The contrast
between the Possessive and Attributive Context-types suggests that only low-AQ comprehenders are sensitive to the relevance of the context to the semantic domain in question, since
the locative and possessive contexts describe the relationship between two entities, while the
attributive context provides detail about one entity alone.
The contrast between the Locative and Possessive Context-types suggests that within the
two relevant contexts, only the Locative Context-type facilitates the intended reading of the
bare have-sentence; crucially, this facilitatory effect is only observed for the low-AQ (more
context-sensitive) group, as the high-AQ group’s Locative ratings were not statistically distinct
from the low-AQ group’s Possessive ratings (p=.72).
This ﬁnding bears out the prediction regarding the cognitive factors of linguistic contextsensitivity: AQ, but not gender-group, correlates with the degree to which comprehenders are
able to use contextual information. This asymmetry suggests that, at least in the present linguistic task, context-sensitivity connects to cognitive predisposition(s); social factors, as man137

ifested through gender-group, by contrast, do not appear to capture any inter-comprehender
variability in the task.

4.4.5

Quantifying individual-level variability in linguistic contextsensitivity

Together with the results described in §2.4, these results support the hypotheses that comprehenders’ linguistic context-sensitivity plays an integral role in lexico-conceptual composition;
(a) the ﬁndings are consistent with a conceptual connection between location and possession
which have lexicalizes, (b) despite being dispreferred, the locative interpretation of a bare
have-sentence can be made salient through linguistic context, and (c) within a given speech
community, the ability to extract relevant content from context is variable across individuals
and correlated with their Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) scores.
Linguistic context-sensitivity as measured by the AQ questionnaire
The principal ﬁnding from the present study is that the AQ measure, as an index of a cognitive source of variability in linguistic context-sensitivity, correlates with the degree to which
comprehenders show a contextual-modulation effect in the linguistic contextualization task.
That is, individual-level variability in “autistic” traits correlates with variability in the degree to
which individual comprehenders are able to identify and use relevant contextual information
to facilitate the locative reading of the target have-sentence, which requires attenuating the
salience of the causal segment in the uniﬁed location-possession lexico-semantic conceptual
structure.
This result adds not only to the existing body of work that AQ is indeed targeting some
dimension of the cognitive system, but bolsters the ﬁndings that the cognitive capacities implicated in “autistic” traits likely contribute to linguistic context-sensitivity, as the critical task
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in this study involved direct, intentional contextualization on the part of the comprehender.
I note here, however, that the AQ measure, while signiﬁcantly correlated with acceptability ratings, accounts for only a small portion of inter-comprehender variability. The three
components for evaluating a correlation, effect size, effect signiﬁcance, and effect meaningfulness can vary independently from another (Hemphill, 2003)—one well-cited example is the
correlation of r=.03 between taking aspirin and preventing heart attack, which bears outsized
meaning for society at large—that is to say, effects must be evaluated in context. To do so, I
offer two points of discussion.
The ﬁrst is that I recognize the inherent limitations set by the experimental tools. Though
it seems clear that AQ is targeting one or more aspects of the cognitive system, it has yet to be
shown conclusively what domain of the cognitive system these dimensions lie in. One possibility is that linguistic context-sensitivity, as indexed by the AQ, is rooted in working memory,
as working memory has been shown to correlate positively with selective attention and inhibition of distracting information (Engle, 2002; Lavie et al., 2004). Yu et al. (2011) tested both
working memory and AQ in a parallel task to that reported in Yu (2010) and found that higher
working memory correlated with lower AQ. This ﬁnding suggests that a component of contextsensitivity is the ability to store more contextual information for processing at a given time.
Another possibility is that the AQ indexes a multitude of cognitive factors, some of which are
more related to context-sensitivity than others. Mathematical evidence for this lies in the AQ’s
well-reported subscale collinearity and factor cross-loading (Austin, 2005; Hurst et al., 2007;
Hoekstra et al., 2008; Stewart and Austin, 2009; Russell-Smith et al., 2011; Kloosterman et al.,
2011; Lau et al., 2013b; Grove et al., 2016). Additional evidence for this lies in the fact that
a number of items in the AQ, such as “I enjoy meeting new people” seem related to contextsensitivity in a less direct way than items such as “I ﬁnd it easy to ‘read between the lines’ when
someone is talking to me” or “I often notice small sounds when others do not’; this observation
is supported by English et al. (2020), who describe over 20 different AQ-trait constellations
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that result in the same total AQ score, since different conﬁgurations of subscale scores can
add up to the same total. By using the aggregate AQ measure exclusively, the characterizing
of the subset of AQ-trait constellations that more directly connects with context-sensitivity
is inherently limited, resulting in a restricted ability to explain variability in a given dataset.
Future use of the AQ and linguistic behavior must consider statistically supported subsets of
the AQ items that are linguistically principled, rather than the total measure.
The second is that the larger goal for this work is to identify possible sources of the variability that has been observed in linguistic behavior in order to nuance the understanding of the
language faculty in context. Incorporating factors that can explain systematic differences in
linguistic behavior between individuals strengthens existing work on the systematic commonalities in linguistic behavior. This work is but one instance of the broader effort to incorporate
variability as an intrinsic part of the system, rather than exclude it conceptually or mathematically as “noise.” Accordingly, I do not expect any single measure to capture all the variability
in such a complex system, which is known to be rooted in a multitude of cognitive, social, and
other factors. Moreover, correlation effects interpreted as meaningful can be variable across
paradigms, questions, and domains (Bosco et al., 2015), in contrast with the widely used benchmarks from Cohen (1988). I take this ﬁnding to be indicative of a direct connection between
factors already hypothesized to be related, that contribute to an individual’s cognitive style
and their linguistic behavior—speciﬁcally, the way they identify information in the communicative context to satisfy the requirements of a linguistic expression in that context. Future
work must continue reﬁning both the methodological instruments and conceptual models in
order to precisify the understanding of the relationship between variability in domain-general
cognitive factors and variability in how individuals use language.
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Social bases of linguistic context-sensitivity
Binary gender-group—the index of the potential social factors contributing to linguistic contextsensitivity—did not play a role in capturing variability in this task. While I certainly expect
sociocultural factors to be implicated in linguistic context-sensitivity, there are at least three
possible explanations for the lack of effect in the current study: one of manifestation, one of
resolution, and one of relevance.
As previously discussed, gender appears to be a much broader construct with numerous
contributing factors; operationally, gender-based effects can be modulated by many features
of a communicative context: gender composition, racial composition, number of participants,
among others (LaFrance and Vial, 2016). These factors of the social context are known to
interact with gender performance, and crucially, can magnify or attenuate the expression of
gender-normative behaviors; for example, Bailey and LaFrance (2017) show that different types
of gendered and gender-neutral wording of questions can modulate gender-based effects like
androcentrism. It could be the case that the lack of cues in this paradigm that elicit so-called
gendered linguistic behaviors could have attenuated any manifestation of gender-associated
social factors potentially present.
It could also be the case that gender-group and AQ in this study indexed overlapping variability between individuals; however, due to the binary nature of the tool, it had less explanatory power than the continuous AQ factor, especially given that the AQ scores across gendergroups were statistically indistinguishable. Thus, it remains an open question the extent to
which the gender-group and AQ indices overlap as contributing factors to context-sensitivity.
The observation here is that when gender is construed as a binary variable, they do not.
The relationship between binary gender-group and a social basis of linguistic contextsensitivity is not one-to-one; while identifying a gender-group effect would have directly supported the idea that social factors play a role in linguistically context-sensitive behavior, failing
to ﬁnd an effect does not rule it out for at least two reasons. First, binary gender-group is an
141

inherently limited way to represent the gradient and dynamic expression of gendered identity
and behavior; a lack of gender-group effect could result from using this categorical predictor for a gradient phenomenon. Second, gender-group represents only one set of social factors
that could give rise to linguistic behavior. This leaves open the possibility that a lack of gendergroup effect does not mean that social factors are not at play in linguistic context-sensitivity,
but rather, that other social factors that connect with variability but are not addressed here
may be impacting context-sensitive linguistic behaviors.
Future research must utilize high-resolution and psychosocially grounded metrics for quantifying gender identity as the gradient and dynamic social construct it is; such measures would
better identify the degree to which the social factors associated with gender identity contribute
to individual-level variability in linguistic context-sensitivity. These tools would be particularly
relevant to the ﬁeld of psycholinguistics, which probes the unconscious, automatic processes
that underlie real-time language use. Better measures of gender identity in tandem with psycholinguistic tools could elucidate the extent to which social factors permeate and are intertwined with the presumedly universal processing mechanisms in the mind and brain.
Linguistic context-sensitivity revisited
In light of the ﬁndings altogether implicating context-sensitivity as a dimension of variability
in linguistic behavior, it is important to better understand the cognitive capacities or traits
that underlie linguistic context-sensitivity, again deﬁned as the overall capacity of a neurocognitive linguistic system to identify and integrate the information in the communicative context
prompted by the meaning requirements of a given linguistic expression in that context. Here,
I revisit the possible components of linguistic context-sensitivity described in Section 4.3.1.
The ﬁrst is perceptual acuity, which could lead to enhanced detection of variation in an ambiguous stimuli. Another is an increased recognition of useful or informative information in
the context. Here, assigning meaning, or even simply meaningfulness, to variants is the key
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switch between recognizing differences and using those differences to tailor their use for different situations. A third possibility is that context-sensitive individuals are more tolerant of
or ﬂexible in adopting variants and their consequent differences in sound or meaning; that
is, context-sensitivity could highlight the willingness to allow for contextual-modulation, in
conjunction or independent from the ability to detect or ascribe meaning to variants.
This study does not arbitrate between these possibilities; it could be the case that one or
more of them give rise to the observed context-sensitivity effects. However, since the task involved an active contextualization effort, it seems to suggest that AQ operationalizes at least
the latter possibilities, rather than the ﬁrst, more passive, baseline sensitivity. Additionally,
in the same way that gender is understood to be either a contributor to variability or a manifestation of other underlying factors associated with that variability, a distinction can also be
drawn between what the “autistic” trait correlation is highlighting: purported cognitive capacities that give rise to context-sensitive behaviors, or alternatively, context-sensitive behaviors
that emerge from other possible cognitive capacities. Future work that better accounts for the
precise task involved as well as these and other potential component capacities or behaviors
that contribute to context-sensitivity must be undertaken to situate the broad cognitive notion
of context-sensitivity as a capacity or behavior, linguistic or domain-general, in the mechanics
of the cognitive system.
Importantly, the ﬁndings from this work suggest that a new parameter is necessary for
future linguistic comprehension studies involving context. A misleading result is seen at the
group-level analysis: while the main effect shows a clear and signiﬁcant distinction in the ratings between the Locative Context-type and the other Context-types, this distinction was
shown, through the AQ measure, to be the case for only a subset of the study sample, specifically the more context-sensitive (lower-AQ) comprehenders. Had individual differences in
context-sensitivity not been accounted for in this study, the conclusion from this ﬁnding would
have generated different consequences for the understanding of contextualization ability, and
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its potential role in variation. Therefore, it is crucial for future work involving any sort of contextual modulation to account for this parameter of individual differences, not only to better
understand the role of cognitively rooted and socially rooted variability in linguistic behavior,
but also for more precise models of linguistic structure and processing.

4.5

Awareness of Communicative Dynamics as an improved
measure of variability

While the body of literature characterizing linguistic variability using the AQ measure is
schematically coherent, in that low scores on the AQ measure seem to identify a high degree
of linguistic context-sensitivity, there are methodological concerns that potentially limit the
ability to which the tool can identify variability between comprehenders. The two primary
concerns are one of conceptual independence and one of mathematical independence.
The latter non-independence has been well-characterized through a body of psychometric assessment studies (see aforementioned discussion of this literature). English et al. (2020)
synthesizes this body of work by showing a collective lack of statistical support for the ﬁvefactor solution in the original AQ measure, which means that the ﬁve component subscales
cannot be used to identify underlying constructs connected to linguistic context-sensitivity.
This limitation converges with the conceptual non-independence of the subscales. For example, numerous items from the CM and SS subscales seem ontologically connected: items such
as “Other people frequently tell me that what I’ve said is impolite, even though I think it is
polite,” “I enjoy social chit-chat,” or “I’m often the last to understand the point of a joke,” are
part of the CM subscale, though it is unclear what motivates them to be distinguished from
items like “I enjoy meeting new people” or “I am a good diplomat,” which are part of the SS
subscale.
To address this problem, Piñango et al. (in prep) use factor analytic techniques to identify a
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conceptually principled and mathematically validated component structure couched within a
larger theoretical framework of linguistic communication. With the largest sample population
in the linguistic AQ literature to date, they identify a four-factor solution (”Conversational Facility”) that better captures variability along the dimension of linguistic context-sensitivity as
well as indicates speciﬁc cognitive components connected to each component of the metric.
The Conversational Facility measure results in a ten-fold increase in variability explained, along
the dimension of linguistic context-sensitivity, over the original AQ measure. In particular, the
Conversational Facility measure identiﬁes relevant subcomponents that carry the bulk of this
variability, speciﬁcally the “Awareness of Communicative Dynamics” (ACD) subcomponent,
shown in Table 4.2, which connects to an individual’s understanding of the communicative
situation, their interlocutor’s communicative intent, and meaningful elements of the communicative context that connect to them.
Table 4.2: Awareness of Communicative Dynamics scale from Piñango et al. (in prep)
AQ item
AQ-7

Subscale
CM

AQ-18
AQ-20

CM
IM

AQ-33
AQ-35
AQ-39

CM
CM
CM

AQ-45

SS

Item
Other people frequently tell me that what I’ve said is impolite, even
though I think it is polite.
When I talk, it isn’t always easy for others to get a word in edgeways.
When I’m reading a story, I ﬁnd it difficult to work out the character’s intentions.
When I talk on the phone, I’m not sure when it’s my turn to speak.
I am often the last to understand the point of a joke.
People often tell me that I keep going on and on about the same
thing.
I ﬁnd it difficult to work out people’s intentions.

Note: CM = Communication, IM = Imagination, SS = Social Skills.

The measure, scored in the same way as the AQ measure, allows for scores of 4 - 28: an
individual with a low score participates in communicative situations ﬂuently and can recognize and make use of both verbal and non-verbal meaning, while an individual with a high
score shows difficulty in participating in such communicative dynamics. What this measure
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highlights is cognitive capacities implicated in linguistic behavior that connect directly to linguistic context-sensitivity, such that a low score better identiﬁes a high degree of linguistic
context-sensitivity.
In sum, I take this ACD measure to identify variability in the cognitive capacities that underlie linguistic context-sensitivity, the capacity of a neurocognitive linguistic system to identify and integrate the information in the communicative context prompted by the meaning
requirements of a given linguistic expression in that context. Linguistic context-sensitivity,
in turn, serves as the key construct of communicative style that contributes to the proliferation of variability in linguistic meaning when interacting with the linguistic and conceptual
variability from Chapters 2 and 3.

4.6

Conclusion

The ﬁndings presented here nuance the Study 1a contextual facilitation effect by showing that
the effect is only borne out by a subset of the participants in the sample, namely those who
exhibit a higher degree of linguistic context-sensitivity, and is quantiﬁed using the AQ-based
Awareness of Communicative Dynamics measure from Piñango et al. (in prep). Speciﬁcally,
more context-sensitive comprehenders are better able to make use of relevant information in
the context to decrease the salience of the causal adjunct in the LCS of have, thereby supporting the otherwise dispreferred locative reading of the bare have-sentence in question.
The use of the ACD, as a conceptually principled and mathematically validated measure
of variability, supports the idea that the cognitive capacities associated with “autistic” traits
contribute to linguistic context-sensitivity, suggesting that inter-comprehender variability is
not entirely random. Instead, it results at least partially from the varying cognitive capacities
of the comprehender to recognize a communicative intention in conjunction with the lexical
meanings present and search effectively for relevant disambiguating information in the con146

text.
Moreover, these ﬁndings cement the vital role of individual-level variability in a broader
model of meaning variation, in that differences in individuals’ communicative styles contribute
to their choosing of different lexical strategies in the cases of ambiguous or generalized lexical
meanings, such as for have-sentences. In this view, contextual modulation is an emergent phenomenon arising from these individual differences in context-sensitivity interacting with the
ﬂexibility within a lexical meaning, as in the case of the uniﬁed LCS account of have-sentences.
In the next part of the dissertation, I unite the three ingredients for the model of meaning
variation through the investigative lens of the comprehension of these locative have-sentences
and show how these components’ interaction manifested during real-time processing synthesizes systematic variability in meaning.

147

Part II
The model in action
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Real-time comprehension: the
convergence of linguistic, conceptual,
and cognitive variability
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5.1

Introduction

In this chapter, I tie together the three ingredients for a cognitively grounded model of meaning variation. In §5.2, I describe how these three components are needed to capture and understand the phenomenon of meaning variability. In §5.3, I apply this implementation to the
real-time composition of English have-sentences, compare it to the extrapolated processing
predictions of the alternative account, and then motivate the real-time comprehension studies
by outlining the step-by-step predictions for how English have-sentences are comprehended.
I conclude the chapter by describing the methodologies for the subsequent studies in §5.4;
for each, I describe the general purpose of the methodology, the scope of its contributions
and limitations, and the speciﬁc predictions for each regarding the comprehension of locative have-sentences, as well as predictions for how the ﬁndings are nuanced by the measure of
individual-level variability in linguistic context-sensitivity.

5.2

The model of meaning variation

I take meaning variation to be a complex cognitive phenomenon that requires a multifaceted
investigative approach. At the end of the day, human language is a cognitive behavior that
requires modeling and description using tools from the study of cognition. Language data, as
the output of the human language system, does not necessarily require such an approach: that
is, characterizing, describing, modeling, and computationally generating such output can be
undertaken with a so-called “black-box” approach. The goal of these approaches is to match
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the input-output of the human language system, but without needing to match its internal processing, thus freeing these approaches to employ a wide variety of tools that are not beholden
to the workings of the cognitive system. Understanding the implementation of language as human neurocognitive behavior, however, requires approaches that are beholden to the workings
of the cognitive system.
In this view, it is important to reframe the “problem” perspective into a “property” perspective. Rather than treating an observed cognitive phenomenon as a problem for an analytical
tradition (i.e., a “too many meanings” situation), I take the phenomenon as a property of the
system that must be understood and explained. One example of this “problem” to “property”
reframing is the case of so-called ‘coercion’ phenomena. Traditionally, complement and aspectual coercion were understood as type-mismatch operations, in which a lexical item is used
in a construction where its semantic type does not match that of its place in the construction. The classic example is the case of Sue began the book, where begin is taken to select for
an ‘event’, which is not correctly satisﬁed by book, which is an ‘object’. This type-mismatch
results in some sort of error, which is resolved by a type-shifting repair mechanism, which
ﬁxes the error by changing the type of the lexical item, namely the object book into an event
of reading/writing/etc. the book. This term and treatment comes from “type-coercion” in computer programming languages Moens and Steedman (1988), which was applied to the linguistic
phenomenon. Taking a step back, it is noteworthy that the borrowing of a superﬁcially similar concept from an ontologically unrelated system results in a framework that cases a highly
frequent and highly productive linguistic construction as an error + repair mechanism. My
point here is that the “problematic” status of a phenomenon can be imported from outside of
the system, resulting in actual consequences for the way the phenomenon is understood from
within the system, which may not have been “problematic” to begin with. One solution to
the “problem” of complement coercion is the structured individual hypothesis Piñango and
Deo (2012); Piñango et al. (2015), which proposes that verbs like begin select not for events but
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for individuals with internal ordered structure along a number of dimensions, like space, time,
or informational content. In this view, a book is an entity with internal structure along the
dimension of informational content, and is naturally a possible and productive complement
to a verb like begin. Such a reanalysis of coercion is a more elegant and parsimonious explanation of the imported “problem” of coercion and its resulting plethora of type-mismatch repair
mechanisms. The takeaway from this example is that treating linguistic phenomena, particularly in the semantic domain, as the naturally occurring behavior to be explained, rather than
problems that must be repaired, lends itself to simpler solutions. Moreover, rooting such explanations in the actual cognitive system that generates the phenomena to begin with is an
important priority for a cognitively substantiated account of human behavior.
My proposal for a model of meaning variation takes this perspective: meaning variation
is a natural property of the human cognitive system that must be explained in a cognitively
grounded way, in contrast to, say, statistically driven models of variation (Eger and Mehler,
2016; Kulkarni, 2017). I take meaning variation to be an emergent cognitive phenomenon
that arises from, at minimum, these three components: linguistic, conceptual, and cognitive
variability. I now brieﬂy recapitulate each (from Chapters 2, 3, and 4, respectively) in turn.
The ﬁrst phenomenon that contributes to the larger, emergent phenomenon of meaning
variation is variability at the lexical level. The lexical item is the basic unit of human language,
and is the conventionalization of a form-meaning mapping. The methodological challenge in
modeling a lexical item is ﬁnding the right degree of speciﬁcity for the structure. Models of
language vary in the degree to which they posit lexical meanings, from co-locational frequency
accounts to highly speciﬁed polysemy accounts; this is yet another case of parsimony optimization. While this range results somewhat from different investigative goals, I maintain that
questions about the structure of human language and knowledge require evidence and tools
rooted in human behavior. Accordingly, I appeal to the conceptual semantics framework as a
balance between cognitively grounded, psychologically real, and linguistically informed units
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of structure, in conjunction with experimentally validated behaviors.
I believe that this approach has two main advantages in contrast to the model implemented
in the transitive copula account. The ﬁrst is that regarding the units of the model. A principal
issue in the linguistic enterprise is understanding the scope of an analysis: is a given analysis
a property of the human language system or a property of the tool or framework being used
to characterize or describe the outputs of that system? I apply this distinction directly to the
competing accounts of the meaning of have: without evidence for the psychological reality of
the theoretically unlimited functional projections required in the transitive copula account to
derive the meanings of have-sentences, these devices remain a part of the algorithm, and do not
necessarily have a constrained grounding in the human cognitive system and the left-to-right
language processing system. The units of conceptual semantics, however, are grounded by rigorous experimentation in the human cognitive system and therefore are able to be claimed as
psychologically real objects that participate in cognitive machinery (i.e., are subject to working
memory constraints, maturational trajectories), especially when implemented in a testable psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic processing proﬁle. The second is the observational validity.
Embodying the fundamental spirit of linguistics in trying to account for the parameters in the
underlying system that generate systematic differences across speech communities (quantized
as languages, dialects, idiolects, etc), I make use of a study sample that is appropriate for investigating the semantic variability of English have-sentences, as highlighted by Belvin and Den
Dikken (1997) and Zhang et al. (2022). This is to say, by enumerating dimensions of both
the context (what parameters and information in the context contribute to observed variability in the interpretation of have-sentences?) and the individual (what cognitive properties
or predispositions of a comprehender contribute to observed variability in the interpretation
of have-sentences?), my analysis is able to capture insights on this variability that the
transitive copula account, which does not address properties of the context or the
individual, is not able to investigate.
153

The lexico-semantic conceptual structure I propose uniﬁes the set of meanings expressed
by the English lexical item have in a conceptually principled way, in contrast to accounts which
simply list labeled meanings without organizing structure. The uniﬁed LCS solves the “too
many meanings” problem, which is, as above, a prescriptive framing that emerges from the
limited scope of the analytic tool, and not necessarily a description of the linguistic behavior of
speakers in a communicative context. In the uniﬁed LCS view, variability is a built-in property
and feature of the system; it allows words to be adaptable in principled ways (not randomly)
from the start, and not just through post-hoc additions, extensions, or repairs.
Overall, I propose that word-meaning variability emerges from variability in the underlying conceptual structure, since lexical items are merely the conventionalization and package
of form-meaning pairings, which allow motoric or otherwise physical signals that can be transmitted inter-personally to identify units of knowledge and thought.
The second component of this model of meaning variation is exactly that: variability in the
structure of “thought” as the cognitive substance packaged into lexical meanings by the lexical item. The gradient conceptual infrastructure (GCI) I propose in Chapter 3 is speciﬁcally
a model of that stuff of “thought” that treats this substance as continuous but organized, in
contrast to a view which treats it as discrete atoms. The LCS-GCI connection is the rooting
of the causal component of the lexical meaning as a packaging of the psychologically real operation of causal perception, which is a measurable behavior of the human cognitive system. In
fact, this behavior is so core to the human cognitive system, and also a feature of non-human
cognitive systems, that it could even be thought to be the very essence of what cognition is:
perceiving, evaluating, and determining causality (x caused y).
The two dimensions of causal perception (connectedness and control asymmetry) that organize the GCI are motivated in part by the behavior of lexicalization, which can serve as an
insight into the structure of the mind. The fundamental assumption of this logic is that a
single lexical item can only identify and “chunk out” an organized piece of conceptual struc154

ture, that is, meanings/concepts that are related. So, the fact that connectedness and control
asymmetry can be linguistically privileged independently of each other, but also lexicalized
together, is the key evidence for modeling the GCI in this way. The implications of this infrastructure for meaning variation and change are that this is the underlying framework of
pathways for lexicalization and change: languages can lexicalize adjacent but not discontinuous regions of the space and these lexicalizations can change over time in smooth trajectories
through incremental encroaching, but not discontinuous jumping.
These implications for variation and change lead to the third component of the model:
individual-level cognitive variability, which is the observation that individual cognitive systems
can make use of incoming information in different ways. The established role of individuals
as the generators of linguistic behavior and thus variation and change tie the conceptual and
cognitive variability components of the model together in a natural way. In any cognitive
science, the investigative quest for universality requires the externalizing of some degree of
variability or noise to a source outside of the target domain; while the threshold for meaningful variability can certainly vary, I take the position that often, systematic variability between
individuals is relegated to social factors exclusively, and therefore excluded from a ‘purely’ cognitive investigation, hence the disciplinary division created between linguistics “proper” and
sociolinguistics, as well as between between cognitive and social psychology, and all the intellectual and bureaucratic consequences thereof. The crucial task therefore is determining what
variability is required by the question to be accounted for, and how that variability must be
structured. I take linguistic and psychological universality to be distributions around a central
property, rather than an invariant operation, such that variability is hard-coded as a property
of universality. Because I take the human language system in its cognitive embedding, I consider known dimensions of cognitive variability to be vital to an understanding of the system.
Speciﬁcally, tools that were built from observations of human behavior and “dysfunction”1 are
1

I stress that the designation of “dysfunction,” “disorder,” and “disability,” are merely societally imposed cat-
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system-internal and are therefore psychologically real parameters that can structure variability
in the way that individuals, as speakers and comprehenders, make use of linguistic information
and tools. The contribution in this area is the novel Awareness of Communicative Dynamics,
as a conceptually principled and mathematically validated tool, for characterizing variability
in a cognitive dimension relevant to the comprehension of have-sentences: linguistic contextsensitivity.
In sum, combining these three components for a model of meaning variation enables a
deeper investigation of not only the patterns of variation, but the mechanisms that generate
those patterns. Speciﬁcally, this model can address the questions: what are the variants and
how are they structured? Why do they pattern in the way they do? How do they emerge
in a speech community? This framing of the “problem” of have-sentences suggests that havesentence variability is not an anomaly, but a naturally predicted logical consequence of the
system itself. By using mutually supporting and mutually constraining tools and bodies of
evidence from the cognitive system, a uniﬁed picture of implementation of model of variation
can be painted.
This sort of approach is certainly more complicated in terms of the number of conceptual
and operational components; I believe that this additional complexity, however, is not only
justiﬁed but also required to inform a cognitive embedding of the grammar. As shown here,
including these components adds challenges to experimental setups and implementations (e.g.,
contextually embedded target stimuli, measures of variability, large study sample, etc.). But
since any research project must be question-driven, a question about the broader human language faculty requires the inclusion of these factors. In contrast, if the research question is
about how a given computational algorithm can describe linguistic data, then these factors
are not necessary to incorporate into the investigation. Such approaches, which are building
egory labels for certain regions of a spectrum of variability. An inclusive view of variability understands these
categories to be natural manifestations of variability, rather than marked or categorical divisions of ability.
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mathematical systems (with internal machinery not necessarily constrained by the internal
machinery of the cognitive system) that can match all and only the documented outputs of a
human language system, are critical to be sure, but are not able to address the neurocognitive
language behaviors of humans in real-time.

5.3

Compositional story: how do humans comprehend a
locative have-sentence?

Given such a model of variation that serves as a cognitive framework for the different components of semantic variability, I now turn to the question of how humans actually comprehend locative have-sentences in real-time. There are two main purposes for investigating these
human behaviors. The ﬁrst is that understanding the way in which we comprehend havesentences can highlight the incompatibilities of the accounts and therefore arbitrate between
them. The second is that understanding the way in which humans comprehend have-sentences
situates the proposed model of meaning variation directly into the actual way humans comprehend language. Each of the model’s individual components are already motivated by ﬁndings
from other approaches toward understanding human cognition: outside of the broad array of
approaches toward studying human language, they make use of ﬁndings from clinical, comparative, cognitive, developmental, and neuro-psychology to constrain the possible ways in
which meaning variability in human language can be understood. It is therefore crucial to
“complete the circle” by studying the implementation of the actual model in the behavior of
human speakers and comprehenders.
Accordingly, the compositional story for have-sentences reveals what precisely the human
language system (the “parser”) must do when it encounters these sentences. This psychological
account therefore does not replace the derivational approach of the transitive copula account.
The derivation is an algorithm that decomposes the human-generated sentence into smaller
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units by using a speciﬁc set of tools. The derivation is not supposed to explain directly how
humans understand these sentences; it is intended to provide a highly articulated account
of the syntactic and semantic structure of human sentences, but not an account of human
behavior and not by using the neurocognitive mechanisms of the human cognitive system.
I argue, instead, that the compositional story can not only characterize the way humans
understand locative have-sentences, but also characterize in detail the syntactic and semantic
structures of these sentences. Speciﬁcally, the compositional story makes predictions for the
syntactic and semantic structure building that must take place when humans comprehend (and
produce) these sentences. The value-add, therefore, is a step-by-step algorithm that explains
the linguistic phenomenon (which is a human-generated linguistic behavior), and is also rooted
in the way the human cognitive system works (which is the same system that generates the linguistic behaviors to start), instead of using cognition-external mathematical tools to describe
human behavior.
In summary, there are a number of beneﬁts of such an approach. One is that since the
account is not limited by a set of tools that were not designed to address the problem of meaning variability in human language, we can obtain a more eloquent and therefore parsimonious
solution to the problem of meaning variability. Another is that the compositional story can
explain why languages pattern and people behave the way they do; in contrast, the derivational
account does not give an explanation for why such variability exists–it only explains how such
variants can be constructed using the algorithm. And at the end of the day, my question is
about the meaning of have-sentences, which is a psychologically real kind of linguistic behavior,
and to address this question, I turn to approaches that investigate how humans comprehend
have-sentences.
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5.3.1

The uniﬁed LCS account

The uniﬁed LCS account takes the process of language comprehension to be the incremental
concatenation of lexical items (as in (33) from §2.3.2), which reﬂects the way that humans perceive language (one word at a time) (see Altmann and Steedman, 1988; Jackendoff, 2014). The
four-part structure of the lexical item thus requires four parallel channels of processing. One
way to conceptualize this is that the lexical item is the constellation of four kinds of linguistic
information–concatenating lexical items is the alignment of each of the four points on the ﬁrst
lexical item with the corresponding four points of the next, and the four channels of processing dealing with their speciﬁc inputs in parallel. The four parallel processes do not take place
entirely symmetrically; language production is led by the meaning composition and outputs
a auditory or visual signal while language comprehension is led by the perceived signal to arrive at a composed meaning. In both cases, what happens “ﬁrst” is the information by which
each lexical item is retrieved from memory, that is, in production lexical items are identiﬁed
by the intended meanings, and with that retrieval comes information about morphosyntactic
co-location requirements and articulatory commands, while in comprehension, lexical items
are retrieved by matching incoming phonetic signals with memorized phonetic information,
and with that identiﬁcation comes the retrieval of meanings, aided by morphosyntactic requirements. In both, however, there is primacy of either signal (as ambimodal “phonetic”
information) or meaning, since after all, language is a set of sound-meaning pairings, which is
enriched by morphosyntax.
Accordingly, I focus here on the syntactic and semantic compositional processes, acknowledging that phonetic, phonological, and morphological processes, such as coarticulation, stress
assignment, and agreement, among many others, are happening simultaneously.
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Syntactic composition
The syntactic composition in this account is straightforward. My proposal for the lexical
item have’s syntactic structure is a verb head that subcategorizes for one NP. Accordingly, the
processing steps are simply to concatenate a subject NP (Entity 1), the verb (have), and the
object NP (Entity 2)–the verbal complement. This account is constrained by the linguistic
material present in a have-sentence, and is therefore more conservative than an account which
postulates silent syntactic constituents. This process also puts the explanatory burden for the
meaning variability of have-sentences into the meaning (lexico-conceptual structure) of the
lexical item, rather than its syntax. Additional syntactic material, such as a locative PP, would
be concatenated either as a verbal or nominal adjunct (as per the discussion in §2.4).
Meaning composition
The meaning composition in this account is also straightforward. Mirroring the syntactic NPV-NP composition, the meaning is composed with the meanings of the three lexical items in
a NP-have-NP sentence, which comprises a THING, the LCS in (77), and another THING. In this
sequence, there is exhaustive retrieval of the LCS, given the model of compositional process
outlined above, and at the point at which Entity 2 (the second THING) is comprehended, there
is a contextualization process that takes place. This contextualization process makes use of the
human causal perception mechanism and evaluates the two entities in terms of their connectedness and control asymmetry; the ﬁnal evaluation of this process will result in a determination
of the degree of causal potential in the relation, and thus the resulting interpretation of the
have-sentence.
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(77)

LCS of have: Entity 1 has Entity 2
Situation
CAUSE

Event2

Event1
ACT

THINGi

(Entity 1?)

BE

PATH

THINGj

(Entity 2)

AT

PLACE

(Entity 1?)
The real-time implementation of this structure therefore proceeds as follows:
1. The ﬁrst entity of have is heard and is held in working memory, represented as just a
THING,

as no relational meaning can be interpreted without the second entity.

2. Have is heard and retrieves the entire LCS.
3. LCS composition: Entity 1 could take one of two places (i.e. be understood as either
a controller or a location), depending on the relation determined:2

(a) The PLACE in Event2 , which could be prompted by conceptual predispositions (e.g.
ground > ﬁgure), if the degree of causal potential is perceived to be low.
(b) The actor (THINGj ) in Event1 , which could be prompted by conceptual predispositions (e.g. animate > inanimate, agent > patient), if the degree of causal potential is
perceived to be high.
4. Entity 2 takes the THINGi position in Event2 by a lexcalizable linking rule.
5. Contextualization: The causal potential relation between the two entities is then

determined based on their ontologies and the information from context. This process is
causal perception, the crucial operation in the processing of have, as its result determines
the degree of salience of the causal adjunct in this structure, and from that, the speciﬁc
reading for the have-sentence.

2

Individual comprehenders could also vary in their prior expectations or preference for a default interpretation or in the certainty of that provisional interpretation. Presumably, comprehenders with greater linguistic
context-sensitivity, might hold off in making a provisional interpretation at all, until the full entity set is interpreted. Comprehenders who rely more on their prior expectations or on the maximal LCS, may settle on an
interpretation to a stronger degree at this point. I return to this discussion in Chapter 8 in light of the real-time
processing and neuroimaging data, which supports this notion of different comprehender strategies in using and
reliances on the LCS structure or contextual features.
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I emphasize now that the visual layout of the LCS is not a representation of the compositional steps, that is, there is not a directionality encoded in the LCS. It is rather a representation of what must be understood for the meaning of a have-sentence. Consequently, there is
not a real-time “assignment” of structural locations in the LCS, but rather, the crucial determination is whether Entity 1 plays a CAUSER role or a non-CAUSER, locational role in the meaning
relation. Similarly, the “assignment” of Entity 2 to as THING in Event2 is not the assignment to
some location in a structure, but the understanding of how Entity 2 ﬁts into the ﬁnal relational
meaning: will it be a possessee/controlled entity, that is, the less causal entity in the control
asymmetry determination? Or will be it a non-control-asymmetric entity, such as the entity
that is located at a given location?
In a prototypical possession relation, such as Sue has a book, the causal perception operation
would consider the degree of connectedness and control asymmetry of the two entities, and
result in an understanding that an entity like Sue has the potential for a high degree of control
over an entity like a book, leading to the use of the causal adjunct of the LCS. For the incidental
locative reading to become salient, the rationale for the possession relation must be made less
salient, that is, there must be no plausible reason to invoke a stronger rationale for the location, given the intrinsic properties of the participants and the linguistic context. For example,
in the sentence The table has a book, the causal perception operation would consider the degree
of connectedness and control asymmetry of the two entities, and result in an understanding
that an entity like The table does not have the potential for a high degree of control over an
entity like a book, and also that the two entities do not have a high degree of connectedness or
inextricability. Because the informativity of this bare have-sentence is lower (and possibly because it requires not making use of the entire retrieved LCS), it requires additional support, in
the form of relevant context (such as There is a newspaper on the desk and) or additional linguistic
material, perhaps in the form of a locative PP (such as on it). This results in the backgrounding of the causal adjunct, and the understanding that the relational meaning is not one of a
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high degree of causal potential. The success of the operation depends on how effectively an
individual can mine their own knowledge–comprising self-supplied omnipresent context and
the linguistic context–to determine the precise relation to interpret, along the dimensions
of connectedness and control asymmetry. This lexico-conceptual structure representation is
connected to the conceptual space in that lexicalization serves as a compression or packaging
mechanism for meaning structure.

5.3.2

The transitive copula account

It is not possible to make a direct comparison with the transitive copula account, in terms
of comprehension and real-time processing, because the aim and tools of this account do not
make direct predictions about psychological reality. There are not explicit and established
groundings of syntactic structure building, derivation, and lambda calculus into the way that
humans comprehend incoming linguistic material in real-time (incrementally, left-to-right).3
As discussed in §2.3.2, the transitive copula account is not intended to be a model of how
individuals understand have-sentences in real-time, but rather, a highly articulated descriptions of linguistic utterances within a speciﬁc algorithmic framework. The account also does
not make speciﬁc claims about the directionality of psychological composition (bottom-up vs.
top-down) or the real-time ordering of steps; it does of course follow the strict rules of composition in the framework. It also does not make speciﬁc predictions about how and when
the phonetic, phonological, and morphological processes take place. Consequently, the realtime comprehension predictions I describe here, in order to compare the two accounts, are
logical extensions into the cognitive domain, rather than the ﬁrst-hand claims of the original
accounts. Accordingly, I proceed with a description of my interpretation of the extension of
the transitive copula account as consequences for a psychologically real process.
3

See Jackendoff (2011), in particular Section 4, on a comparison between the real-time processing implementations of the Minimalist Program and the Parallel Architecture, as two ﬂagship frameworks representing stepby-step versus constrain-based computational approaches.
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Because comprehension of language happens incrementally, I take the same incremental
approach from the previous section: the ﬁrst NP4 composes with the verb, which then takes
the second NP as its complement. This NP has the structure [D [Poss N]P ossP ]N P , with a
silent PossP and Poss head, in the case of a possessive complement, and the structure [D [N
[P NP]Loc−P P ]N ′ ]N P , in the case of a locative complement.
The real-time comprehension consequences of the Entity 2/DP2 -internal syntactic is that
(a) since the relational meaning of the have-sentence is unambiguously encoded into the meaning/structure of the second entity/DP, then there will be no contextualization or other effort
required once this entity/DP is heard and comprehended, and (b) without a locative PP, a
bare locative have-sentence results in a ungrammaticality that must be repaired by a syntactic
operation, namely the post-hoc insertion of a locative PP.5
There are consequences to this approach. The ﬁrst is that while the uniﬁed LCS proposes
that have-sentences of all kinds share a standard compositional process involving semantic contextualization at the point of the second entity, and are therefore generally equally available,
the derivational approach of the transitive copula account takes non-possessive have-sentences
to be marked and secondary, therefore requiring the insertion of additional syntactic structure
to be comprehended. From a processing perspective, there are two immediate limitations: one
is that a subclass of these sentences, though well observed, are only possible through post-hoc
repair mechanisms, and the second is that these mechanisms require structure that has no physical realization. While both of these situations, a repair mechanism for otherwise standard
4

I take NP and DP to be notationally equivalent since for the purposes here, there are no theoretical consequences for using one over the other.
5
There are other possible syntactic operations that could be extrapolated in this family of proposals, as no
processing predictions are provided directly by the analyses. See §8.4 for a discussion of alternative syntactic
approaches and §9.3 for the implications of those alternatives on the analysis of have-sentences. In preview,
postulating a PP projection which can be overtly realized or not as part of have’s syntax would align the proposal
with the uniﬁed LCS account, essentially stating that there is a licensed space for a relational meaning to be
interpreted. However, this represents a maximal departure from the transitive copula account, which actively
ascribes no semantic content and no additional syntactic structure beyond NP-have-NP to have, so I do not
consider this syntactic implementation here.
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sentences and silent structure, are possible, they require much higher burdens of justiﬁcation
from real-time processing, which have not been undertaken following the transitive copula
account. From a processing perspective, a uniﬁed, ordinary, and What-You-See-Is-What-YouGet account for these sentences is the more conservative approach of the two. Ultimately, the
relationship between the analytical tools implemented in the transitive copula account and its
real-time comprehension reﬂex remains to be formalized, so it could also be the case that the
real-time comprehension process from the transitive copula account would differ from my extrapolations here. The linking between these analytical tools and real-time comprehension
must be established in order to truly compare these accounts. But in the absence of such a
linking, I proceed with the competing predictions by the two accounts.

5.3.3

Competing predictions

The research question here is: how do comprehenders understand locative have-sentences, particularly bare locative have-sentences? In a nutshell, the uniﬁed LCS answers the question by
proposing that the comprehension of a have-sentence involves the incremental constituent-byconstituent composition of Entity 1, have, and Entity 2; crucially, the speciﬁc degree of causal
potential–and therefore the speciﬁc relational meaning of the have-sentence–is determined as
soon as Entity 2 is composed into the larger structure. This determination process involves
considering the nature of the entities themselves as well as relevant information in the context
or relevant explicit linguistic material. In the corresponding nutshell, the transitive copula account does not answer this question. However, extrapolating the details of the account into
the domain of real-time language understanding, the account proposes that comprehenders
cannot understand these sentences. In light of the ﬁndings in Study 1a, however, the account
would propose that comprehenders must “rescue” and repair the ungrammatical sentence by
inserting a locative PP, which is the only possible way to achieve a locative have-sentence. I
summarize the critical differences between the two accounts regarding the nature of have as a
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lexical item, have-sentences, as well as their respective processing predictions in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Comparison assumptions and predictions
Have’s
Uniﬁed LCS account
Transitive copula account
Semantic content
Uniﬁed LCS
None
Source of variability
Conceptual breadth of relations
DP-internal XPs
Crosslinguistic typology
Predicted/regular
Unpredicted/anomalous
Comprehension nature
Semantic/conceptual-led
Syntactic-led
Comprehension operation LCS retrieval + contextualization
DP composition
Bare locative treatment
Normal processing
Error rescue/repair
These distinctions are the focus of the subsequent real-time comprehension studies. In
particular, the methodologies described below speciﬁcally address the questions of whether
the comprehension of have-sentences is a syntactic or semantic operation, and whether the
comprehension of locative have-sentences is a standard comprehension process or an error
rescue and repair process. Is it not possible to answer all of these questions in a falsiﬁable way
through traditional linguistic intuition, because they require evidence from the neurocognitive system itself. The ability to answer these questions is therefore an immediately salient
contribution of investigating the real-time comprehension process. Directly below, I detail
the speciﬁc ways in which real-time comprehension techniques can shed light on the nature
of the comprehension of have-sentences.

5.4

Real-time processing predictions for have-sentences

I take the stance that any theory involving a mental faculty (such as language) and aspiring to
describe the behavior of humans must be contextualized in the neurocognitive underpinnings
of the human mind. While research in psychology can inform understanding of the mechanisms in the brain itself, neuroscientiﬁc investigation can also constrain the possible theories
and models of mental faculties, like language, in the mind. This insight is crucial especially for
the present focus on the linguistic nature of have-sentences.
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These approaches can directly assess questions that arise from the competing accounts
above, namely: is one kind of sentence harder or easier (and therefore marked or unmarked)
than another? Is one kind of sentence hard or impossible to comprehend? If one kind of sentence is harder to comprehend, then this cognitive work will be reﬂected into psychologically
real processing cost. These approaches can also directly assess the nature of such processing cost–is it incurred at the word or sentence level? Is it phonetic, morphological, syntactic,
or semantic? In the following sections, I detail the real-time processing methodologies and
speciﬁcally, how they can answer these questions and in turn, arbitrate between the competing
accounts of locative have-sentences.

5.4.1

Timecourse: the order of operations

One of the primary ways of assessing the psychological reality of a linguistic theory or model
is by investigating the timecourse of the comprehension or production process. This is particularly relevant once an offline measure, such as an acceptability judgment, which indicates
the “ﬁnal result” of a given process, is obtained. Experimental paradigms that combine both
offline (judgment data) with online measures (reaction/reading time data) to provide insights
that are not afforded by either type of study alone (Kaiser, 2013). The timecourse of processing
can address the question of how the individual participant arrived at the ﬁnal result, and what
are the operations they engaged in. How does measuring the time it takes for something to
be processed connect with the underlying nature of the process? The psychological index of
effort, which can be interpreted as psychological processing cost, is time. That is, because of
the physical nature of the neurocognitive system is rooted in the physical transport of atoms
and molecules across distances, neurocognitive operations have temporal reality. The greater
the operation, the greater the temporal reality. Speciﬁc to locative have-sentences, since Study
1a showed that context facilitated the comprehension of bare locative have-sentences, it is possible to investigate whether participants incurred extra cognitive work (processing cost) and
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whether that extra work was of a syntactic or semantic nature, using methodologies which
target the timecourse of processing.
There are two parameters for identifying processing cost in terms of time. One is degree
of the cost, which corresponds to the amount of extra time incurred by a process. The general
setup for timecourse processing studies is always one of relative comparison. Since there are
not absolute time measures for anything cognitive (i.e., one cannot determine that comprehending a passive sentence takes 12 seconds or 800 milliseconds), identifying any processing
cost requires establishing a minimal pair, not necessarily with a single linguistic unit, but with
a single hypothesized operational difference. If there is an observed temporal difference between the two members of the minimal pair, that time can be ascribed to a difference in the
underlying processing operation between the two members. Accordingly, one of the members
must be set up as the baseline case, in order to assess the “extra” processing cost (and its temporal reality) of the test case. The second parameter of processing cost is the location (along a
timeline) of the processing cost. Taking the same setup as above, if multiple sequential units
of measurement are established, then a processing cost can be localized in the sequence. This
setup is that used in self-paced reading.
It is also possible to establish the nature of the processing cost: speciﬁc to language, is a
cost incurred due to extra syntactic, morphological, or semantic processing? By comparing
a controlled experimental pair with electroencephalography, a processing cost can be determined to be associated with a certain kind of processing.
Method and predictions: self-paced reading
The present study used reading time measurements (in milliseconds) from a masked noncumulative moving-window self-paced reading paradigm as an index of the contextual facilitation effect. In this type of SPR study, each participant reads sentences at their own pace;
each press of a button makes the next word appear onscreen. The words not being read are
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replaced with a mask composed of dashes to give the subject a sense of the total length of
the sentence. Thus, the duration from the onset of the presentation of one word to the onset of the presentation of the next is a taken to be the reading time of each word. Variations
of reading times in corresponding windows of different experimental conditions are taken to
be measures of processing cost (e.g., Ferreira and Henderson, 1990; Kaiser, 2013; Gibson and
Warren, 2004).
I use SPR to localize the processing cost of the hypothesized contextualization, which
should occur at the point of the noun complement of have–when Entity 2 is comprehended
and the contextualization operation can take place. Using the exact same sentences as in Study
1, however, poses a problem for the SPR paradigm, because the noun complement is the last
word in the target sentence. In SPR, the last word of a sentence is known to engender large
increases in reading time that result from a reinstantiation of the entire sentence (Kaiser, 2013),
so for the stimuli in the SPR study, an additional descriptive detail in the form of a three-word
relative clause was added to each of the target sentences in order to separate the predicted
task-evoked effects at the critical noun complement window from the sentence-ﬁnal wrap-up
effects. These three words act as a spill-over buffer–-a series of cost-free windows that isolate
delayed sentence-processing effects from the wrap-up, since processing costs in SPR often
show up across several windows, either due to multi-window-length costs, or costs that accrue
beyond the timespan of a single window. Accordingly, the modiﬁed target sentence would
appear as in (78).
(78)

The maple tree has a car that is red.

For this sentence, there are two predictions, regarding the two possible parameters for
processing cost identiﬁcation in SPR: the direction of cost and the location of the cost. The
target in (78) has been found to be facilitated by contextual information that decreases the
salience of the causal frame and therefore supports the non-causal locative reading of the sen169

tence. As such, the uniﬁed LCS account predicts that a facilitatory locative context should
engender lower reading times for a bare locative have-sentence, corresponding to the increased
acceptability found in Study 1, than a non-facilitatory possessive context. This means that bare
locative have-sentence after a non-facilitatory context will be harder to process and therefore
cause a slow-down in reading time at the point where the contextualization operation is supposed to take place. Accordingly, a difference in reading times between a facilitatory (locative)
and non-facilitatory (possessive) context would support the uniﬁed LCS account, while no difference in reading times between a facilitatory and non-facilitatory context would lend support
to the transitive copula account. In terms of location of cost, in this sentence, following the
uniﬁed LCS account, the contextualization operation should take place at ‘car’ since that is
when Entity 2 is comprehended and the degree of causal potential can be evaluated for the
two entities. If, however, the critical operation taking place is one of syntactic repair, then
processing cost should be observed starting only at the following window ‘that’ (?). This is
because at the point of ‘car’, the parser could still encounter a locative PP, but encountering
‘that’ signals the absence of the locative PP complement. Accordingly, when the processing
cost begins will support one or the other account proposed.
In summary, the uniﬁed LCS account predicts that a facilitatory context will engender
faster reading times for a bare locative have-sentence starting at the window containing the
second entity of the have-sentence, compared to a non-facilitatory context. This faster reading
time represents an attenuated cost of contextualization in light of the facilitatory context. The
transitive copula account predicts either no difference in reading times between facilitatory
and non-facilitatory contexts or a difference that begins at the window following the second
entity, indicating a repair cost once the parser detects the absence of a locative PP.
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Method and predictions: event-related potentials
Electroencephalography (EEG) is a neuroscientiﬁc technique that measures the continuous
changes in electrical potentials in millionths of a volt (µV ) on the surface of the scalp that
results from the ﬁring of neurons en masse in the cortex of the brain. These signals are measured using small electrodes (typically 16-256 of them) that are placed in speciﬁc locations on
the scalp. EEG data has high-temporal resolution–usually measured to the millisecond. Eventrelated potentials (ERPs) are time-locked deﬂections in the EEG signal that are consistently
observed in response to speciﬁc types of cognitive processes. For example, word-level processing (when compared to a baseline control), semantic unexpectedness, consistently triggers a
negative deﬂection peaking around 400 ms post-stimulus-onset which is typically observed
in the central and posterior parietal regions; this ERP component is thus called the N400.
Sentence-level processing (again, when compared to a baseline control), consistently produces
deﬂections in the positive direction between 600-700 and 850-1000 ms post-stimulus; hence
the P600 or late-positivity components. The former, P600, reﬂects processing of a syntactic
nature, while the latter, the late-positivity, reﬂects processing of a semantic nature, speciﬁcally
sentence-level contextualization. These components have emerged from thousands of systematic studies and offer a toolkit for identifying the nature of a given cognitive operation. The
presence/absence and strength of the component is indicative of the underlying cognitive processes and can therefore arbitrate between proposed processing mechanisms. In sum, there
are three parameters for ERP: the onset of the response, the polarity, and the scalp region.
Because SPR can only localize processing cost differences, I employ ERP to identify the
types of processing that are taking place in the window identiﬁed by the SPR results. The
non-facilitatory context should evoke an N400 at the noun complement of the target havesentence, indicating that comprehenders are sensitive to the nature of the context and its effect on the target. Additionally, the contextualization operation should elicit a late-positivity
ERP component in the same window, which has been shown to index contextualization effort
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(DeLong et al., 2014; Weiland et al., 2014; Piñango et al., 2017). If, in fact, the processing of have
does involve the syntactic repair of locative PP insertion, then components that index syntactic processing, namely the P600 (Frisch et al., 2002; Burkhardt, 2007; Bornkessel-Schlesewsky
and Schlesewsky, 2008), should be identiﬁed.

5.4.2

Brain bases: the neurocognitive mechanisms

The other primary way of assessing the psychological reality of a linguistic theory or model is by
making use of the fact that the surface (cortex) of the brain is topographically organized, with
different regions performing different functions and operations. For example, the processing
of incoming visual information from the eyes happens in a very topographically constrained
area at the back of the brain, while the control of various parts of the body is highly speciﬁed
in a strip of cortex in the middle of the brain. Investigating the brain regions that underlie
speciﬁc operations involved in the comprehension process can address the questions of how
an individual arrives at a ﬁnal interpretation and what operations they engage in to do so.
There are two general approaches toward making use of brain data for linguistic inquiry.
The ﬁrst parallels the ERP approach, by using an existing framework of neural traces to arbitrate between models. These neural traces can make use of and shed light on the larger
framework of language processing within the cognitive system by asking what areas of the
brain “belong” to language and what doesn’t? That is, how does the comprehension of havesentences (or any sentence) depend on neurocognitive resources that are highly specialized for
language as well as neurocognitive resources that are recruited domain-generally? For arbitrating between the two accounts of have-sentences, investigating brain areas that are known to
underlie syntactic processing and brain areas known to underlie semantic processing will lend
key support for one account of another. Crucially, these brain areas are non-overlapping, and
are therefore provide a clear test for the two accounts. Finding activations of cortical regions
associated with semantic composition will support the uniﬁed LCS account, while ﬁnding ac172

tivations of cortical regions associated with syntactic composition will support the transitive
copula account. This parametric approach complements and supports the ERP ﬁndings by
identifying the core linguistic operations that are proposed by each account to be involved in
the comprehension of have-sentences.
The second approach is more broad in that it makes use of the entirety of cortical localization research in identifying and discretizing the operations that must be taking place, given the
known functions of certain brain areas over others. Such an approach is more exploratory, in
contrast to the ﬁrst approach described above, which is more conﬁrmatory. The neuroimaging results could shed light on the nature of an operation, that is, whether is it “standard”
versus “error repair” depending on regions activated, given that some regions, like the anterior cingulate cortex, are systematically activated during error detection tasks (Alexander and
Brown, 2019). Complementarily, the recruitment of general or specialized working memory
cortical regions serve as a measure of processing cost, speciﬁcally relating to effort. For example, computationally demanding tasks will elicit greater activations in generalized working
memory regions like the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Hagoort, 2005; Binder et al., 2009),
which could serve as a potential parallel for the ERP indices of effort, like the late-positivity
component. Other cortical regions can also index features of the operation such as emotional
arousal (Mather et al., 2006) or uncertainty (Volz et al., 2004). Finally, activations can also
provide insight into the content of the target process: for example, cognitive operations involving physical layouts and object relationships in space will preferentially recruit speciﬁc
regions of the brain (Ganis et al., 2004), while operations involving the visualization or recall
of human faces will recruit other speciﬁc areas (Weiner and Grill-Spector, 2012). Altogether,
investigating the brain bases of a given process can illuminate the underlying neurocognitive
mechanisms involved; beyond arbitrating between non-complementary accounts of a process,
brain localization data can provide insight into other involved operations that are not visible
in targeted experimental paradigms like ERP.
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Method and predictions: functional magnetic resonance imaging
The principal method for identifying brain areas involved in a candidate cognitive process is
through functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), a technique that measures changes in
blood ﬂow throughout the brain (Logothetis et al., 2001). In short, the MR scanner uses physical properties of atomic subparticles to identify oxygenated and deoxygenated hemoglobin
molecules and map the changes in the proportion between them in high-resolution across the
brain–the units of fMRI images are called voxels (essentially a three-dimensional or volumetric pixel) and typically are measured at a cubic-millimeter resolution. The movement of oxygenated blood toward a given region of the brain is called the Blood Oxygen Level Dependent
(BOLD) response, which is predicated on the logic that if a certain area of the brain is being
preferentially recruited by a given task, it will require an observable increase in oxygenated
blood. Therefore, a BOLD response for a given area is taken to index greater recruitment of
that cortical region. The BOLD response is comparatively slow–happening on the scale of
seconds rather than milliseconds–and therefore is not suited for making the precise temporal
measurements that a technique with high temporal resolution, such as ERP, is suited for. As a
result, these two techniques together provide a multimodal triangulation of the processes that
underlie a given operation and the order in which they are executed (Logothetis, 2008).
Crucially for experimentation, however, the entire brain is always active and consuming
oxygen-rich blood, so the fMRI paradigm makes use of the subtraction method to identify
differences between two minimally different experimental conditions; this setup reveals the
regions that are systematically recruited for one condition versus another, above and beyond
any regions that are recruited for both conditions. I will therefore use this neuroscientiﬁc
approach to compare the real-time processing proﬁles of bare locative have-sentences following supportive locative contexts and non-supporting possessive contexts, in line with Studies
2 and 3. Speciﬁcally, I will use functional localization to identify the cortical regions that are
implicated in the contextualization operation at the core of the uniﬁed LCS account.
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The key cortical regions of interest are areas that have been consistently shown to underlie linguistic processing; these areas are elements of the larger language network in the brain,
which comprises areas highly speciﬁed for linguistic operations as well as areas that are understood to be domain-general cognitive resources, but that are implicated in certain types of linguistic tasks (Hagoort, 2014). The transitive copula account takes bare locative have-sentences
to be ungrammatical but repairable through the insertion of a locative PP, which is the source
of the locative meaning. Accordingly, the account predicts that cortical areas associated with
error detection and ungrammaticality, as well as areas associated with syntactic composition
and reanalysis will be recruited during the comprehension of these sentences. Finding activations in these two areas, which are systematic and circumscribed, would correspond to ﬁnding
the P600 ERP component and support the transitive copula/syntactic composition account
for have. The uniﬁed LCS account, on the other hand, takes locative have-sentences to be
standard interpretations for have, and not ungrammatical sentences to be rescued through a
repair mechanism, though these interpretations require additional support with respect to
the conceptual relationship between the two entities of the have-sentence. Accordingly, the
account predicts that cortical areas associated with lexico-semantic conceptual composition
and contextualization, which are distinct from the aforementioned syntactic composition regions, will be recruited during comprehension of the target sentence. Finding activations in
these regions would support the uniﬁed LCS account of have-sentences, in which the compositional burden is borne out in the causal potential evaluation operation, and not insertion of
additional syntactic constituents.
Harnessing the topographic organization of the brain serves as a key tool for arbitrating
between theoretical accounts of a psychological and linguistic phenomenon, namely the comprehension of have-sentences. Investigating the neurocognitive implementation of these sentences also can provide insights into the nature of the process beyond the direct comparison
of two competing accounts. Ultimately, these approaches exemplify the perspective of the
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uniﬁed model of meaning variation (as described in §5.2) by grounding linguistic inquiry, as a
study of the human mind, into a study of human biology.

5.4.3

The role of individual-level variability in linguistic context-sensitivity

A critical dimension of the real-time process of comprehension is the degree to which individual participants differ in the contextualization process as a function of their linguistic
context-sensitivity. The uniﬁed LCS and transitive copula accounts predict different patterns
of variability across the studies: the former predicts variability in the contextualization effect,
given known variability in individuals’ degree of linguistic context-sensitivity, while the latter
makes no direct predictions about variability, due to no possibility for variability in its organization of the language system. However, extrapolating into the real-time comprehension,
no variability should be observed in the hypothesized syntactic repair operation, since such
operations are taken to be universally identical and automatic.
The manifestation of individual-level variability associated with the AQ measure has been
found to show discrepancies across methodologies. For example, Xiang et al. (2013) identiﬁed AQ-structured variability for a parallel task in acceptability judgments but not self-paced
reading, while Nieuwland et al. (2010) found AQ-structured variability in both acceptability
judgments and ERP measures. The ﬁndings in Study 1b, which serve as the motivation for
the subsequent studies, were offline acceptability judgments, which could have two types of
differences compared to real-time processing studies. The ﬁrst is that the two methodologies
invoke different types of engagement with context by the participants. The second is that the
underlying engagement with context is the same, but the methodologies differ in the time window of measurement, leading to differences due to identiﬁcation of variability at different time
points. That is, real-time processing measures capture immediate, automatic responses within
approximately one or two seconds of the critical stimulus onset, while acceptability judgments
are gathered on the timescale of three to ten seconds. Accordingly, identifying individual-level
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variability in both study types will shed light on the nature of the contextualization process and
whether individuals’ varying degrees of linguistic context-sensitivity manifest in their unconscious and automatic contextualization processes and/or in their conscious reasoning involved
in a judgment task.

5.5

Conclusion

I have now brought together the three components of my proposed model of meaning variation, justiﬁed it in context of the motivating questions, and applied it to the real-time comprehension of locative have-sentences.
In the next chapters, I present the details of the three studies that assess the psychological
and neurological reality of the contextualization operation for bare locative have-sentences
invoked by the uniﬁed LCS account. In doing so, I not only show the three components of
the model of variation in action, but also how it arbitrates between the two accounts of the
comprehension of have-sentences in question.
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6.1

Prediction: context-dependent compositional eﬀort
at have’s noun-complement

In line with the uniﬁed LCS account of locative have-sentences, SPR results should identify
compositional effort due to the nature of the context at the noun complement window. This
compositional effort should manifest as lower reading time for a bare locative have-sentence
after a facilitatory context as compared to a non-facilitatory context. Identifying the start of
the compositional effort, additionally, will help arbitrate between this account and the transitive copula account: observing context-induced cost beginning at the window of the noun
complement suggests that the cost is one of the semantic contextualization required to obtain the ﬁnal meaning of a have-sentence, while observing cost beginning in the next window
would suggest that the cost is one of syntactic repair, incurred when the parser discovers the
lack of a locative PP and must repair the sentence by inserting one. Moreover, the uniﬁed LCS
account, along with the cognitively grounded model of meaning variation, predicts individuallevel variability governed by degree of linguistic context-sensitivity in this contextualization
process. Speciﬁcally, individuals who are less context-sensitive should show a smaller effect of
contextual facilitation than their more context-sensitive peers.

6.2
6.2.1

Methods: self-paced reading
Participants

Sixty-ﬁve native speakers of American English were recruited from the Yale University student
body (37 female, ages 18-27, mean age 20;8 years) to participate in the study. All participants
were right-handed and by self-report, had no history of psychological illness, neurological dis179

ease, brain injury, learning or reading disability, and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
All participants gave written informed consent in accordance with the guidelines set by the
Yale University Human Subjects Committee and were compensated for their participation.

6.2.2

Materials

Linguistic stimuli
The stimuli for Study 2 were created, based off the stimuli from Study 1a, using the same
context-target paradigm and the same semantic criteria about the relationship between the
entities employed. In light of the Study 1 results, two types of contexts were provided: the
Locative-have Context-type, which contains a locative relationship using a have sentence and
the Possessive Context-type, which contains alienable and inalienable possessive relationships
using a have-sentence. No other ﬂoor conditions were included considering both the Study 1
ﬁndings as well as the methodological constraints of the real-time processing paradigms.
Given the methodological requirements of SPR, a three-word relative clause was added
to each target sentence in order to provide a spill-over buffer, a series of cost-free windows
that provide separation of the target reading time effects from the sentence-ﬁnal wrap-up effect. The corresponding descriptive detail was added to each context to ensure conversational
felicity. The addition of these modiﬁers also serves to prevent a pragmatic bleaching effect
(attenuated processing costs from a semantically and pragmatically valueless sentence), since
informativeness has been shown to modulate reading time (Levy, 2008). One example set of
stimuli are presented in Table 6.1. In each set, there are a total of three sentences: one with
the Locative-have Context-type and target and two with the Possessive Context-type and target (one alienable possession relation and one inalienable possession relation). Fifty sets were
created, for a total of 150 sentences shown to each participant.
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Table 6.1: Example stimulus set for real-time processing
Context-type
Locative-have
Possessive

Context
Conj.
The pine tree has a silver motorcycle under it
and
The pine tree has big
branches

Target
the maple tree has a car that is red.

Measures of individual-level variability
Participants completed the AQ questionnaire, described in §4.4.1, in order to calculate the
Awareness of Communicative Dynamics (ACD) scale, described in §4.5. For this study, the
ACD measure was used to quantify each participant’s degree of linguistic context-sensitivity.

6.2.3

Design

Eight unique self-paced reading scripts were created for the study. Scripts 1-4 contained identical material in different orders comprising half of the total materials, while Scripts 5-8 contained the other half of the materials, in different orders as well. Each experimental item set
was split so that half the set was present in Scripts 1-4 while the other half was presented in
Scripts 5-8; the split halves were counterbalanced across all sets. Each participant was shown a
unique combination and order of two scripts, (see Cowart, 1997). Within each script, all items
were pseudo-randomized such that no two items of the same experimental set or of the same
condition appeared consecutively.
Comprehension questions followed 75% of the questions, while the other 25%, distributed
equally and randomly across conditions, were followed by an instruction to press either the
“yes” or “no” key. The correct answers were half “yes” and half “no” to prevent a response bias.
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6.2.4

Procedure

Prior to the start of the study, participants were given written and oral instruction about the
experiment. Participants were seated in a chair at a desktop computer in a quiet room. Experimental items were presented one at a time on the computer monitor.
Stimuli were presented following a standard noncumulative moving-window self-paced
reading paradigm, created and presented using the E-Prime software suite. For each sentence,
a mask composed of series of dashes representing the total length of the sentence was presented on the screen to give participants a rough sense of the length of the sentence, without
any indication of its content. Participants then proceeded through the sentence word-by-word
by pressing the spacebar on the keyboard. Every spacebar press displayed the next word in the
sentence and replaced the old word with the mask.
Participants were instructed to read through the sentence at as natural of a pace as possible while maintaining full comprehension of the sentences. They were also instructed that
comprehension questions following the sentences would ensure their attention and comprehension of the items.
The study began with a practice session of three example sentences based off the experimental items. The practice session ensured the participants understood and were familiar with
the paradigm prior to beginning the study. Participants were required to answer all the practice questions correctly before moving on to the experiment; if any questions were answered
incorrectly, the practice session was given again. No participant completed the practice session more than twice.

6.2.5

Preprocessing and analysis

Because average reading times do not reﬂect differences in word length across windows or
differences in reading speeds between participants, a residual analysis was performed (see
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Trueswell et al., 1994; Gibson and Warren, 2004, for discussion). For each subject, a regression equation was constructed, based on all the reading time data for each participant, that
predicted a reading time in milliseconds from the length in characters in each window. For
each window, the predicted reading time from each participant’s regression equation was subtracted from their actual reading time for a residual reading time. Accordingly, if a participant’s
actual reading time was exactly the predicted reading time, the value for that window would
be zero. Therefore, this residual reading time, which factors out window length and individual
reading speed, is a more direct index of processing cost.
Reading times were measured for every word in the sentence, but only the critical window,
and two windows before and after it are analyzed. The critical word begins at the onset of
the noun complement of have in the target sentence, when the contextualization operation
in the uniﬁed LCS account is predicted to begin. Because the target sentence is the same for
all Context-types within each set, any differences in reading times can be attributed to the
inﬂuence of the context, as the target being measured for each Context-type within a set is
the same. Sample excerpts of two experimental sets are given in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: Critical word placement
C-2
has
has

C-1
a
a

C
car
cactus

C+1
that
that

C+2
is
is

For the reading time analysis, linear mixed-effects models were constructed in R (R Core
Team, 2016), using the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015), for each of the ﬁve segments using the
ﬁxed effects of Context-type (2 levels) and the continuous ACD measure as well as their interaction term, in addition to, as random effects, random intercepts for participants and items
as well as by-participant random slopes for the effect of context-type. Statistical signiﬁcance
(p-value) was obtained by a likelihood ratio test of the full model with the effect in question
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against the null model without the effect in question.1
For the individual-level variability analysis, individual linear regressions were conducted
using a second dependent variable, calculated to directly isolate each participant’s degree of
linguistic context-sensitivity. This measure, henceforth the ∆ measure, is the arithmetic difference between the response to the target after the facilitatory locative context and the response
to the corresponding target after the non-facilitatory possessive context. The ∆ measure is
therefore serving as an explicit measure of the magnitude to which each participant showed
a context-type effect. Correlation coefficients were calculated between participant ∆ measures and ACD scores, but these correlations were not evaluated for statistical signiﬁcance
due to the small participant sample size. Instead, correlation coefficients are evaluated for
meaningfulness in the context of convergent ﬁndings across study paradigms (see §8.4.4 on
the relationship between effect signiﬁcance and effect meaningfulness).

6.3

Findings: the processing cost of contextualization

Mean residualized reading times for the segments of interest (two windows before and after
the critical window, which contains the noun complement of have) are presented in Figure
6.1. Signiﬁcant main effects of Context-type were observed in the critical word (C) window, as
well as the two windows (C+1, C+2) following it (all χ2 (2)<13.0, n=65, all p<.001), indicating that
context affected the real-time comprehension of the target locative have-sentence beginning
at the critical window. No signiﬁcant main or interaction effects of ACD were found (all
p>.4), and all three ∆ measure correlations were weak (all r<.1), indicating that individual
comprehenders showed relatively uniform reading times over the course of the target sentence.
1

This method computes a χ2 -value, as opposed to other statistical techniques which may compute, say, a t- or
F-value.
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Figure 6.1: Mean residualized reading times by context-type

6.4

Discussion: real-time contextual facilitation

The uniﬁed LCS account for the behavior of locative have-sentences predicted that a facilitatory locative context would engender faster reading times in a bare locative have-sentence,
beginning at the point in the sentence where the noun complement was comprehended, due
to an attenuated contextualization effect, which would be visible by slower reading times for
the target sentence after a non-facilitatory possessive context. In contrast, the real-time processing predictions extrapolated from the transitive copula account of have-sentences posit
no difference due to the context, since, the argument goes, context plays no role in determining the meaning of a have-sentence, and any potential syntactic repair mechanism required to
“rescue” the target sentence would be observed in the target after both context-types.
In terms of the direction of the processing cost, the results are consistent with the uniﬁed
LCS account, which predicted a facilitated speed-up of the target sentence after only the facilitatory context-type. Since Study 1 ﬁndings show that a possessive context was equivalent (in
its effect on acceptability ratings) as a context containing a descriptive predicate (e.g., The pine
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tree is very green), the reading time proﬁle for the Possessive Context-type can be interpreted as
being similar to that of no relational context at all. This interpretation renders the Possessive
Context-type as the “baseline” with which the Locative Context-type reading time proﬁle can
be seen as facilitated. In terms of the localization of the processing cost, these results are also
consistent with the uniﬁed LCS account, which predicted that the contextualization effort
would be visible starting at the window containing the noun-complement of have.
One consequence of this overall pattern is that with context, bare locative have-sentences
are standard, normal processing, especially in conjunction with the Study 1 ﬁndings. That is,
with appropriate contextual support, there is no “extra” work that must be done to arrive at
the locative reading. In contrast, the contextualization operation is visible in the Possessive
Context-type reading time proﬁle, which suggests the parser is attempting to seek out relevant
contextual information, yet fails to obtain it (as shown in Study 1) due to the non-facilitatory
context and lack of other possible sources of disambiguating information, like a locative PP.
While the localization pattern appears to clearly support the contextualization effort, it
could be the case that both contextualization and syntactic repair operations are taking place.
Due to spillover effects, where the processing cost (reading time slowdown) incurred from a
single operation could be observed across multiple windows, it is likely that the cost incurred
is all due to the hypothesized contextualization operation. But, to be maximally conservative,
these reading time patterns do not rule it out, especially since there is a slight increase in
reading time across both conditions from the critical word window (C has) and the following
window (C+1 that). This increase could be interpreted as increased cost across both conditions
because the measure here is of residualized reading time.
These results clearly show a facilitatory effect of context as well as the hypothesized contextualization effect beginning at the right point. However, these results do not rule out the
presence of a syntactic repair operation, like locative PP-insertion, because of the spillover
effect as well as the fact that reading times cannot distinguish between the nature of a process186

ing cost as arising from either syntactic or semantic sources. To make this distinction, I turn
to ERP measures (Study 3) in the following chapter, to address this question.
It is interesting to note that no effects of individual-level variability were observed in the
reading time measures. A few possibilities could explain this. First is an issue of temporal
window. Since the Study 1 ﬁndings do show differences between comprehenders as a function
of their degree of linguistic context-sensitivity, it could be the case that the temporal windows
investigated do not reveal an individual-level variability effect. Because the Study 1 measures
are obtained over the timescale of several seconds, while these measures are obtained over
the timescale of approximately one second (about 300 ms per window), it may be the case
that the contextualization operation does not begin to differ across participants until much
later–speciﬁcally, that the contextualization operation begins with an automatic (and common)
sub-operation, and later manifests differently across participants as a function of their contextsensitivity. In that case, it could be that variability in contextualization can only be measured
after the sentence is completely processed, beyond the temporal window available to SPR
methods.
Second is a potential task effect. In Study 1, participants were asked to evaluate the acceptability of a sentence, while in Study 2, they were merely asked to read for comprehension.
This difference in type of engagement with the stimuli could have differentially manifested
variability in context-sensitivity. Xiang et al. (2013) also observe variability in offline but not
online effects, and posit a few differences, including the greater dependence on automatic processes (e.g. working memory encoding and retrieval) during online tasks masking any potential variability effects, though their experimental setup assesses a completely distinct linguistic
phenomenon.
Third is an issue of resolution. SPR can be regarded as the most basic of real-time processing methodologies, in that it is unable to distinguish between different types of processing
cost–it cannot reveal the underlying nature of an observed operation’s effect on reading time.
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Since the contextualization effect is possibly “hiding” a potential syntactic repair operation,
it could be the case that there are multiple effects within the observed slowdown, between
which individual-level variability effects manifest differently. Such a conﬂation between effects that show or do not show variability effects could obscure the overall measurement of
any variability effects that are present. This possibility in particular adds further motivation
for the ERP study to identify the nature of the observed processing cost in reading times.
In summary, SPR results show a contextual facilitation effect by which a facilitatory locative context supplies the relevant contextual information required to interpret a bare locative
have-sentence. In contrast, the same bare locative have-sentence without the facilitatory context undergoes a contextualization operation at the point when the noun complement (Entity
2) of the have-sentence is processed, consistent with the uniﬁed LCS account of have-sentences.
However, SPR reading times do not identify the linguistic nature of an incurred processing
cost, so ERP measures are required to both validate the semantic nature of the contextualization operation as well as verify that no syntactic repair operation is taking place at the same
time.
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7.1

Prediction: context-dependent semantic contextualization, not syntactic repair

To evaluate the real-time processing of contextually facilitated locative have-sentences, I will
evaluate three ERP components: the N400, as an index of general word-level semantic expectedness, the P600, as an index of syntactic repair operations, and the late-positivity, as an index
of semantic contextual integration operations. Due to the Study 2 ﬁndings, the processing
cost has already been localized to the point in the sentence when the noun complement of the
have-sentence is processed–ERP results will shed light on whether this processing cost is of a
semantic context integration nature or a syntactic repair nature.
In line with the uniﬁed LCS account of locative have-sentences, ERP results should identify
an effect of semantic contextualization at the point of the noun complement. This contextual
integration process should manifest as a late-positivity component for the non-facilitatory context compared to the facilitatory baseline. In contrast, identifying a P600 component, indexing syntactic repair, for the facilitatory context would be more consistent with the transitive
copula account. Observing an N400 component for the non-facilitatory context-type would
be consistent with both accounts, as this index of word-level semantic expectedness would
be indicative of a mismatch detection between non-facilitatory possessive context and the
locative target at a word-level compositional level, and not a broader, sentence-level contextualization effort.
Moreover, the uniﬁed LCS account, along with the cognitively-grounded model of meaning
variation predicts that individual-level variability in degree of linguistic context-sensitivity will
be observed in the late-positivity component, but not the N400 component. Speciﬁcally, more
context-sensitive comprehenders should show a greater late-positivity component amplitude
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than their less context-sensitive peers for the non-facilitatory Possessive context-type. The
transitive copula account does not make predictions about individual-level variability.
In summary, observing a late-positivity component correlated with individual contextsensitivity (ACD) measures would support the uniﬁed LCS account, while a P600 component
with no correlation with the variability measure would lend support to the real-time processing
mechanism extrapolated from the transitive copula account. Both accounts predict an N400
component due to semantic expectations established by the context.

7.2
7.2.1

Methods: Event-related potentials
Participants

Twenty-nine Yale University students (19 female, ages 18-24, mean age 20;5), were recruited
from the Yale University community. By self-report, all participants were right-handed and
had no history of psychological illness, neurological disease, or brain injury for which they had
lasting symptoms or are currently being treated, as well as no learning or reading disability. All
participants also reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All participants gave written
informed consent in accordance with the guidelines set by the Yale University Human Subjects
Committee and were compensated for their participation.

7.2.2

Materials

The linguistic stimuli (Table 6.1) and measures of individual-level variability in linguistic contextsensitivity used in Study 2 were employed for Study 3.
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7.2.3

Design

The 150 sentences were presented in a unique order for each participant; the order was pseudorandomized such that no two consecutive items were from the same set or of the same contexttype. Yes/no comprehension questions followed 75% of the sentences to help ensure attention;
in the remaining cases, participants were asked to press the “yes” or “no” keys. The total
breakdown between “yes” and “no” responses was equal to prevent a response bias.

7.2.4

Procedure

Participants were seated in a darkened room in front of the stimulus presentation computer.
Sentences were presented one word at a time in the center of the screen in a white font on a
black background; in an rapid serial visual presentation paradigm, each word was presented for
500 ms with no inter-stimulus interval. At the end of each sentence assigned a comprehension
question, the participant were given 10000 ms to answer the question. A ﬁxation cross was
displayed for 1 s between the end of an experimental item (sentence + question) and the start
of the next. Participants were instructed to read each sentence and were informed of the
comprehension question procedure. Participants were asked not to blink or move during the
stimulus presentation to minimize eyeblink or motion artifacts in the EEG data.
Electrophysiological measures were recorded using Neuroscan Synamps2 ampliﬁers and a
64-channel Quik-Cap (sintered Ag/AgCl electrodes, 5% system conﬁguration; Oostenveld and
Praamstra (2001)) with an online Cz reference, at a 1,000 Hz sampling rate. Horizontal and
vertical electrooculograms were recorded with electrodes above and below the left eye and on
both outer canthi to control for eye-movement artifacts. Impedances were kept below 5 kΩ
for each electrode.
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7.2.5

Preprocessing and analysis

The EEG waveforms were ﬁrst visually inspected for artifact rejection, and then using EEGLAB
(Delorme and Makeig, 2004), were ﬁltered (0.1–80 Hz bandpass with a notch ﬁlter at 60 Hz),
re-referenced offline to averaged mastoids, epoched around the critical words (200 ms pre- to
999 ms post-stimulus), baseline corrected using the pre-stimulus interval, and averaged within
each condition for each subject.
Event-related potentials (ERPs) were time-locked to the onset of the noun complement
of have, as shown previously in Table 6.2. This critical word is the start of the contextualization operation, as indicated by the Study 2 ﬁndings. Mean amplitudes were calculated
over commonly used windows in the psycholinguistic ERP literature (e.g., 400-500 ms poststimulus-onset for N400; 600-800 ms post-onset for P600; and 850-1000 ms post-onset for
late-positivity (Kutas and Federmeier, 2011; Schumacher, 2011; Schumacher and Avrutin, 2011;
Schumacher, 2013, 2014; Piñango et al., 2017)).
Four subjects’ data were excluded from the analysis due to insufficient data from technical
artifacts; the data from the remaining 25 participants (15 female) were included in the analysis.
All statistical analyses were performed in R (R Core Team, 2016).
For the ERP analysis, linear mixed-effects were constructed using the lme4 package (Bates
et al., 2015) for each of the three component windows: N400, P600, and late-positivity. Each
model had as ﬁxed effects: Context-type (2 levels), Location (9 levels: left anterior,medial anterior,right anterior, left central, central medial, right central, left posterior, medial posterior,
right posterior, see Piñango et al. (2017) for the speciﬁc grouping of channels) and the continuous ACD measures as well as all interaction terms. The random effects included random
intercepts for participants and items as well as by-participant random slopes for the effect of
context-type. Statistical signiﬁcance (p-value) was obtained by a likelihood ratio test of the
full model with the effect in question against the null model without the effect in question.
For the individual-level variability analysis, Pearson correlations were calculated using par193

ticipants’ ∆ measures, which were obtained separately for each ERP component, and their
ACD scores, but these correlations were not evaluated for statistical signiﬁcance due to the
small participant sample size. Instead, correlation coefficients are evaluated for meaningfulness in the context of convergent ﬁndings across study paradigms.

7.3

Findings: semantic contextualization but no syntactic repair

The mixed-effects models revealed a signiﬁcant effect of Context-type for the N400 window
across the six anterior and central scalp regions (all χ2 (1)>7.0, n=25, all p<.01). The corresponding models for the late-positivity window revealed a signiﬁcant effect of Context-type across
the six central and posterior scalp regions (all χ2 (1)<4.0, n=25, all p<.04). No effects of Contexttype were found for either the early (0-400 post-stimulus-onset) window (all χ2 (1)<1.5, n=25,
all p>.2) or for the P600 window (all χ2 (1)<1.0, n=25, all p>.4).
Figure 7.1 shows the EEG traces for all nine scalp regions; the central medial scalp region
is highlighted to show the speciﬁc ERP components observed. The N400 is visible at approximately 450 ms and appears as the Possessive Context-type EEG trace deﬂecting upward and
the Locative trace deﬂecting downward, as it is standard practice to plot EEG traces with the
y-axis reversed (negative values on top). The late-positivity is visible at approximately 850 ms
with the Possessive trace deﬂecting down and the Locative trace deﬂecting up.
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Figure 7.1: Grand average ERP components by context-type

7.3.1

Individual-level variability in contextualization

A signiﬁcant interaction effect between Context-type and the ACD measure was observed in
the late-positivity mixed-effects model (χ2 (1)=22.3, n=25, p<.001). I thus turn to the ∆ measure (=late-positivity amplitudenon−f acilitatory_context –late-positivity amplitudef acilitatory_context )
as a direct measure of the degree to which participants were affected by context. Figure 7.2
shows each participant’s mean late-positivity amplitude in the medial anterior scalp region as
a function of their ACD score. The correlation coefficient (r(23)) for this relationship registered as -.24, as a small-to-medium effect following the benchmarks outlined by Cohen (1988)
for the social sciences. The coefficient of determination (R2 ) registers as .06, indicating that
the ACD measure accounts for approximately 6% of the total variability in the late-positivity
amplitudes.
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Figure 7.2: Mean late-positivity ∆ measure by ACD score

7.4

Discussion: the semantic nature of contextualization

Overall, the distribution of ERP components in this study render clear, interpretable bearings
on the proposed account of locative have-sentences. The patterns are consistent with the uniﬁed LCS account of locative have-sentences, in which locative have-sentences are (a) part and
parcel of have’s repertoire, but due to lower informativity about the relation between the two
entities in a have-sentence, (b) require additional support in the form of relevant contextual
information that decreases the degree of causality perceived in the entities’ relation. The patterns are not consistent with the transitive copula account, in which locative have-sentences
without explicit locative PPs are ungrammatical, and must be rescued through the syntactic
repair operation of locative-PP-insertion. I now discuss the ramiﬁcations of each ERP component speciﬁcally.
The N400 component indicates a clear context-based semantic effect: an incongruent
semantic context-target pairing results in a reliably evoked brain response that indicates the
comprehender’s semantic expectations about this word were violated. This component is yet
another indication that have-sentences can indeed be modulated by contextual information.
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The N400 does not arbitrate between the two accounts proposed, because it is an index of
word-level semantic unexpectedness, which arises from the otherwise unexpected locative relationship in the target sentence when it follows the possessive context. The N400, therefore,
is indicating a fundamental mismatch between context and target, which supports the claim
that comprehenders are sensitive to the nature of the context and its effect on the target,
but do not conclusively rule out the transitive copula account because it is only a word-level
meaning effect.
The late-positivity indicates another clear context-based semantic effect: a non-facilitatory
semantic context results in additional context-integration effort that is undertaken to support
an otherwise dispreferred locative have-sentence. This component veriﬁes that the processing
cost observed in the Study 2 ﬁndings, and taken to be associated with the contextualization
operation detailed in the real-time processing proﬁle in §5.3, is indeed semantic in nature,
the critical piece of evidence that supports the uniﬁed LCS account and fails to support the
transitive copula syntactic repair account. While this result clearly arbitrates between the
two accounts, it does not indicate whether or not there is some degree of measurable contextualization happening for the facilitatory locative context-type. This is because this ERP
component is a relative measure, so without a separate baseline measure that clearly has no
contextualization, it remains to be determined the degree to which the facilitatory context
also shows a late-positivity component. Consequently, this evidence does not clearly show
that contextually facilitated locative have-sentences are entirely cost-free, but they certainly
do not appear to be a product of error detection and syntactic repair. Ultimately, the components, while not illustrating a completely cost-free processing proﬁle, are consistent with the
more parsimonious view that contextual-integration effort is part of the standard processing
of a have-sentence.
Finally, the lack of a P600 component indicates that no syntactic repair mechanisms took
place in these locative have-sentences, which goes against the predictions made by the transi197

tive copula account, that bare locative have-sentences are ungrammatical and require a syntactic repair mechanism to render them acceptable. While the ERP traces in Figure 7.1 do show a
slight gap between Context-types in the 600-750 ms window, there are two reasons supporting
the interpretation of no P600. First, if a P600 were to be observed, it would be seen in the
Locative Context-type, as this is the context, shown in Study 1, that is judged to be acceptable,
hence, in the transitive copula account, the locus of the putative syntactic repair operation.
The traces do indeed show a small gap in which the Possessive Context-type is more positive
than the Locative, which is the opposite direction of that prediction. Second, the difference
between ERP traces over this window was not found to be statistically signiﬁcant; in light of
the signiﬁcance determinations for the other components, there is a sufficient degree of statistical power to assess the presence and absence of these three ERP components (in contrast
to other ERP components, like the mismatch-negativity, which are much smaller in nature).

7.4.1

The linguistic consequences of divergent neural responses

I take the correlation, w between the ACD measure and late-positivity ∆ measure, while small,
to be meaningful. The ACD measure is a conceptually principled and mathematically validated
improvement on the existing AQ measure that has served as the basis for quantifying variability
in linguistic context-sensitivity in the literature. With correlations in small samples, evaluating
meaningfulness must be done in the context of other applications of the measure. I make this
evaluation along three parameters: effect direction (whether the correlation is positive or negative), effect magnitude, and its improvement over the original AQ measure. In terms of effect
direction, I note that the negative ACD correlation aligns with all the observed AQ effects
in the literature, which show that individuals with lower context-sensitivities (and therefore
higher AQ scores) show less context-induced differences across methodologies. Looking back
to the Study 2 ﬁndings, while not signiﬁcant, the corresponding ACD measure shows a small,
negative correlation as well (r(63)=-.07). In terms of effect magnitude, I note that the corre198

lation here is comparable in magnitude to the effect size for the ACD measure described in
Piñango et al. (in prep), from §4.5, which designed and validated the ACD measure with a
sample size of over 800 participants in a range of methodologies. This correspondence suggests that perhaps it is the case that the ACD measure can only explain, maximally, a small
but consistent proportion of the overall variability in a linguistic contextualization task. And
ﬁnally, in terms of improvement over the AQ measure, the ACD correlation in this sample
(r(23)=-.24) is approximately six times greater than the AQ correlation for the same sample
(r(23)=.04), suggesting that the validated improvements made by Piñango et al. (in prep) are
manifested in these data as well.
Ultimately, with a small sample like this, quantitative generalizations regarding individuallevel variability are difficult to make. Instead, I explore two representative participants’ ERP
component proﬁle to illustrate the linguistic consequences of individual-level neurocognitive
variability. In Figure 7.3, I show the ERP traces for a participant with high context-sensitivity
(low ACD score) on the left, and a participant with low context-sensitivity (high ACD score) on
the right. Participant 5 has the second lowest ACD score in the study sample, while Participant
20 has the sample’s fourth highest ACD score. The key observation is that Participant 5 shows
a large late-positivity component in line with the groups’ combined effect, while Participant 20
shows no late-positivity effect whatsoever; this contrast is highlighted by the parallel rectangles
overlaid on the plot.
I present this distinction to illustrate the point that the analytic tradition of identifying
group averages can sometimes paint a misleading picture about the behavior of the individuals
that contribute to the average. While these speciﬁc participants’ data were of course selected
for their clarity, I emphasize that the selection of individuals to make up a study sample can
greatly impact not only the quantitative result of the study, but also the linguistic theory that is
based on evidence from a study. Especially in the situation of highly context-dependent (and
still fragile) locative have-sentences, the impact of the speciﬁc individuals in a study sample
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a. High context-sensitivity participant

b. Low context-sensitivity participant

Figure 7.3: Representative participants’ late-positivity components
could be monumentally consequential when the sample is small; the effect of the individual
decreases as a sample size increases, which further emphasizes the importance of adequate
samples for any linguistic investigation. The three principal representatives of the transitive
copula account, Ritter and Rosen (1997), Harley and Jung (2015), and Myler (2016) do not report the methods they employed to make the claim that bare locative have-sentences are not
acceptable to native speakers of English, on which they ground their proposals of linguistic
theory. If each had asked for an acceptability judgment from a single person of the Participant 5 (context-sensitive) pattern, perhaps their arguments would be different (in allowing the
possibility for a bare locative have-sentence to be grammatical for native speakers).
One observation arising from this comparison is regarding the relationship between the
N400 component, an index of word-level meaning processing, and the late-positivity component, an index of sentence- or discourse-level meaning processing.1 In the two participants’
data above, the high context-sensitivity participant’s large late-positivity follows a small N400,
the low context-sensitivity participant’s small late-positivity follows a large N400, potentially
indicating a tradeoff in the resources allocated toward word-level or context-level meaning
1

While the relationship between the N400 and P600 components has been well-discussed (see Frenzel et al.,
2011; Brouwer and Crocker, 2017), there is not yet a clear understanding of the relationship between the N400
and late-positivity components.

200

processing. This tradeoff would align the general idea introduced in Chapter 1 about a continuous meaning that is variably captured by lexical structure: where does word meaning end and
context begin? Following this logic, variability in the divergence in word-level versus contextlevel meaning processing would suggest that some individuals within a speech community rely
more on lexical structure versus others who rely more on context to guide the disambiguation
of underspeciﬁed language and comprehension in general.
In Figure 7.4, I present a quantitative summary of this processing tradeoff: the correlation
between the mean amplitudes for the N400 and late-positivity components2 within the same
electrode regions shown above. The correlation coefficient registers as a large effect (r(23)
= -.71) following the Cohen (1988) thresholds. The correlation shows that the larger (more
negative) a participants’ N400 component, the smaller (less positive) their late-positivity component.

Figure 7.4: N400 - late-positivity correspondence by participant
2

The amplitudes were calculated by subtracting “smaller” value from the “greater” value for each component.
This means that for the N400, the “greater” (more negative) value is that in the Possessive context-type, so this
amplitude was calculated as N400-amplitudeP ossessive - N400-amplitudeLocative . For the late-positivity, the
“greater” (more positive) value is also the Possessive context-type, though the polarity of the value is reversed,
hence the negative correlation.
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This relationship bears out the divergence above in which individual comprehenders show
a tradeoff in their reliance on word-level or context-level meaning processing mechanisms.
The fact that both components are elicited for the non-facilitatory Possessive context-type
over the facilitatory Locative context-type suggests directly that in response to a semantic
interpretation challenge, some speakers effectively “try” harder to make use of the full LCS
(the composition operation), while others “search” harder in the context (the contextualization
operation).
Overall, such a divergence across two participants in the study sample represents real evidence supporting the idea that individual-level variability within a speech community is critical
to account for, especially in situations involving context-dependent linguistic constructions
not only for experimental validity, but as the basis for a theoretical model of language. The anticorrelation of the ERP components indexing word-level and context-level meaning processing indicate a differential reliance on the LCS composition and contextualization operations,
though both are still implicated in the real-time processing of have-sentences.
These patterns of two categorically different behaviors and the correspondences between
them, which are not accounted for by traditional group-level analytical procedures, drives
home the idea that individual-level variability is an intrinsic and important part and property
of the language system, as described in the proposed model of meaning variation.

7.5

Conclusion

The key ﬁndings from the ERP study detailed here have clear implications for the two accounts of English have-sentences: the presence of a late-positivity component indicates that
the processing cost incurred by the non-facilitatory context is one of a semantic contextintegration nature, which is not observed in contextually facilitated locative have-sentence–a
pattern which supports the uniﬁed LCS account. Moreover, the absence of a P600 component
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indicates that no syntactic repair operations, such as locative PP-insertion, are taking place,
which elucidates the ﬁndings from Study 2. Together, the Study 2 and 3 ﬁndings fail to support the processing predictions extrapolated from the transitive copula account for locative
have-sentences.
In terms of individual-level variability in linguistic context-sensitivity, Study 3 showed a
small effect of the ACD measure. This effect was consistent in three ways with other work on
linguistic context-sensitivity, suggesting potentially that the ACD measure, at most, explains
a small but consistent portion of the overall amount of variability in a linguistic contextualization task. Crucially, participants differed in their reliance on context at the expense of their
reliance on the full LCS, indicating a tradeoff between lexical composition and contextualization in comprehender strategies. Future work must further elucidate additional dimensions of
systematic individual-level variability in order to better understand the variability effects observed here in Studies 2 and 3. This additional work can further clarify the exact nature of this
variability–be it an inability or unwillingness to identify relevant information from the context,
an inﬂexibility or intolerance of making use of identiﬁed relevant contextual information, or
something different, as discussed in §4.4.5.
Overall, the real-time processing studies presented here not only advance the uniﬁed LCS
account for the behavior of locative have-sentences in English, but also deepen the neurocognitive grounding of the proposed model of meaning variation.
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8.1

Predictions: standard lexico-semantic conceptual composition

To evaluate the neurocognitive bases of contextually facilitated locative have-sentences, I investigate the brain activation patterns resulting from the same experimental contrast as in
Studies 2 and 3: a target bare locative have-sentence following a locative or possessive context.
Brieﬂy summarizing the approach, as described in §5.4.2, the study compares a bare locative
have-sentence following a facilitatory locative context and a non-facilitatory possessive context. I describe the brain activation predictions from each account below, but in short: the
transitive copula account’s extrapolated processing hypothesis predicts that syntactic composition and repair are the key processes in the comprehension of have-sentences; the uniﬁed LCS
account directly predicts that comprehension relies on semantic and conceptual (LCS) composition and contextualization. Identifying distinct (non-overlapping) patterns of activation
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that support each of these operations, within known neurocognitive networks underlying language as well as across the entire brain, will lend decisive support to one of the two competing
accounts. In sum, the neural activation patterns will reveal the nature of the comprehension
process, thereby arbitrating between two linguistic analyses.
The transitive copula account is at its core an account involving syntactic composition,
in which the meaning of a have-sentence is determined based on the syntactic constituency
within the second DP argument of have. Speciﬁcally, a locative have-sentence is only possible
with the inclusion of a locative PP in the domain of that second DP. Therefore, the account
straightforwardly predicts that cortical areas that underlie syntactic composition, namely the
left inferior frontal gyrus, speciﬁcally BA 44 and 45 (Segaert et al., 2013; Henderson et al.,
2016), traditionally associated with Broca’s area, should be recruited during the comprehension of these sentences, since syntactic composition is the key differentiator between different readings of a have-sentence. Bare locative have-sentences, in this view, are taken to be ungrammatical but repairable through the insertion of a locative PP. Accordingly, cortical areas
associated with error detection and ungrammaticality, like the anterior cingulate cortex (Volz
et al., 2004; Alexander and Brown, 2019) or the medial prefrontal cortex (Gauvin et al., 2016;
McCormick and Telzer, 2018), should also be recruited during the comprehension of these sentences. While the lack of P600 effect in Study 3 is evidence against a syntactic source of the
meaning of a have-sentence, the direct connection between the P600 and cortex has not yet
been established; (Service et al., 2007) ﬁnd evidence for a superior temporal cortex source of
the P600, suggesting for the purposes here that the lack of a P600 is not necessarily indicative
of a lack of cortical activation associated with syntactic processing.
In contrast, the uniﬁed LCS account of have-sentences takes locative have-sentences to
be standard interpretations for have, and not ungrammatical sentences to be rescued through
a repair mechanism, though these interpretations require additional support with respect to
the conceptual relationship between the two entities of the have-sentence. While this ac206

count straightforwardly predicts no neural signatures of error detection, ungrammaticality,
or repair/rescue mechanisms, its conceptual and semantic compositionality could manifest
through a few possible neural patterns, as the localization of meaning composition is more
broadly distributed across the brain than syntactic processing. The ﬁrst set of patterns would
lie within canonical language areas in the left hemisphere: traditionally, semantic processing
has been associated with the temporal cortex (Friederici et al., 2003; Brennan et al., 2012),
though much of this swath of cortex (particularly the anterior superior temporal gyrus) is associated with argument structure and therefore would not necessarily arbitrate between the
competing models (Bornkessel and Schlesewsky, 2006). Crucially, within the temporal lobe,
lexical-semantic processes have been identiﬁed to recruit the middle temporal gyrus and surrounding areas, namely the posterior temporal cortex and angular gyrus (Obleser et al., 2007;
Lau et al., 2008). Of these two, the superior posterior temporal gyrus has been found to underlie lexically driven semantic “completion” operations that involve identifying lexical material
that can satisfy the semantic requirements of previous structures, as in long-distance dependencies (Piñango et al., 2016). The angular gyrus is associated with conceptual-semantic integration (Badre et al., 2005; Boylan et al., 2015; Lai et al., 2020), and the supplementary motor
area has been found to support activity in the angular gyrus (Piñango et al., 2017; Schwartze
et al., 2012) in more computationally demanding conceptual-semantic integration tasks. These
last two cortical regions are particular signatures of lexically driven composition and lexicosemantic selectional restrictions (Hickok and Poeppel, 2004; Shetreet et al., 2009; Friederici,
2012; Lai et al., 2014; Piñango et al., 2016), and would directly support the lexically driven semantic composition operation of the uniﬁed LCS account. Additionally, the contextualization
operation required to support the locative interpretation of the target have-sentence could recruit cortical regions associated with causal perception in the parietal lobe (Woods et al., 2014;
van Dam and Desai, 2016), language-focused working memory in the prefrontal cortex (Sabb
et al., 2007), the visual cortex (Gaffrey et al., 2007; Petersen and Posner, 2012), or dorsolateral
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prefrontal cortex (Hagoort, 2005; Binder et al., 2009; Piñango et al., 2017), or right-hemisphere
correlates of left-hemisphere language areas (Devlin et al., 2003; Wende et al., 2013; Piñango
et al., 2016), areas outside of the canonical language networks that can support language function but are external to linguistic processes proper. In line with the distribution of variability
in Study 2, individual-level variability in linguistic context-sensitivity is predicted to manifest
in cortical regions associated with effort, such as the language-focused working memory regions described above. Additionally, individual differences in working memory capacity (as
measured behaviorally) have been correlated with activation in the posterior cingulate cortex
and precuneus during sentence comprehension (Newman et al., 2013), an area associated with
constructing representations of events. Crucially, individual-level variability due to linguistic
context-sensitivity is not predicted for cortical regions within traditional language networks
involved in the LCS composition operation itself, such as the left angular gyrus.
In summary, the key neural evidence would be a non-overlapping activation of cortical
regions underlying syntactic composition (namely anterior left cortex), which would support
the transitive copula account, or lexico-semantic conceptual composition (namely posterior
left cortex), which would support the uniﬁed LCS account.

8.2
8.2.1

Methods: functional magnetic resonance imaging
Participants

Thirty native speakers of American English were recruited from the Yale University community (16 female, ages 18-29) to participate in the study. All participants met the same exclusion
criteria as the previous two studies, and additionally, safety requirements for entering a magnetic resonance scanner, such as no ferromagnetic materials in or on the body. All participants
gave written informed consent in accordance with the guidelines set by the Yale University Human Subjects Committee and were compensated for their participation.
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8.2.2

Materials

The linguistic stimuli (Table 6.1) and measures of individual-level variability in linguistic contextsensitivity used in Studies 2 and 3 were also employed for Study 4.

8.2.3

Design

The total set of 150 sentences were divided into 10 groups, resulting in 15 sentences per run.
Each sentence was visually presented segment-by-segment using E-Prime (Psychology Software Tools, 2012), with all the words appearing in white text at the center of a black screen.
Within each run, the sentences were pseudo-randomized such that no successive sentences
were of the same context-type or entity set. Participants were presented with a comprehension question after 50% of the sentences (distributed equally across context-types) to ensure
they maintained engagement with the stimuli. Each question was presented for 6000 ms. Before each sentence, there was a ﬁxation cross (+) displayed at the center of the screen for 1000
ms; between the end of the context and the start of the target, there was a 1000 ms pause,
and after the sentence there was another 1000 ms pause, which was then followed by either
the next item’s initial ﬁxation cross or the comprehension question. There were 16-18 words
per sentence, and each was presented for a duration of 750 ms, resulting in a total duration of
15-18.5 s per sentence without a question and 20-23.5 s per sentence with a question. Therefore,
each run lasted between 4 min 20 s and 5 min 18 s.

8.2.4

Procedure

Prior to the start of the study, participants were given written and oral instruction about the
experiment. Participants completed one practice run identical in format but with different
sentences from the experimental run in a room outside of the scanner to acclimate to the
feel of the task. They were required to answer at least 90% of the comprehension questions
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in the practice run correctly before moving on to the experiment; if more than 10% of the
questions were answered incorrectly, the practice session was completed again. No participant
completed the practice session more than twice. In the scanner, participants completed 10
functional scans (runs) and all the anatomic MR scans, with short breaks as needed between
each scan.

8.2.5

Image acquisition

Anatomical images
MR data were acquired on 2 identically conﬁgured Siemens 3T Prisma scanners equipped with
a 64-channel head coil at the Yale Magnetic Resonance Research Center. Acquisition parameters were the same across scanners. Each session began with a 3- plane localizer, followed by
a sagittal localizer, and an inversion recovery T1 weighted scan. Anatomical images for the
functional slice locations were then obtained using spin echo imaging in axial planes parallel
to the AC-PC line with TE= 2.61, TR=285 ms, matrix 192×192, FOV=220 mm, ﬂip angle=70°,
bandwidth=501 Hz/pix, 51 slices with 2.5 mm thickness.
Functional images
Event-related functional MRI was conducted using gradient echo-planar imaging (EPI) blood
oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) contrast, with TE=30 ms, TR=956 ms, matrix 84×84,
FOV=210 mm, ﬂip angle=62°, bandwidth=2289 Hz/pixel, slice thickness=2.5 mm, with 327 measurements (images per slice). The scanner was set to trigger the stimulus presentation program,
which enabled the image acquisition to be synchronized with the stimulus presentation.
At the end of the functional imaging, a high-resolution 3D Magnetization Prepared Rapid
Gradient Echo (MPRAGE) was used to acquire sagittal images for multi-subject registration,
with TE=2.77 ms, TR=2530 ms, acquisition matrix 256×256, FOV=256 mm, bandwidth=179
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Hz/pix, ﬂip angle=7°, 176 slices with 1 mm slice thickness.

8.2.6

Preprocessing and analysis

The data were converted from Digital Imaging and Communication in Medicine (DICOM)
format to the format for analysis using XMedCon (Nolfe, Voet, Jacobs, Dierckx, & Lemahieu,
2003). The ﬁrst 6 images at the beginning of each of the 10 functional runs were discarded
during the process to enable the signal to achieve steady-state equilibrium between radio frequency pulsing and relaxation, leaving 321 images per slice per run for analysis. Functional
images were motion-corrected with the Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM) 8 algorithm for
three translational directions (x, y, z) and three possible rotations (pitch, yaw, roll). Trials with
linear motion that had a displacement exceeding 1.5 mm or rotation exceeding 2° were rejected.
The data from one participant were excluded from further analysis due to excessive head movements. All further analyses were performed using Yale BioImage Suite (Papademetris et al.,
2006).
Individual subject data was analyzed using a general linear model (GLM) on each voxel in
the entire brain volume withregressors speciﬁc for each task. As described above, each sentence was segmented into two events (i.e. two regressors), shown in Table 8.1 below, which isolated the hypothesized processing stages involved in the comprehension of the target locativehave sentences.
Table 8.1: Analytic window segmentation
Event 1
Event 2
The pine tree has a motorcycle under it and the maple tree has a car that is red.
Event 1 included the onset of the context sentence to the offset of the subject noun phrase
of the target. Event 1 ranged between 6000 and 7500 ms, depending on the length of the
noun phrases in the context sentence). Event 2 included the onset of the verb have in the
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target sentence until the offset of the target sentence. Event 2 lasted 8000 ms for all sentences
across conditions. Accordingly, Event 2 is when the critical contextualization operation of the
uniﬁed LCS account takes place, as shown from the Study 1 and Study 2 ﬁndings.
The resulting beta images of each task were spatially smoothed with a 6 mm Gaussian kernel to account for variations in the location of activation across subjects. The output maps
were normalized beta-maps, which were in the acquired space (2.5 mm × 2.5 mm × 2.5 mm).
Three registrations were then calculated within the BioImage Suite software package to map
the data onto a common reference space. The ﬁrst registration carried out a linear registration
between the individual subject raw functional image and that subject’s 2D anatomical image.
Then the 2D anatomical image was linearly registered to the individual’s 3D anatomical image.
The 3D differs from the 2D in that it has a 1×1×1 mm resolution whereas the 2D z-dimension
is set by slice-thickness and its x-y dimensions are set by voxel size. Finally, a non-linear registration was computed between the individual 3D anatomical image and a reference 3D image.
The reference brain used was the Colin27 Brain (Holmes et al., 1998) in Montreal Neurological
Institute (MNI) space (Evans et al., 1992). All three registrations were applied sequentially to
the individual normalized beta-maps to bring all data into the common reference space.
Using BioImage Suite, two-tailed paired t-test maps were generated to examine the differences between tasks. Family-wise error (FWE) correction for multiple comparisons was
conducted with Monte Carlo simulation using AFNI’s 3dClustSim, using the autocorrelation
function option and 10,000 iterations, and using an input smoothness (6 mm and a connection
radius of 6.97 mm on 3.44 mm x 3.44 mm x 5 mm voxels) estimated from the residuals of the
t-tests. A p-value of 0.005 was considered statistically signiﬁcant for whole brain family-wise
error correction, based on the spatial extent of contiguous suprathresholded individual voxels,
and a cluster correction of p=0.05 was used. The cluster-forming threshold was 320 mm3 .
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8.3

Findings: LCS composition-centered network of activations

The whole-brain analyses showed a network of activations centered around left hemisphere
cortical regions implicated in lexico-conceptual semantic processing, conceptual composition,
and language-dedicated working memory.
For the comparison of interest (Locative > Possessive), preferential activations were observed for the target Event 2 region (have + complement) in the left angular gyrus (AG, BA
39), left supplementary motor area (SMA, BA 6), precuneus (BA 7), right AG, and right frontal
cortex (BA 8). Comparing the two conditions using subtraction means that these regions
were preferentially activated when participants were comprehending the target locative havesentences. In contrast, the reverse subtraction (Possessive > Locative) showed preferential
activations in the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG: BA 47) and the anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC). The details of each activation is presented in Table 8.2 and the preferential activations
are shown below in Figure 8.1.
Table 8.2: Imaging results: regions of activation
Cortical region
Volume (mm3 ) Max. (Mean) t-value Max. MNI coords. (x, y, z)
Precuneus
5353
6.21 (3.54)
(-8, -62, 48)
Left superior AG
1693
6.46 (3.70)
(-32, -74, 38)
Right BA 8
1139
4.67 (3.51)
(30, 17, 49)
Right AG
1095
4.86 (3.42)
(39, -72, 38)
Left BA 6
646
4.85 (3.61)
(-22, 7, 56)
Left inferior AG
628
4.78 (3.65)
(-49, -69, 19)
Left BA 47
803
-5.51 (-3.67)
(-27, 33, -15)
ACC
739
-4.78 (-3.49)
(-4, -6, 36)
Note: AG = angular gyrus, BA = Brodmann area, ACC = anterior cingulate cortex.

In summary, the neural activation patterns showed preferential recruitment of regions underlying lexico-conceptual semantic composition and event representation, and crucially, no
regions associated with syntactic composition, lending support to the uniﬁed LCS account and
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Figure 8.1: Axial slice views for activations in the Locative > Possessive subtraction.

Note: Images are presented in radiological format, which means that the left hemisphere is depicted on the
right side of the image. Axial slices are shown from the superior to inferior from left to right in each row; the
ﬁrst image is the ﬁrst slice at the top of the brain, and the last image is the last slice at the bottom of the brain.
Because this ﬁgure represents the Locative > Possessive subtraction activations in orange/yellow, the
preferential activations for the reverse subtraction (Possessive > Locative) are shown in blue/purple.

not the transitive copula account. Directly below, I present a discussion of these activations
patterns. First, I discuss the predicted and unpredicted activations in areas of cortex known to
support language function, and then describe the activations outside of these areas. I conclude
by presenting corresponding individual-level variability ﬁndings of the ACD measure across
brain regions.
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8.4

Discussion: the neural bases of lexico-conceptual semantic composition

8.4.1

Comprehension as composition and contextualization

In unpacking the neuroimaging results, I ﬁrst return to the operationalization of the comprehension process for have-sentences, which consists of the incremental syntactic composition of an NP-have-NP structure, the incremental LCS composition of a two-entity relational
meaning, and the contextualization of a causal potential that ultimately disambiguates the
speciﬁc relation to be understood. The results show preferential activations in brain regions
associated with construction of the meaning of these sentences, which is understood to be a
lexico-conceptual semantic composition operation that depends on the evaluation of a causal
potential between the two entities in the have-sentence. I describe in turn, the areas that actuate the LCS composition operation, and then two networks that reveal additional effort in
the comprehension process.
Left angular gyrus as the center of LCS composition
The key result from this study is the preferential activation of the left angular gyrus (AG) in
the comprehension of contextually supported bare locative have-sentences. The left AG has
been shown to underlie composition of the meanings of words as it relates to both linguistic and conceptual domains, speciﬁcally referred to as conceptual-semantic integration (Badre
et al., 2005; Binder et al., 2009; Lau et al., 2008; Seghier et al., 2010; Boylan et al., 2015; Price
et al., 2015; Schell et al., 2017). Notably, Lai et al. (2020) ﬁnd that the mapping of speciﬁc
conceptual-semantic features of nominal entities into conceptual structure template of a verb
recruits the left AG. Similarly, in the comprehension of locative have-sentences, I take the
process of evaluating the conceptual features of the entities and situation within the retrieved
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lexical meaning structure of have in order to determine the intended relational meaning of
the target sentence to be the source of the observed AG recruitment. The two principal takeaways from this speciﬁc ﬁnding are that (a) LCS composition, as the nexus of lexical-semantic
and conceptual-structure integration, is the core operation of understanding have-sentences,
and (b) bare locative have-sentences are part of regular semantic composition networks and
processes and should thus be treated as “normal” sentences rather than categorically ungrammatical. Both of these interpretations are entirely consistent with the uniﬁed LCS account
proposed here.
Supplementary motor area and right angular gyrus support LCS composition
While the LCS composition underlying the bare locative have-sentences in the experimental
setup takes place within the standard processing mechanisms, it is not entirely easy, however,
as additional areas involved in supporting language function were systematically recruited,
namely the supplementary motor area (BA 6)1 and the right hemisphere angular gyrus (AG).
For a variety of cortical regions that show lateralization, such as the left-lateralization of
language function, right hemisphere regions have been shown to support the function of their
left hemisphere homologues (van Ettinger-Veenstra et al., 2010), especially in the case of extra
demands or processing required (Hugdahl, 2000; Hinkley et al., 2016), and even assume the linguistic operations after left-hemisphere stroke (Xing et al., 2016; Gainotti, 2015).2 In this case,
I take the preferential activation of the right hemisphere AG to indicate, in the same manner
1

BA 6 is divided into two sub-regions that both have implications for language areas. The inferior portion
of BA 6 is proximal to the cortical regions typically ascribed to Broca’s area (Hagoort, 2014), while the superior portion of BA 6 is immediately anterior to the motor cortex and is therefore typically referred to as the
supplementary motor area (SMA), or pre-motor cortex, because it is implicated in supporting complex physical
movements and muscular coordination (Nakagawa et al., 2016). In this case, the activations in BA 6 are in the
superior region, corresponding to existing ﬁndings that show that the SMA is implicated in demanding semantic
tasks (Alario et al., 2006; Hertrich et al., 2016) beyond the clear connection between speech production and the
non-speech motor coordination functions of the SMA. In contrast, ﬁnding an activation in the inferior region
of BA 6 might support the hypothesis that demanding syntactic processing is a key component of understanding
have-sentences (Schell et al., 2017).
2
For an interesting, in-depth discussion of the evolutionary advantages and costs of systematic (“population”)
lateralization, see Rogers (2002); Vallortigara and Rogers (2005).
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as the SMA activation, an increased demand in processing power for the lexico-conceptual
semantic composition taking place during the comprehension of the have-sentences in question. This increased demand for the otherwise regular LCS composition is attributable to the
non-canonicality of these bare locative have-sentences.
Again, the additional processing power involved in the compositional process is highly circumscribed to areas that systematically support canonical language function, suggesting that
this additional processing is ontologically inherent to the standard cortical infrastructure for
language. That is, that a contextually supported but less canonical bare locative have-sentence
requires additional processing of the standard variety. The contrasting case would be additional processing of an ontologically different kind, namely wholesale activations in the bilateral prefrontal and frontal cortices, which are domain-general resources implicated in “panic”
or asystematic demands of an unexpected nature (Hubers et al., 2016), or even the amygdala,
which is an evolutionarily ancient neural center for negative emotional processing (Brennan,
2016).
In sum, the additional recruitment of the SMA and right AG, and crucially, not bilateral
prefrontal and frontal cortex, supports the uniﬁed LCS prediction that the comprehension
of bare but contextually supported locative have-sentences is standard semantic composition
and not a “crash” and repair mechanism. Importantly, it is not the case that the uniﬁed LCS
account predicts that these sentences are entirely preferred or maximally straightforward, but
that they do not present an undue challenge to the linguistic system since they make use of
the LCS associated with the lexical item have. As detailed in Chapters 2 and 3, the dispreference of bare locative have-sentences results from lower informativity and language-speciﬁc
lexical blocking effects, and not from a categorical ungrammaticality due to a mismatch in
the syntactic structure. The resulting dispreference in turn contributes to lower frequency
in the language, which itself manifests as requiring additional effort; experimentally, more
comprehension effort has been shown to lead to lower task-elicited acceptability ratings or
217

judgments, even though the sentences themselves may not be less acceptable in everyday use
(Lai and Piñango, 2019). These ﬁndings add to an effort within the psycho- and neurolinguistic literatures to distinguish between processing costs and error signals (see Christensen and
Wallentin, 2011).
BA 47 and anterior cingulate cortex underpin eﬀort in the contextualization operation
I turn now to the “negative” activations, which are the regions shown with blue and purple coloring in Figure 8.1. These “negative” activations in the subtraction method represent hemodynamic activity associated with the subtrahend, namely the target sentence following the
Possessive context-type. To understand this pattern, I ﬁrst describe the possible role of the
context itself, and then highlight a few possibilities of what processing mechanisms are involved in the experimental condition. The content of the Possessive context-type is a prototypical inalienable or alienable relation, which precedes the target locative have-sentence.
Based on the ﬁndings from Study 1a, these contexts contribute very little semantic bias because they represent the most canonical and frequent uses for have-sentences in the language.
In fact, they resulted in acceptability ratings that were indistinguishable from the Attributive
context-type, which provides a semantic relation outside of the domain of relational meanings,
suggesting that this context-type did not contribute any helpful information for disambiguating the speciﬁc relational meaning for the target. Accordingly, the participants are faced with
an essentially context-less bare locative have-sentence, and upon comprehending the second
entity, must evaluate the causal potential between the two entities, as usual for a have-sentence.
At this point, participants encounter a low-frequency and underinformative locative meaning,
thus requiring a greater contextualization effort to identify a possible situation or event to
license it. Effectively, participants are mining the context for a semantic or communicative
motivation to decrease the salience of the causal component of the LCS of have, which is a
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much greater contextualization effort than in the facilitatory Locative context-type. For those
participants that are able to do so, there may be an additional process of detecting and possibly
reconciling the mismatch in relational meaning between the context and target in a conjoined
setting.
The negative activation patterns are directly consistent with this interpretation of effortful
contextualization, that is, extra processing work for the target locative have-sentence after a
possessive context as compared to the same target after a locative context. Speciﬁcally, the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 47) is understood to be a cortical source for language-oriented
working memory and has been connected to extra effort associated with cognitive control in
attention-mediated, demanding tasks (Sabb et al., 2007; Heyman et al., 2015; Coderre et al.,
2016), semantic ambiguity resolution (Badre et al., 2005; Rodd et al., 2012; Lai et al., 2020), as
well as resolving conﬂicting contextual information and a target sentence (Piñango et al., 2017).
This cortical region has also been shown to underlie the encoding of context-dependent memory by connecting salient items with their contextual features (Zhang et al., 2017).
Furthermore, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) underlies the detection of errors and conﬂict monitoring; in fact, it was one of the earliest functional areas to be identiﬁed in the human
brain mapping effort (Carter et al., 1998; Van Veen et al., 2001; Botvinick et al., 2004), and operates across a variety of domains (Volz et al., 2004; Gauvin et al., 2016; Alexander and Brown,
2019), including in language, speciﬁcally in both semantic (Blanco-Elorrieta and Pylkkänen,
2016) and phonetic (Haupt et al., 2009) congruence tasks. In the case of have-sentences, the
mismatch detection could be relevant at two levels: the ﬁrst being the conﬂict within the conjoined context and target between their initial acceptability, canonicity, or frequency in the
language, and the second being between the speciﬁc relational meanings, i.e., possessive versus
locative, respectively. For the latter to be true, it would be the case that only a subset of the
participants, presumably the more context-sensitive ones that are better able to construct a
facilitatory context to support the otherwise dispreferred target, would show ACC activation,
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or that these participants would show a greater degree of ACC activation.
Overall, this contextualization interpretation matches the interpretation of the late-positivity
ERP component, in which an index of extra processing cost was identiﬁed for the nonfacilitatory context. While some studies have associated with the late-positivity with the
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (Liu et al., 2012) and the ACC (Sun et al., 2017), the most direct comparison within the semantic domain associates it instead with the middle temporal
gyrus (Pauligk et al., 2019), though the experimental paradigms across studies are not directly
comparable. The study presented here offers an ideal setup for an investigation of the neural generator of the late-positivity, as it uses the same stimuli and population3 , though with
slightly modiﬁed timings. The convergent measures of contextualization effort in the ERP
(late-positivity component) and fMRI (ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and ACC) present not
only a result in support of the uniﬁed LCS account, but also strengthen the case for multimodal research in identifying complementary but overlapping sets of ﬁndings that shed light
on different aspects of language comprehension.

8.4.2

Comprehending have-sentences is not diﬀerentiated by syntactic composition

The second key ﬁnding from this study is the lack of activation of any areas associated with
syntactic composition or processing: speciﬁcally, the pars opercularis (BA 44) and the pars triangularis (BA 45) in the left inferior frontal gyrus (Friederici et al., 2003; Santi and Grodzinsky,
2012), the typical locus of Broca’s area.4 Speciﬁcally, the potential repair operations consistent
3

Here, population refers to the characteristics of the population from which the individual study participants
come from, not the speciﬁc individuals themselves.
4
Broca’s area is of course implicated in a range of linguistic functions beyond syntactic composition, though
syntactic processing has been reliably used to trigger preferential activation in Broca’s area. Recent research
has also proposed identifying a more broad cortical distribution of areas underlying syntactic processing (Blank
et al., 2016), as areas involved in syntactic processing at a lesser degree than Broca’s area can fail to surface in
traditional fMRI analytical procedures. I take this to be an extremely important stance for future neuroimaging
work, though for the purposes here, I consider the lack of activation of the most reliable and robust cortical area
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with the transitive copula account, PP manipulation (insertion or ellipsis), has been shown explicitly to involve the workings of the left inferior frontal cortex (Fiebach et al., 2005; Mätzig,
2009). While increasing the lexicalized-ness of syntactic operations, which could be involved
in have-sentences given their centrality to English, has been shown to shift the cortical activation toward the posterior temporal gyrus (Yang et al., 2017), there is no evidence of activation
in this region either.
Since the subtraction paradigm for evaluating this kind of brain data highlights differences
between the relevant comparisons, the lack of syntactic activation does not imply that no syntactic composition is happening. Rather, the syntactic processing that underlies the locative
and possessive meanings is entirely shared, a ﬁnding that is not reconcilable with the transitive copula account, which predicts that the two meanings are differentiated by their syntax.
This ﬁnding also parallels the lack of P600 effect in Study 3, again demonstrating the utility of
multimodal language processing research, using two neural indices of syntactic composition
and processing to arbitrate between the two competing linguistic accounts.
Finally, the lack of activation in the left inferior frontal gyrus for the contextualized bare
locative have-sentences also suggests that there is no notion of ungrammaticality at play, as
ungrammatical sentences have been shown to activate these cortical regions reliably as well
(Hubers et al., 2016; Piñango et al., 2016). This renders further support for the uniﬁed LCS
account’s proposal that locative meanings are core to the semantic range of have-sentences in
English.
Alternative syntactic analyses
One of the issues dealt with in this dissertation is understanding the scope of the transitive
copula account in the context of a psychological language faculty: this account’s analysis does
not make processing predictions, due to the nature of the tool, and is therefore unable to be
associated with syntactic processing to be supportive of the uniﬁed LCS account.
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directly tested, supported, or falsiﬁed using psycho- or neurolinguistic methods. Accordingly,
the instantiation of the transitive copula account in these studies is my best logical extrapolation into a possible operationalization. It is possible that the lack of syntactic effect, which I
interpret to be a failure to support my extrapolation of processing hypotheses from the transitive copula account, is due not to the analysis but of my extrapolation, that of PP manipulation.
The ﬂagship proposals within this account family claim that bare locative have-sentences are
ungrammatical (Ritter and Rosen, 1997; Harley and Jung, 2015; Myler, 2016), which is not consistent with anecdotal reports in the literature (Belvin and Den Dikken, 1997), nor acceptability
judgments from a large sample of native speakers (Study 1a and Zhang et al. 2022).
These accounts have no prediction nor explanation for the acceptability of these sentences;
so in order to test them, I extended them into the processing domain by proposing a repair
mechanism in which a locative context can somehow trigger the insertion of a locative-PP, the
exclusive source of a locative interpretation, into an otherwise unspeciﬁed or possessive havesentence. Since the framework used for the analysis does not have a linearization algorithm,
there are a few other possibilities that would be consistent with the ﬁndings from Studies 3 and
4, which show no difference in the syntactic processing between the contextually facilitated
locative and possessive readings of the target have-sentence.
Logically, there are three possibilities consistent with the ﬁndings: (a) no syntactic structure beyond the surfaced NP-V-NP is being processed; (b) have encodes a maximally speciﬁed
syntactic structure with all the possible projections for a possible have-sentence and these surface as needed; or (c) there are covert syntactic operations involving unpronounced structure
that have no processing traces, that is, they are undetectable by any psychological means.
Possibility (b) is entirely consistent with the uniﬁed LCS proposal, in which a maximal
structure is retrieved with have and context or other factors are able to make salient the most
relevant portions of the structure depending on the interpretation. Speciﬁcally for these sentences, this analysis would predict an obligatorily constructed locative PP that surfaces in the
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case of locative have-sentences and remains silent for the case of possessive have-sentences.
The lack of syntactic effects in the ﬁndings would correspond to the fact that in both interpretations, the locative PP is constructed; this analysis would have to predict that the contextually
driven surfacing of the already-built locative PP in the locative readings would not rely on syntactic processing operations, since none were observed (no P600 ERP component and no BA
44/45 activation). This syntactic analysis is consistent with the processing data and entirely
parallel to the uniﬁed LCS account, which predicts a maximal meaning structure involving a
core locative relation that is then modulated by context. However, this analysis is a maximal
departure from the transitive copula account, since Myler (2014) states that “The further an
analysis pushes the idea that have is meaningless, the more successful it turns out to be.” This
highlights that a syntactically versus semantically implemented account is not the relevant
question for debate here; the evidence fails to support an analysis of have in which there is no
semantic content or syntactic infrastructure for a PP-like complement. The crucial difference
between the uniﬁed LCS and transitive copula accounts is the semantic content and syntactic
structure that comes with the lexical item have.
The third option, one of psychologically undetectable covert operations, is challenging due
to its untestable nature. While there is a large literature relating overt syntactic phenomena
with sentence processing (see Grodzinsky and Friederici, 2006; Frazier, 2013, for an overview),
there is markedly less work relating covert syntactic analyses to processing. Some effort has
been made to operationalize covert syntax with processing predictions, largely for the case
of wh-in-situ constructions, particularly in Mandarin Chinese. Xiang et al. (2014) compares
wh-in-situ questions with corresponding declaractive sentences and ﬁnds that the former take
longer to process, as measured through a speed-accuracy-tradeoff paradigm; these results are
consistent with a covert movement to the left edge of either a covert wh-element or an interrogative operator. However, these processing differences could also be explained by an
expectation violation, since the wh-element is encountered in situ and therefore the compre223

hender could have just been expecting a declarative sentence. They could also be due to a
difference in the meaning of the two sentences: a statement and a question have differences
in numerous aspects of linguistic structure, including in pragmatics and in prosody. Other
efforts in identifying processing traces of covert movement lie in the multiple wh-question domain, though results from Kotek and Hackl (2013a,b) are also confounded with other possible
operations, including overt wh-movement.
ERP studies have also sought to identify processing traces of covert movement. Ueno and
Kluender (2009) ﬁnds no P600 component for Japanese, which is a wh-in-situ language, contrasting ﬁndings of P600s for wh-movement in English. This evidence does not support the
hypothesis that wh-movement, covert or overt, has the same processing trace. It only supports a syntactic operation for the overt wh-movement. Similarly, Lo and Brennan (2021) ﬁnd
no support through another syntactic ERP component–the sustained anterior negativity–for
the covert movement associated with wh-in-situ; this effect is robust for overt wh-movement
languages. In sum, there seems to be little processing evidence for covert movement in this
domain, even though the covert movement analysis is generally standard in this framework.
The evidence instead shows evidence only for overt movement. This is a separate domain
from PP manipulation operations, but the takeaway is that these analyses generated testable
hypotheses that can assess the development of the analysis.
Another large body of work assessing the presence or absence of null syntactic structure
has emerged through the investigation of ellipsis phenomena; ellipsis is directly relevant to the
idea of locative PP insertion, but this account is largely supported by processing traces, and
Study 3 shows no neural signature of ellipsis in the processing of these sentences (see Martin,
2018). However, the PP insertion mechanism is not explicitly spelled out in terms of ellipsis,
so future work could rigorously assess this by building off of the strong body of processing
evidence and analyses for ellipsis (see Merchant, 2019; Frazier, 2019; Culicover and Jackendoff,
2019a, from a recent handbook on ellipsis).
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The takeaway message from my discussion here is that our analyses should seek to describe our language data; the neurocognitive processing results here constitute direct language
data. And these data show no difference in syntactic operations for the locative-biased and
possessive-biased have-sentences. With the assumption that any syntactic repair mechanism
such as PP insertion would show observable traces, the data fails to support an analysis in which
the interpretations of a locative and possessive have-sentence differs crucially on their syntactic composition–this is the main idea of the transitive copula account. Alternative syntactic
analyses that rely on syntactic operations that do not make predictions about neurocognitive
processing could still accurately describe the differences between locative and possessive havesentences. These analyses, however, cannot claim to shed light on the mental representation
and execution of the sentences, until they have clear linking hypotheses and algorithms that
generate processing predictions. Here, I rule out only one syntactic possibility resulting from
the transitive copula account; future work must be done to assess the viability of other possible syntactic composition-based analyses of the meaning variability in have-sentences. I take
up this topic again, at a different level of engagement, in §9.3.

8.4.3

A neural basis for locative have-sentences?

The remaining activations, though not directly predicted, further support the uniﬁed LCS account by offering a possible grounding of the cognition of relational location and locative havesentences in the actual function of the brain. In this section, I will discuss the three remaining
activated cortical regions as support for a neurocognitive embedding for understanding locative relations through the LCS of have.
Visuospatial representation is rooted in the precuneus
In the case of the target locative have-sentences, one of the main strategies that participants
used to comprehend the sentences for the purposes of the comprehension question was by
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envisioning a visual scene with the four entities (e.g. There is a pine tree under the motorcycle and the
maple tree has a car.), which is exempliﬁed by the context elicitation results described in Chapter
2. Visuospatial imagery could be helpful in the absence of any causal relationships, which are
the source of narrative construction, a fundamental component of linguistic communication.
I take this operation to be the trigger for the preferential activation of the precuneus in the
Locative > Possessive subtraction, as the precuneus is a well-established neural center for
the processing of visuospatial information (Fletcher et al., 1995; Cavanna and Trimble, 2006).
Moreover, within the domain of visuospatial cognition, the precuneus has also been implicated
in the representation of oneself in space and the associated perspective-taking (Freton et al.,
2014).
The precuneus has also been implicated in certain relevant linguistic functions as well:
Shetreet et al. (2009) report recruitment of the precuneus for comprehending prepositional
phrases. This result is entirely consistent with the precuneus underpinning visuospatial representation, since prepositional phrases by and large encode and support meanings of location.
Another possible neural source for location is also the superior portion of BA 6, referred
to as the SMA above, which has been found to be preferentially activated by constructions involving spatiotemporal conﬁgurations over conceptually abstract (nonphysical) constructions
(Romero Lauro et al., 2013). The SMA activations described previously could also in part be
due to the locative nature of the target meanings, though further manipulation would be required to dissociate activations due to lexical composition or visuospatial representation in
this region.
A neural signature of the representation of location could also be the source of the BA
8 activation as well, since BA 8 contains the fronto-eye ﬁelds, which support control of eye
movements in terms of their physiological operations, such as ﬁxation and saccadic motion, as
well as connected cognitive processes, such as attentional orienting and visual awareness (Vernet et al., 2014). BA 8, however, has also been connected to uncertainty in a range of cognitive
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operations (Volz et al., 2005). Speciﬁcally, activity in BA 8 correlated with two types of uncertainty: external, which refers to uncertainty about the outside world or perceived stimuli (as
in the case of an ambiguous visual image), and internal, which refers to one’s own uncertainty
about one’s knowledge of a situation (as in rules of a game or social setting). In this study, both
sorts of uncertainty could be at play, since the target have-sentences are inherently ambiguous
(as per the uniﬁed LCS account) and participants could be uncertain about the acceptability of
the locative readings, as they are indeed low frequency and dispreferred in English. In sum, the
BA 8 activation could be underlying participants’ hesitancy in accepting the target meaning,
consistent with the Study 1a ﬁndings in which contextually facilitated locative have-sentences
showed increased acceptability judgment ratings, but still not to a ceiling level.
Causal perception is rooted in the left inferior frontal gyrus
Another interesting result was the activation in the left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47) for the
possessive context-type over the locative, which connects to both the causal potential evaluation proposed in the uniﬁed LCS account as well as existing ﬁndings in the literature implicating this very cortical region in causal perception in neurotypical (Fugelsang and Dunbar,
2005; Kranjec et al., 2012; Wende et al., 2012) and clinical (Wende et al., 2015) human populations, as well as across a variety of primate species (Khemlani et al., 2014). van Dam and Desai
(2016), speciﬁcally, found that sentences expressing caused motion activated BA 47 preferentially over sentences that did not. This body of work, as well as the ﬁndings presented here, do
not clearly distinguish between the possibility that this region underlies the causal evaluation
mechanism or the representation of causality, though in both cases, the operationalizations
are consistent with the activation of this region for the possessive context over the locative.
While the causal evaluation mechanism is hypothesized to be at play in the comprehension
of all have-sentences, it could be the case that the non-causally facilitatory context succeeds
in rendering less salient the causal adjunct of have’s meaning, leading to a decreased effort to
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identify causality. Consequently, this causal evaluation mechanism would be activated to a
greater degree for the possessive context. The activation could also be directly reﬂecting the
causal representation in the possessive context itself. These results provide potential evidence
for the neurocognitive grounding of a variety of relational meanings, speciﬁcally distinguished
by the degree of causality as proposed by the uniﬁed LCS account, though further exploration
is required to validate the role of the left inferior frontal cortex, and BA 47 in particular, and
the evaluation or representation of causality.
Overall, the cortical areas activated in response to the have-sentences support locative havesentences as being a standard case of lexico-conceptual semantic composition that also relies
on some degree of contextual support, and not a result of a marked syntactic repair mechanism.
Additional cortical areas offer a preliminary network for the comprehension of have-sentences
that is centered around visuospatial/locative representation and causal perception. Together,
these patterns of activation are entirely consistent with the uniﬁed LCS analysis of English
have.

8.4.4

Constrained individual-level variability in the neurocognitive
bases for language

The neuroimaging results also show patterns of individual-level variability that are interpretable
in the context of the suite of studies in this dissertation as well as the broader linguistic contextsensitivity literature. These results serve as an exploration into the potential nuances of what
different participants are doing in the face of these sentences. I will evaluate the results following the interactions of a few parameters of variability: the directionality of the correlation (positive or negative, indicating that, for example, more context-sensitive comprehenders show
greater or lesser activation), the brain area itself, and the presence or absence of variability in
a given region (variability observed or not, indicating that, for example, a certain brain area
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indexing a cognitive operation is not observed to be variable across participants, while others
may be).
I ﬁrst note that the three components for evaluating a correlation (effect size, effect signiﬁcance, and effect meaningfulness) can vary independently from another (Hemphill, 2003)–one
well-cited example is the correlation of r = .03 between taking aspirin and preventing heart
attack, which, though small, bears outsized meaning for society at large–that is to say, effects
must be evaluated in context. To do so, I offer two points of consideration.
The ﬁrst is to recognize the inherent limitations set by the available experimental tools.
Though it seems clear that AQ-based tools are targeting one or more aspects of the cognitive
system, it has yet to be shown conclusively what domain of the cognitive system these dimensions lie in. One possibility is that linguistic context-sensitivity, as indexed by the total AQ
or even by the ACD measure used here, is rooted in working memory, as working memory
has been shown to correlate positively with selective attention and inhibition of distracting
information (Engle, 2002; Lavie et al., 2004). Yu et al. (2011) tested both working memory
and AQ in a parallel task to that reported in Yu (2010) and found that higher working memory correlated with lower AQ. This ﬁnding suggests that a component of context-sensitivity
is the ability to store more contextual information for processing at a given time. Another
possibility is that the AQ indexes a multitude of cognitive factors, some of which are more
related to context-sensitivity than others. Mathmematical evidence for this lies in the AQ’s
well-reported subscale collinearity and factor cross-loading, as described in Chapter 4, a ﬁnding complicated even further by English et al. (2020), who describe over 20 different AQ-trait
constellations that result in the same total AQ score, since different conﬁgurations of subscale
scores can add up to the same total. While these limitations are somewhat superseded by the
statistically supported AQ-based tools described in Piñango et al. (in prep) and in Chapter
4, the connection between the cognitive operations underlying the ACD measures and the
task-evoked preferential activations of certain cortical regions is yet to be fully instantiated.
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The second is that the larger goal for this body of work is to identify possible sources of the
variability that has been observed in linguistic behavior in order to nuance our understanding
of the language faculty in context. Incorporating factors that can explain systematic differences in linguistic behavior between individuals strengthens existing work on the systematic
commonalities in linguistic behavior. The studies presented here are but one instance of the
broader effort to incorporate variability as an intrinsic part of the system, rather than exclude
it conceptually or mathematically as “noise.” Accordingly, we do not expect any single measure to capture all the variability in such a complex system, which is known to be rooted in a
multitude of neural, cognitive, social, and other factors. Moreover, correlation effects interpreted as meaningful can be variable across paradigms, questions, and domains (Bosco et al.,
2015), in contrast with the widely used benchmarks from Cohen (1988). I take these ﬁndings
to be indicative of a direct connection between factors already hypothesized to be related,
that contribute to an individual’s cognitive style and their linguistic behavior—speciﬁcally, the
way they identify information in the communicative context to satisfy the requirements of a
linguistic expression in that context.
I take these results to be both meaningful and interpretable, despite a lack of statistical signiﬁcance, on the grounds that they resemble, along multiple quantitative dimensions, previous
ﬁndings using the same tools, stimuli, and participant populations. That is, the ACD measure
reliably results in a correlation of around .2 in tasks involving comprehending a target sentence
after a supporting versus neutral context. I attribute the lack of statistical signiﬁcance to a lack
of statistical power for the sample of 29 participants. A power analysis reveals that for an effect size of r=.2 at an α-level of .05 and a statistical power of .8, a sample of 194 participants
would be required, while an effect size of r = .4 at the same thresholds would require 46 participants, which are numbers in line with both the Study 1a ﬁndings as well as the ﬁndings from
Piñango et al. (in prep) described in Chapter 4. A sample of 194 is clearly not feasible nor
required for the principal purpose of this fMRI study, suggesting that quantitative limitations
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on statistical signiﬁcance testing should be evaluated independently of the correlation patterns
observed. These ﬁndings, therefore, represent not only support for the existing work on the
ACD measure and other AQ-based tools for quantifying variability in adult populations but
also the beginnings of a neurocognitively grounded framework for language-speciﬁc dimensions of variability. Future work must continue reﬁning both the methodological instruments
and conceptual models in order to precisify our understanding of the relationship between
variability in domain-general cognitive factors and variability in how individuals use language.
Variability in the right angular gyrus as variability in LCS compositio eﬀort
The ﬁrst pattern of variability within the activation patterns concerns the bilateral angular
gyri; as described above, the left angular gyrus (AG) is taken to underlie the standard lexicoconceptual semantic compositional processing that takes place during language comprehension, while the right AG is taken to represent its hemispherically homologous processing support. Within these related cortical regions, the hemodynamic activity in the left AG did not
correlate with the ACD measure of individual-level variability (r(27)=.04) while the activity
in the right AG correlated with the ACD measure to a moderate degree (r(27)=.23). These
correlations are presented in the top and bottom panels of Figure 8.2, respectively.
The positive correlation for the right AG indicates that individuals with lower ACD scores
(and are therefore considered to be more context-sensitive) showed a lesser degree of recruitment, while less context-sensitive comprehenders recruited this processing support region to
a greater degree. The pattern is particularly noteworthy because of the distribution of variability: crucially, within the core language network, the left AG, as the neurocognitive center of
the LCS composition operation, does not show systematic variability across individual comprehenders, while the additional processing resource regions in the right AG do show systematic
variability along the measure in question. The key takeaway is that individual comprehenders
do not vary in the degree to which they are performing LCS composition, but rather in the
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Figure 8.2: Bilateral angular gyrus activation by ACD score
degree to which they require additional support for that composition. Individuals who show a
lower degree of linguistic context-sensitivity, speciﬁcally operationalized with the ACD measure as an awareness of communicative dynamics, require additional support to perform the
otherwise universally invariant LCS composition.
Variability in ventrolateral prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortices as variability
in contextualization eﬀort
The second pattern of variability offers a complementary ﬁnding regarding the role of variability in linguistic context-sensitivity. Here, the correlations are localized to the ventrolateral
prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortices, which are, as described above, taken to underlie
effortful contextualization of a target, which is attenuated with the presence of a relevant, facilitatory context. The ACD measure correlated negatively with the activity in both the ACC
(r(27)=-.14) as well as BA 47 (r(27)=-.15), respectively, as shown in Figure 8.3; combining these
data yielded a correlation of (r(56)=-.14), suggesting that the variability captured by the ACD
was the same for both cortical regions.
The negative correlations here indicate that individuals with higher ACD scores (which
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Figure 8.3: Ventrolateral prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortex activation by ACD score
connect to a lower degree of context-sensitivity) showed a lower degree of recruitment of these
areas, while more context-sensitive comprehenders recruited this contextualization region to
a greater degree. A greater activation in BA 47 for the most context-sensitive comprehenders
is consistent with BA 47 underlying the effort to identify or generate a licensing context in the
face of a contextual demand. Furthermore, a greater activation in the ACC for the same comprehenders bolsters this interpretation, as this region is associated with mismatch detection,
suggesting that only the comprehenders that were better able to support the locative meaning
of the target were recognizing the conﬂicting conjunction of the context and target sentences.
Variability is intrinsic to, yet circumscribed within, the neurocognitive system underlying language
How do these patterns of variability shed light on the nature of context-sensitivity? What can
be said about how individual comprehenders are understanding these sentences? The general
pattern emerging from the neuroimaging results suggest that individuals with lower contextsensitivity are showing more compositional effort and less contextualization effort, while in233

dividuals with higher context-sensitivity are showing the opposite pattern: less compositional
effort and more contextualization effort. This manifests as some speakers relying more on
the entire encoded LCS and its inherent properties (i.e., a strong bias toward a more informative (maximally causal/possessive) reading from its entire LCS) versus some speakers relying
more on relevant contextual features (i.e., a ﬂexibility in modulating the salience of the causal
adjunct). This dichotomy aligns with known ﬁndings about individual preferences for more
rule-based or context-dependent cognitive processing, particularly when comparing individuals with autism spectrum condition and neurotypical peers (Wing, 1988; Plaisted, 2001; Russo
et al., 2007, a.o.).5 The pattern also connects directly to the anticorrelation of the N400 and
late-positivity ERP components discussed in Chapter 7. The constrained pattern of variability
in composition versus contextualization bolsters the cognitive grounding of linguistic contextsensitivity by showing its instantiation beyond linguistic behavior into the actual function of
the brain.
This tradeoff in attentional burden connects with the larger linguistic idea of the inversely
related context-dependence and conventionalization, whereby certain composite linguistic
constructions can be lexicalized to a degree where a relevant context is no longer necessary,
as is the case for systematic metonymy (e.g. The students read Shakespeare in 7th grade, in which
Shakespeare refers to the written works of William Shakespeare and not the person himself),
in contrast to circumstantial metonymy (e.g. The ham sandwich wants another cup of coﬀee, in a
restaurant, in which the ham sandwich refers to the orderer of a ham sandwich and not the food
item itself).6 Here, I connect the context-dependence versus conventionalization dichotomy
as a property of linguistic constructions to a possible parameter in individual speaker preferences, in which speakers may choose to use or be better at using linguistic construction variants
5

The operationalization of this behavior as a preference connects to the well-discussed chicken-and-egg issue
of whether preferences arise from ability or vice versa.
6
This example has been conventionalized to some degree in the metonymic literature itself, and can be contrasted to less conventionalized metonymic constructions such as The red Adidas wants to pay in cash, at a shoe
store, or That pomegranate kombucha has a sick jacket, at a hip cafe in Brooklyn.
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that are more or less context-dependent.7 This preference could be one possible driving force
in the lexicalization or conventionalization of such constructions.
In sum, the contribution of this line of evidence is that individual-level variability in cognitive predispositions is inherently connected to both linguistic behavior as well as neurocognitive function, strengthening the legitimacy of variability as an intrinsic part of the language
system, and in turn, strengthening the grounding of language as a human behavior and therefore language as a biological capacity at its core. Understanding the role of variability in the
language system for both linguistic structures and language users can not only inform more
comprehensive and cognitively grounded models of linguistic theory, but can also offer insights into the mechanisms for the actuation and propagation of variation and change.

8.5

Conclusion

The key ﬁndings from the fMRI study detailed here have clear implications for the two accounts of English have-sentences: the patterns of cortical recruitment indicate that the comprehension of a have-sentence is a standard process of lexico-conceptual semantic composition
associated with the lexical item have and of contextualization of the conceptual features of the
entities in the have-sentence required for the causal perception evaluation–patterns that support the uniﬁed LCS account. Moreover, additional cortical areas suggest that understanding
have-sentences is a process grounded in visuospatial locative representation as well as causal
7

One possibility for further specifying the role of variability in a broader model of change is by understanding
the reliance or preference for maximizing the entire LCS structure as a speciﬁc prior probability of activation,
and the available context as the likelihood of activation. In this formalization, the inter-comprehender variability lies within the domain of the priors, with the more LCS-dependent (less context-sensitive) comprehenders
showing a higher prior for the maximality lexical structure itself in the GCI space and the more context-sensitive
comprehenders showing a lower prior for the maximality of the uniﬁed LCS. The likelihood is taken to be constant in this schematization, though it may certainly be the case that an interaction between these would be
observed in more speciﬁed modeling. Moreover, I take it to be the case that the uniﬁed LCS is part of all individuals’ representation of have, though it may be that this representation is also variable across speakers. Further
understanding the respective roles of variability in the priors, the likelihoods, or both, represent a fruitful area
of research that would not only connect this cognitively driven model with computational approaches, but also
enable more precise characterizations of the scopes of different dimensions of variability.
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perception, aligning with the two key semantic components of the lexical meaning of have:
a core locative relation as well as a causal potential evaluation operation. In contrast, the
absence of neural indices of syntactic composition, syntactic processing, or ungrammaticality
aligns with the ERP ﬁndings in failing to support the processing predictions extrapolated from
the transitive copula account for locative have-sentences.
In terms of individual-level variability in linguistic context-sensitivity, neural activations
reveal a functional tradeoff between individuals who, in the face of semantic ambiguity, lean
into the properties of the lexical meaning or into the properties of the context. This tradeoff in
neurocognitive effort substantiates the construct of linguistic context-sensitivity as a relevant
parameter of variability in language use.
Overall, the event-related imaging study presented here not only advances the uniﬁed LCS
account for the behavior of locative have-sentences in English, but deepens the neurocognitive
embedding of the proposed model of meaning variation.
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Part III
Altogether
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9.1

A neurocognitive model of variation through the window of English have

In this dissertation, I have sought to construct a model of meaning variation built upon variability in linguistic structure, conceptual structure, and cognitive makeup, and in doing so, exemplify an approach to studying meaning that is both linguistically principled and psychologically
grounded. As my window into the internal structure of the mind, I make use of the English
lexical item have by proposing a novel analysis of its meaning based on its well-described variability in English and its embedding into crosslinguistically consistent patterns of variation and
change. I support this analysis by investigating its real-time comprehension patterns through
behavioral, electropsychophysiological, and hemodynamic brain data, thereby incorporating
dimensions of domain-general cognitive variability as crucial determinants of linguistic variability. Here, I review the entire narrative and the components of the analysis, model, and
evidence. This summary serves as a recapitulation and extension on the points made in §5.2,
in light of the whole project. I follow the narrative with a brief discussion on what I hope are
the principal contributions and takeaways as well as implications for the continued study of
linguistic meaning. Finally, I conclude the dissertation by highlighting potential avenues for
growing a model of meaning change out of this model of meaning variation.
The dissertation begins with a description of the meaning variability observed in English
have-sentences; in Chapter 2, I focus on the relational meanings and propose that the lexical
item have encodes a generalized lexico-conceptual semantic structure that can give rise to
the entire set of relational meanings, from incidental location to inalienable possession. This
uniﬁed LCS account of have states that the meaning of have is a locative relation at its core with
a variable relation that is determined on the basis of the causal potential that one entity in a
have-sentence has over another. Varying the degree of causal potential gives rise to the range of
relational meanings: a low degree of causality perceived will result in a more locative relation,
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while a high degree of causality perceived will result in a more possessive relation. Crucially,
the causal potential evaluation can be supported by conceptual features of the entities, explicit
markers for sub-regions of the range of relational meanings, or even contextual features of the
communicative situations. The uniﬁed LCS account for the meaning of have is presented
in opposition to the “transitive copula” account, which takes have to be a semantically null
identity function. In this account, the semantic variability of have-sentences are taken to arise
from a limitless set of syntactic heads inserted into the DP of the second entity of have. The
competing accounts generate different predictions for the case of bare locative have-sentences:
the uniﬁed LCS account predict that these sentences, though informationally dispreferred, are
acceptable with supporting context, while the transitive copula account predicts that they are
categorically ungrammatical. Acceptability ratings in Study 1a are consistent with only the
uniﬁed LCS account.
I relate the meaning variability of relational meanings to a broader set of crosslinguistic patterns of variation and change in Chapter 3, and show that these meanings, differentiated for
have by degree of causality, can be parameterized using two conceptual dimensions of causality,
leading to a structured explanation for why these meanings are lexicalized across the world’s
languages in systematic ways and for how relational markers show constrained, unidirectional
pathways of change over time. Crucially, the LCS of have is proposed to lexicalize over the
entire gradient conceptual infrastructure, leading to the wide range of relational meanings
encodable by have-sentences.
I introduce the ﬁnal ingredient for the model of meaning variation, linguistic contextsensitivity, a cognitive dimension of individual-level variability, in Chapter 4. To implement
it experimentally, I ﬁrst describe the cognitive bases for this parameter as well as a recently
developed tool to index it, which I employ in Study 1b. These results show that individuals
vary systematically in the degree to which they show the contextual-facilitation effect in Study
1a; individuals who have a higher degree of context-sensitivity showed greater acceptance of an
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ambiguous target after a facilitatory context over a parallel non-facilitatory one, while individuals with a lower degree of context-sensitivity did not show a difference between contexts on
ratings for the target. This pattern of variability suggests that linguistic context-sensitivity is
an integral component for a model of meaning variation, as variability across individual speakers and comprehenders can result in divergent linguistic choices and uses of variants.
In Chapter 5, I spell out the interaction of the three ingredients for a model of meaning variation, and describe the compositional story for how have-sentences are understood
in real-time. The uniﬁed LCS account directly predicts that locative have-sentences, and all
have-sentences, for that matter, are comprehended through a sequential process of LCS composition, through the retrieval of have, and a contextualization operation that evaluates the
causal potential of the entities based on their conceptual features as well as features from the
communicative context. In this view, locative have-sentences are entirely standard processing
that result simply from a low degree of causal potential between the two entities. On the other
hand, my extension of the transitive copula account into a processing operationalization predicts that locative have-sentences are possible (in light of Study 1a) only through the detection
of an error and a resulting syntactic-repair operation. These predictions set the stage for two
real-time processing studies in Chapters 6 and 7 and a neuroimaging study in Chapter 8.
Self-paced reading results (Study 2) reveal processing cost at the noun-complement of
have, supporting the uniﬁed LCS account by showing that the comprehension of have-sentences
is a straightforward process of contextualization in which the critical disambiguation work
happens upon comprehension of the noun-complement. Electropsychophysiological results
(Study 3) show that this processing cost evokes a late-positivity ERP component, an index of
semantic contextualization effort. Crucially, a P600 component, an index of syntactic repair,
is not observed. Moreover, the individuals with lower context-sensitivity measures showed a
highlight attenuated late-positivity component (and a strengthened N400), which could be
the neurocognitive basis for the lack of contextual facilitation found in Study 1a, further estab241

lishing the inseparable nature of cognitive variability from real-time meaning comprehension.
Finally, brain activation data from fMRI (Study 4) reveal a network of cortical regions
associated with conceptual composition and contextualization that underlies the comprehension of have-sentences, consistent with the uniﬁed LCS account; crucially, no cortical areas
involving syntactic composition or repair were preferentially recruited, consistent with the
real-time processing evidence, further failing to support the transitive copula account. In addition, cortical regions associated with visuospatial/locative representation as well as causal
perception were activated for the locative context-type, further grounding the uniﬁed LCS
account of have into actual brain function. The divergent neurological signatures of LCS composition and contextualization, in parallel with the N400-late-positivity correspondence, also
substantiate a linguistic divide between individuals along the dimension of context-sensitivity
in terms of a reliance or preference in communication on the structure of the lexical item in
isolation or on the lexical-semantic structure as interpreted within the features of communicative context.
Altogether, the four studies provide multimodal support for the uniﬁed LCS account, its
processing predictions for English have-sentences, and the broader model of meaning variation.
They show that meaning variation is an emergent phenomenon arising from the interaction,
in real-time, of linguistic, conceptual, and (neuro-)cognitive variability.

9.2

Principal contributions and takeaways

While the content of this dissertation touches upon a variety of topics in linguistics and cognitive science, I describe here ﬁve main ideas of consequence for future work.
The ﬁrst is regarding the semantic content and richness of have. One emergent parameter in the literature on have is whether have has any semantic content of its own accord;
the uniﬁed LCS account and its predecessors ascribe various degrees of lexical meaning to
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have, while the transitive copula family of accounts are identiﬁed by their semantic vacuity
for have. While my proposal is not the ﬁrst to ascribe a rich semantics for have, and not even
the ﬁrst to analyze possession as controlled or caused location (Evans, 1995), it is the ﬁrst to
use the tools of conceptual semantics (Jackendoff, 2019) and two-level semantics (Lang and
Maienborn, 2019) to propose a comprehensive lexical analysis that not only accounts for the
semantic variables in terms of entities and relations, but also provides an articulated connection of conceptual factors and contextual features to the lexical meaning itself.
Moreover, the uniﬁed LCS account provides a speciﬁed conceptual structure that
grounds the range of lexical meanings. Speciﬁcally, the gradient conceptual infrastructure provides a conceptually principled system for organizing the set of relational meanings.
By distilling causality into conceptual dimensions that are rooted in two of the most primary
core cognition operations (that of causal perception and object individuation), the infrastructure not only provides the framework for characterizing the observed crosslinguistic patterns
of lexicalization and change, but also provides a more systematic tool for describing the various relational meanings. This conceptually principled systematicity lies in direct contrast
with more intuitionally generated and researcher-speciﬁc groupings, such as stereotypical versus non-stereotypical (Karvovskaya, 2018) or intrinsic versus extrinsic (Storto, 2005) which are
not formally deﬁned and do not provide sufficient resolution for describing speciﬁc relational
meanings, or ad-hoc individuation (Myler, 2016), in which speciﬁc meanings are limitlessly
enumerated through listed functional heads or related lexical entries. These characterizations
of relational meanings are not inherently ﬂawed as they serve different types of inquiry, such
as variation description, but crucially, do not shed light on the source, structure, breadth, or
limits of such variation.
Combining these two advantages, the uniﬁed LCS account provides an articulated channel
for context-dependence in the lexical meaning. Within the model-theoretic tradition,
the most relevant account of possessive meanings (Karvovskaya, 2018) accounts for context243

dependence, but is not able to specify the precise role that context plays in determining a single relational meaning from the set. The analysis for have presented here allows for nuanced,
conceptual and contextual features to contribute to the determination of the relational meaning through the causal potential evaluation operation, even though the featural combinations
may not as of yet be quantiﬁable. For example, the two sentences in (79) may be classiﬁed
as the same relation, depending on the analytical tradition of choice, but clearly have some
difference in meaning.
(79)

a.

I have a child who’s three years old.

b. I have a child who’s thirty years old.
They are both inalienable relational meanings, both kinship relations, both relational
nouns (i.e., no π -type-shifting required, à la Barker 1991), as well as syntactically, argumentstructurally, type-theoretically, and even conceptual-primitively identical. The crucial difference lies in the degree of causal potential perceived between the two entities. Here, the causal
potential relational is more asymmetric in the case of the three year-old than in the case of
the thirty year-old. Additionally, different degrees of causal potential are possible depending
on the antecedent of the subject; this could vary depending on the speaker and comprehenders’ conception of parental roles or knowledge of the speciﬁc referents of the pronoun. The
gradient conceptual infrastructure allows for a continuous degree of relational meaning variation, over which languages can individuate using their speciﬁc lexicalization inventories, as
manifested through the meaning of the lexical item. Again, the output of the causal evaluation
operation has direct linguistic consequences because it is the crucial determinant for the relational meaning interpreted as well as the language-speciﬁc lexical strategy chosen to express
the relation.
Furthermore, the context-dependence in the lexical meaning allows for a contextualization versus conventionalization tradeoﬀ, as both the electrophysiological and brain ac244

tivation data revealed a neural distinction between a reliance on lexical meaning structure
or contextual features in the face of an ambiguous target during comprehension. In English,
there is a clear lexical preference for a possessive interpretation of a have-sentence, given the
maximal informativity of the LCS (see Chapter 2). Formally, this preference could be situated
on a Horn scale or connected to the Maximize Presupposition norm (Heim, 1991), though
the details of such a formalization would require further speciﬁcation. However, the range
of relational meanings is still available, with the locative reading requiring additional support
through either explicit marking, as in a locative PP, relevant linguistic context, as in Study 1a,
or other contextual features. For example, contextual features given in a visual context paired
with relatable museum personal experience fully supports the locative relation in Figure 9.1.

Figure 9.1: A bare locative have-sentence in the wild

Note: Cartoon by Amy Hwang published in the New Yorker magazine, April 2019.

In this cartoon, the visual context and relatable personal experience from fatigued museum245

going provide the justiﬁcation for a low degree of causality between the two entities in the
have-sentence, leading to a perfectly acceptable PP-less locative have-sentence. Providing an
explicit locative marker (e.g. I like this painting because it has a bench in front of it.) or a relevant
linguistic context (e.g. There’s a chair in front of this sculpture but this painting has bench that seats
two.) are also effective ways to disambiguate the intended locative relation. From the perspective of the uniﬁed LCS account, the incorporation of a space for contextual and conceptual
features into the lexical semantics of have enable to it to capture cases such as this one in a
straightforward, comprehensive, and principled way.
Finally, the uniﬁed LCS account is grounded in multimodal neuropsychological reality. The real-time composition and contextualization operations elucidated from Studies 2-4
follow from the analysis’ semantic structure. Importantly, the process of comprehending a
have-sentence, as predicted by the uniﬁed LCS account, is not one based on errors, repairs,
and reconciliation, but constitutes a beautifully ﬂexible, adaptable strategy for capturing a
wide range of relational meanings through a powerful but simple lexical meaning. The neuropsychological reality of inherently connects the uniﬁed LCS account, again, to the role of
individual-level variability, which is independently the topic of an entire branch of psychology.
This constrained variability, that is, variability that is circumscribed to relevant dimensions,
emerging from the cognitive system gives rise to the psychological real communication styles
shown in the data from Studies 1b, 3, and 4. While accounting for these additional factors
at fundamental level complicates the linguistic system, these extra parameters are justiﬁed by
the systematic nuance they contribute to our understanding of how individuals’ linguistic behaviors precipitate patterns of variation and change. This variability has been widely adopted
in a number of linguistic subdisciplines, and in fact forms the basis for a number of them, but
has yet to be incorporated into the most dominant theories of linguistic meaning. The work
here serves as one ﬁrst step toward doing so.
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9.3

Implications for the study of meaning

In this section, I discuss four main implications for the incorporation of context-dependent
conceptual structure, neuropsychological reality, and variability into the study of linguistic
meaning.
Methodological convergence (and divergence) of linguistic tools
The communication of meaning through language is the most fascinating of all psychological
operations, in my opinion, though this perspective is not mine alone, as a vast array of investigative approaches have been deployed by an army of semanticists of all ﬂavors to understand
it. Their tools vary widely not only in their mechanics, but also in their goals and scopes.
In this dissertation, I have sought to align complementary approaches in my analysis of have,
bringing in model-theoretic, conceptual, and two-level semantics to provide an articulated
description have’s compositionality and lexical meaning.1 I ground this description into an
organized conceptual space to enumerate the boundaries of the observed semantic variability
as well as provide it internal structure. Moreover, this analysis generates testable hypotheses
for processing, that I then assess through a suite of complementary techniques that shed light
on the timing, nature, and operationalization of the linguistic analysis, and ground it in the
function of the neurocognitive system.
The large literature on have in English, relational markers across the world’s languages, and
the linguistic structure of location and possession meanings more broadly have contributed a
wealth of insight into the behavior of these linguistic devices, as described in Chapter 2. They
largely make the right insights in terms of observations about the data, but often are limited
by their analytic tools. Take for example, Karvovskaya (2018), who implements a context1

A special tip of the hat is due to the two-level semantics framework, which allows for the beginnings of
integration of the lexicality and compositionality of the two other approaches. While I expect that as our ability
to quantize and understand the substance of conceptual and linguistic meaning develops, we may no longer need
such an intermediary framework, though this of course remains to be seen.
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dependent semantics for deriving an ambiguous relational meaning, but only goes as far as
classifying those meanings as stereotypical or non-stereotypical. In this way, the proposal is
limited in its scope (and potentially in its goal), as model-theoretic semantics is not particularly
well-suited for characterizing the content of lexical meanings or a gradient conceptual dimension such as degree of causal potential. Paired with a conceptual semantics analysis for lexical
meaning and a cognitively grounded conceptual infrastructure, however, it can describe the
linguistic phenomenon in a more complete way. In the syntactic approaches toward deriving
have-sentences as transitive copular constructions, there is not a clearly sanctioned mechanism
for introducing and precisely incorporating context-dependence, which prevents the synergy
of (a) a highly articulated account of the variability of have-sentences in English and have-like
sentences crosslinguistically and (b) a conceptually principled infrastructure for constraining
the possible meanings to begin with.
Methodologically speaking, it is of utmost importance to understand both the power and
the limitations of each tool. I exemplify this point with a brief discussion on the way the two
accounts, the syntactic-composition-based transitive copula and the semantic-compositionbased uniﬁed LCS, have been positioned relative to one another. An ecologically appropriate
theory of language requires both accurate description of the syntactic structures observed in a
language as well as cognitively grounded mechanisms for generating those syntactic structures,
among other components.
Structural description and processing are not by any means mutually exclusive, and in fact,
should be maximally convergent for a thorough characterization of the language faculty.2 Traditional approaches toward describing syntactic and semantic structure do not inherently make
claims about their cognitive and real-time generation; instead, these approaches rely on com2

See recent discussion on the false divide between representation/theory and processing/experimentation
Pablos et al. (2018); Phillips (2021), for a thorough argument for why these are one in the same and cannot exist
independently, if the goal is to understand and explain human language. A particular point is made to denounce
the claim that processing approaches are devoid of theory, which is a potential sociohistorical consequence of
the ﬁeld’s development.
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binatorial principles that emerge from logical, algorithmic, and even intuitive sources that are
not constrained by the mechanisms of the cognitive system. The connection to the actual
substance of language production and comprehension, the utterances, is left to un- or underdeveloped linearization functions and PF spellout algorithms.
One argument for not accounting for these other aspects of language is that of scope: the
enterprise is to develop a mathematical system for predicting all and only the grammatical
sentences of a language.3 , 4 , 5
I take issue with this argument for a few reasons. The ﬁrst is while the scopal limitation
means that these analyses do not address the substance of linguistic meaning, only the syntactic structures that may support the meanings, the claims regarding the lack of semantic
content of have are strong. The second is that the role of context must be clearly operationalized; a proposal for the meaning of have-sentences, which have been shown to be affected by
context, is not complete without a clear mechanism for context-dependence. How does con3

In this section, the use of the term “syntax” is largely referring to the Minimalist framework of linguistic
syntax, and perhaps should be characterized as “capital-S” Syntax–the enterprise of the subdiscipline of syntax.
For sociohistorical reasons, this Syntax is often conﬂated with syntax, referring to the rules that govern the order
of constituents in language and the body of phenomena relating to word order. This latter syntax is not a matter of
belief or choice–it is a documented set of linguistic phenomena and the properties thereof; the (former) Syntactic
enterprise that dominates the study of syntax is, however, but one of several ways to investigate it.
4
In this sense, a formal account of language can never reach explanatory adequacy because it does not seek
to nor have the ability to explain how the language system works; it can only accurately describe and predict
the outputs of that faculty. Without processing evidence, no amount of formalism can synthesize a model of
the human language faculty. One parallel from this is in the natural sciences: while mathematical formulas can
describe and predict the behaviors and interactions of atoms, it is not a question of whether or not atoms “know”
the formulas. The same can be said about the mind and brain regarding language; no matter how comprehensive
a formal theory of language is, it cannot be said, without the right kind evidence, that the human implementors
of language must “know” this formal theory. The indisputably best approach is a partnership and synergy of a
multitude of tools, formal description and real-time processing being two of them, in which ﬁndings from each
tool are able to constrain the parameter space and interpretations of others’.
5
One consequence of this scopal overreach is the use of terms like “repair,” which is a theory-internal characterization that arises from the limitations of the algorithm, and not of the behavior itself. A truly descriptive
account of a linguistic phenomenon as a human phenomenon would require a speciﬁc set of neurocognitively
grounded evidence to consider a given operation to be one of “repair” status. Importing “repair” into the cognitive domain from a theory-internal source can mislead inquiry into the actual ontological status of a psychological
operation, as described previously in a “repair” versus “contextualized” operation for the comprehension of locative have-sentences. These two approaches lead to different conceptualizations of the language system as either
ﬁxing something or making the most of the incoming information. This serves as another example of the idea
that theoretical limitations do not constitute evidence for cognitive impossibility.
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text interact with the linguistic structure; what are the places where it can have an affect and
what are the places it cannot? What is the substance of context itself ? The admission of some
role of context and the limitation of the system to account for it are not valid justiﬁcations to
support the claim.
The principal limitation of the frameworks in which the transitive copula account are developed is that they are not falsiﬁable by processing data, because they do not make predictions
about how an analysis is borne out in real-time language processing. As discussed in §8.4.2,
the ﬁndings in Study 3 and 4 only discount one possible syntactic instantiation of the transitive copula account–the locative PP insertion repair–but there are other possible real-time
processing instantiations. I do not recount them here, but escalate the issue to a larger parameter in linguistic analysis: whether the baseline of parsimony is a minimal syntactic structure
or no linguistic meaning without the support of overt or covert syntactic structure. In other
words, this is the difference between no syntax or null syntax to support linguistic semantic or
meaning composition. The former perspective is embodied in the Simpler Syntax Hypothesis
(Culicover and Jackendoff, 2019b), which states that “syntactic structure is only as complex as
it needs to be in order to establish the relationship between phonological structure and semantic interpretation.” Consequently, there cannot be null syntax that is not directly borne out
through processing evidence. Meaning composition has its own structure and combinatorial
principles that need not be underlain by syntactic structure. This approach represents a maximally minimal syntax. On the other hand, the latter approach takes the view that syntax is the
principal (or even only) system with its own structure; meaning is an amorphous conceptual
substance carved into linguistic structure by syntax. This view results in the positing of null
syntactic structures that are claimed to support known semantic composition processes. In
theory, there are not necessarily advantages to one or the other; the important consequence is
that the connection between null syntax and real-time linguistic processing is not enumerated.
Null syntax is one way of characterizing language data, within the rules of the syntac250

tic framework, but not necessarily within the cognitive embedding of the language system.6
While there is no a priori reason not to posit invisible structure, the burden of its justiﬁcation
should be very high and supported by evidence from the way humans implement such structure, as in the well-studied case of ﬁller-gap dependencies. If a proposal for covert syntax has
no basis in or even predictions for processing, it cannot be tested.
And therein lies the problem: null structure is often invoked to solve a formal problem,
but it is much less often connected to psychological reality. The consequences thereof are
enormous: the endeavor of science, as a way of discovery, is predicated fundamentally upon
falsiﬁability of testable hypotheses. Without grounding in the neurocognitive system from
which human language emerges, the disciplinary status of linguistics as a proper science is at
stake.
Identifying and acquiring enough of the right data
Accordingly, the acquisition of the right data is of utmost importance for the scientiﬁc inquiry
of language: the right human data is obligatory to make appropriate characterizations of a
human phenomenon. One clear example of this is the basis for the transitive copula accounts
in Harley and Jung (2015) and Myler (2016), as the two most recent representatives of this family
of proposals. The entire analysis rests upon the categorical ungrammaticality of sentences like
(80).
(80)

The maple tree has a car that is red.

These sentences without context have already been reported to have varying degrees of
acceptability by native speakers (Belvin and Den Dikken, 1997), which are corroborated by
the Study 1a and 1b results presented in this dissertation. These results show that at least a
6

This again is a manifestation of the status of the language system as a mathematical system capturing the
outputs of a black-boxed human behavior, or as the psychological system underlying human communication. Such
a divide between language is encapsulated by the ideas of “humans implement language decently but imperfectly”
versus “the only language there is is what humans produce.”
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subset of the native speaker community ﬁnds these sentences, especially with context as in
(81), acceptable and crucially, not ungrammatical.
(81)

There is a silver motorcycle under the pine tree and the maple tree has a car that is red.
What if these proposals had considered the data from these results? The absence of the

ungrammaticality marker bears enormous consequence on the existence of an entire family
of proposals within the transitive copula approach. Methodologically speaking, this raises a
few questions regarding the sentences that launch a family of analyses. Who gets to assert the
grammaticality of a sentence? How do we decide the validity of this assertion? Is the nature
of grammaticality binary (i.e., ±*)?
In light of these questions, I again emphasize the importance of goal-directed, domainspeciﬁed research in context. If the goal is to characterize linguistic meaning in the human
language system, then a different kind of data is needed than if the goal is to mathematically
complete a formal derivation. In this perspective, the inability of a given tool to account for
a phenomenon does not necessarily constitute evidence about the nature of human language.
Again, if linguistics is to be approached scientiﬁcally, the rigorous testing of processing implications of analyses should feed back into the formulation of those analyses. This iterative
process is the lifeblood of the scientiﬁc enterprise.
How does this translate into future research? It does not necessarily entail that multimodal
neuroimaging investigations or triple-digit study samples are mandatory, by any means. What
it does mean is that a deep understanding of the source and nature of any grammaticality
judgment is required. The fewer judgments, the deeper this understanding must be, given the
nature of both known and unknown dimensions of variability in language.
One immediate area for deepening the understanding of the data is regarding the context
of the data. Utterances that serve as the basis for linguistic analysis must be better contextualized in terms of its linguistic context: what discourse is it embedded in, what was its prosodic
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implementation, what was the utterance that immediately preceded it? Understanding this
ﬁnal point, speciﬁcally, alters the judgment of the sentence in question, particularly in the
case of the have-sentences. Although utterances in isolation are often regarded as the object
of study, I consider whether the principal target of linguistic analysis should be founded upon
decontextualized utterances in the same way that monolingual language has been taken to be
the default situation. In the same way that multilingualism is in fact the majority situation,
and perhaps serves as a better model for human language behavior, single utterances rarely
exist in total isolation. Even if they are not preceded by explicit linguistic context, we know
that the communicative, discourse, and social contexts may play a role in the understanding
of a given utterance. This idea further promotes the importance of understanding the cognitive contexts of the individuals and the communicative and social contexts in which they
are providing both utterances and judgments of utterances. Experimentally, this manifests as
creating and validating contextually appropriate stimuli.
Many questions and their associated investigative efforts in our science are no longer advanceable through a binary categorization of grammaticality; our reconceptualization of any
individual human being as being situated at the intersection of a great number of gradient
dimensions of cognitive style and social identity means that understanding the way these dimensions interact and manifest through language is vital to understanding the meaning or
evaluation of any given utterance. This reconceptualization in turn forces a reconceptualization of the status of ungrammaticality as being speciﬁc to a context, an individual, and a point
in time. In sum, I hope that this dissertation advocates for understanding the source of our
data at a deep level: humans are complex and multi-dimensional, so we must ensure that the
data from people we think we are investigating are in fact the data we are investigating.
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Language as a biological capacity
Striving for the scientiﬁc underpinning of linguistics brings me to two points I would like to
emphasize about the biological basis of the human language faculty.
The ﬁrst is about the importance of real-time processing. Linguistic communication is
a behavioral operation that is rooted in the neurocognitive system. Consequently, studying
language processing in the neurocognitive system itself cannot be considered an accessory to
an analysis, especially on the grounds of logistical or operational effort. It is the scientiﬁc instantiation of the linguistic enterprise. Real-time processing studies reveal the psychological
reality of linguistic structure, providing insight into the order of operations during production
and comprehension, the representational substrate and the resource demands of a given operation, and the relative recruitment of conventionalized lexical meaning structure or contextual
factor. These aspects of production and comprehension, among others, are inseparable from
an explanatorily adequate linguistic analysis.
The second is about the importance of variability. Variability is intrinsic to language as
a biological capacity, and should be a key desideratum not only for a more high-resolution
and precise understanding of the cognitive context of the language system, but also because
variability impacts individuals’ use of language. The brain data in particular highlights a potential tradeoff between relying on lexical meaning structure versus contextual features in the
course of real-time comprehension. This divergent pattern of variability in neurocognitive
function could be a source of variability in linguistic choice, speciﬁcally in the case of have, for
individuals who may choose to use contextually grounded ambiguous have-sentences versus
alternative lexical structures that highlight particular subspaces within the relational meaning
space. These linguistic consequences of measurable differences in brain function highlight the
singularity of language as a biological capacity and sociocommunicative system.
All things considered, these patterns of variability illustrate how linguistic structure, and
lexico-conceptual semantic structure in particular, and the processing mechanisms through
254

which we can see that structure are so deeply intertwined with its cognitive system foundation, not only in the core resources such as long-term and working memory which support the
mental lexicon and real-time comprehension and production, respectively, but also in the informational and procedural constraints on lexicalization, and the forces that shape its stability
and variability within an individual and across communities.

9.4

Moving forward: a neurocognitive model of linguistic variation (and change?)

Ultimately, this framework for variation also serves as a natural, prerequisite setting for meaning change. What are some possible parameters in the model in which change can be seeded,
that is, the spaces for variability to accumulate? One possibility is the lexicalization of ambiguity, as the trapping of systematic context-dependence by word-meanings. Incorporating features of the context represents a reach in the boundaries of lexical compositional structure–a
process that could take place through conventionalization. That is, if a lexical form X systematically occurs in context Y but not Z, or W and Y but not Z, the incorporation of Y or W and
Y into the lexical meaning of X represents a viable pathway of change that would be supported
by the subset of the population, as in Study 4, who show an increased reliance on the lexical
compositional structure, rather than sensitivity to and dependence on features of the context
that can disambiguate a word meaning. Further research into the dynamics of these opposing
forces could illuminate patterns of stable variation as well as unidirectional or bidirectional
change.
Connecting these underlying dimensions of variation to existing patterns and principles
in more traditional linguistic approaches may also be a fruitful way to coordinate parallel approaches in the study of language. For example, one recent effort has been made to understand the ontology of Heim (1991)’s Maximize Presupposition not as a “normative constraint
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on language use” nor a “defeasible tendencies in behavior motivated by general considerations
about cooperative communication” but as a speaker preference emerging from independent cognitive predispositions (i.e., cognitive style) that manifest systematically in language use (Lauer,
2016). Connecting existing well-adopted principles in linguistic theory, such as this one, to
related principles in language change, such as presupposition accommodation (Schwenter and
Waltereit, 2010) or presuppositional content asymmetry (Sanchez-Alonso, 2018), can provide
immediate seeds for extending the model of variation into one of change.
Further unpacking the cognitive sources of variability in the use of and dependence on context is also an important avenue for expanding the model of variation into a model of language
change. While Studies 1b and 4 do show that a measure of linguistic context-sensitivity plays
an important role in the contextual facilitation of locative have-sentences, additional work is
required to verify the connection between the questionnaire itself and the underlying cognitive capacities it is indexing. Moreover, multimodal approaches consisting of qualitative and
quantitative research are the key to distinguishing speaker preference and speaker ability, the
distinction described in §8.4.4, which cannot be ascertained based on these ﬁndings alone.7
This ontological distinction is important for the development of variation into change, as abilities and preferences are differentially affected by the social and communicative contexts in
which they play out.
One important missing ingredient to actuate change out of this model of variation is these
sociocommunicative contexts. This body of factors, social meaning and social dynamics, addresses the motivations individuals have in using the linguistic devices they do. For example,
possible motivations for using, say, an expressive variant (over an economical variant) could
include pleasure, acceptance, or novelty, among others. These social meaning motivations
7

As shown by Piñango et al. (in prep), this work may require much larger study populations than are typically
recruited for linguistic and psycholinguistic studies; solidly grounding the development of these novel psychometrics from the start will enable more widespread use and ease of use and ideally, will establish a tradition of
incorporating measures of variability in all investigations of human language.
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originate separately but interact with properties of the variants themselves, which can differ
in terms of ambiguity/speciﬁcity and informativity, among others. Moreover, varying social
dynamics of individual interactions arising from features of identity, social structure, power,
among others, are always at play. Together, these sociocognitive factors can drive the use of different variants, and therefore the propagation of certain variants over others within a speech
community. Enumerating the parameter space for sociocommunicative variability through
large-scale data collection, such as the KiezDeutsch-Korpus (Wiese et al., 2012) or the Maybachufer Market project (Wiese, 2020), is important for establishing a systematic foundation
for future research. Extending a model of variation into a model of change requires the incorporation of such factors in an articulated way.
In sum, this cognitively grounded proposal is borne out in the actual cognitive implementation of real-time language use: each linguistic utterance is a communicative act in which a
speaker chooses one linguistic device out of a set in order to achieve a speciﬁc communicative goal. For the comprehender, discovering the message requires interpreting the incoming
linguistic material in context. The conceptual structure underlying lexical-semantic structure
and relevant context cooperate in guiding comprehension by increasing the salience of different potential meanings, in real-time, as comprehension unfolds. The degree to which individual comprehenders are affected by and make use of contextual information during real-time
comprehension is also variable; these linguistic and cognitive factors together form the core
of normal language processing and, with a gradient conceptual framework, the minimal infrastructure for meaning variation and change. Models such as this one contribute to deepening
our overall understanding of how the linguistic system and conceptual structure, embedded
in the broader cognitive system, ultimately give rise to the expressive power of the human
language faculty.
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Appendix: Experimental stimuli
Studies 1a and 1b
1. The bag is under the table and the chair has a box.
2. The motorcycle is under the pine tree and the maple tree has a car.
3. The mug is next to the book and the notebook has a cup.
4. The encyclopedia is on top of the textbook and the dictionary has a phonebook.
5. The saucepan is inside the salad bowl and the stock pot has a cake pan.
6. The fern is beside the door and the mirror has a cactus.
7. The table has four legs and the chair has a box.
8. The pine tree has big branches and the maple tree has a car.
9. The book has a dust jacket and the notebook has a cup.
10. The textbook has an online supplement and the dictionary has a phonebook.
11. The salad bowl has a ﬂoral pattern and the stock pot has a cake pan.
12. The door has a deadbolt and the mirror has a cactus.
13. The table has a bag and the chair has a box.
14. The pine tree has a motorcycle and the maple tree has a car.
15. The book has a mug and the notebook has a cup.
16. The textbook has an encyclopedia and the dictionary has a phonebook.
17. The salad bowl has a saucepan and the stock pot has a cake pan.
18. The door has a fern and the mirror has a cactus.
19. The table is made of glass and the chair has a box.
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20. The pine tree is very green and the maple tree has a car.
21. The book is leatherbound and the notebook has a cup.
22. The textbook is very heavy and the dictionary has a phonebook.
23. The salad bowl is ceramic and the stock pot has a cake pan.
24. The door is made of metal and the mirror has a cactus.
25. The bag is under the table so the chair has a box.
26. The motorcycle is under the pine tree or the maple tree has a car.
27. The mug is next to the book because the notebook has a cup.
28. The encyclopedia is on top of the textbook because the dictionary has a phonebook.
29. The saucepan is inside the salad bowl until the stock pot has a cake pan.
30. The fern is beside the door or the mirror has a cactus.

Studies 2, 3, and 4
1. The pine tree has a silver motorcycle under it and the maple tree has a car that is red.
2. The willow tree has a red dirtbike under it and the sycamore tree has a four-wheeler that is yellow.
3. The oak tree has a yellow convertible under it and the ﬁr tree has a hummer that is green.
4. The birch tree has a black sportscar under it and the elm tree has a camper with green stripes.
5. The lamppost has a red bicycle next to it and the signpost has a scooter that is pink.
6. The telephone pole has a blue truck under it and the cell phone tower has a minivan that is green.
7. The billboard has a white pickup under it and the ﬂagpole has a jeep that is black.
8. The parking meter has a brown station wagon next to it and the ﬁre hydrant has a sedan that is
white.
9. The bike rack has a red Toyota next to it and the parking sign has a Honda that is silver.
10. The table has a paper bag under it and the chair has a box that is cardboard.
11. The desk has a tote bag under it and the stool has a basket that is wicker.
12. The dining table has a large houseplant next to it and the recliner has a side table that is mahogany.
13. The book has a blue mug next to it and the notebook has a cup that is white.
14. The legal pad has a travel mug next to it and the newspaper has a teacup with a saucer.
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15. The textbook has a leatherbound encyclopedia on top of it and the dictionary has a phonebook
that is paperback.
16. The atlas has a colorful graphic novel on top of it and the yearbook has a children’s book with
many illustrations.
17. The newspaper has a ﬁtness magazine on top of it and the junk mail has a postcard with three
stamps.
18. The salad bowl has a round saucepan inside it and the stock pot has a cake pan that is square.
19. The colander has a square griddle inside it and the Dutch oven has a pie pan that is round.
20. The frying pan has a steel wok on top of it and the saucepan has a cookie sheet that is rectangular.
21. The skillet has a black pressure cooker on top of it and the casserole pan has a roasting pan that
is copper.
22. The door has a large fern beside it and the mirror has a cactus that is small.
23. The front door has a beautiful bonsai beside it and the lamp has a lucky bamboo with a ribbon.
24. The garage door has a lawn mower beside it and the water heater has a furnace that is broken.
25. The still-life has a detailed cityscape above it and the portrait has a seascape with three ships.
26. The nude painting has a stormy landscape above it and the Picasso has a painting by Vincent van
Gogh.
27. The yacht has a ﬁberglass kayak next to it and the rowboat has a canoe that is wooden.
28. The houseboat has a white motorboat next to it and the catamaran has a ferry with many passengers.
29. The toothbrush has a blue razor beside it and the comb has a jar with cotton balls.
30. The mascara has a red lipstick beside it and the eyeliner has a box with bobby pins.
31. The mouthwash has a stick of deodorant beside it and the contact lens solution has a can of
shaving cream.
32. The spatula has a plastic ladle beside it and the wooden spoon has a whisk that is metal.
33. The oven mitt has a cheese grater beside it and the garlic press has a rolling pin that is wooden.
34. The scone has a chocolate croissant next to it and the muffin has a bagel with sesame seeds.
35. The turkey has a green bean casserole next to it and the gravy boat has a bowl of mashed potatoes.
36. The roast beef has a broccoli gratin beside it and the cherry pie has a dish of scalloped potatoes.
37. The tuna steak has a whole lobster beside it and the swordﬁsh has a salmon ﬁllet that is fresh.
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38. The ground beef has a rack of lamb beside it and the chicken breast has a steak with barbecue
sauce.
39. The ground turkey has a frozen chicken beside it and the sirloin steak has a package of pork
sausages.
40. The avocado has a red bell pepper next to it and the tomato has a potato with red skin.
41. The papaya has a small watermelon next to it and the turnip has a yam with brown skin.
42. The cantaloupe has a box of clementines next to it and the honeydew has a bag with gala apples.
43. The goat cheese has a container of ricotta next to it and the feta cheese has a bottle of olive oil.
44. The sesame oil has a plate of noodles beside it and the soy sauce has a bowl of fried rice.
45. The canopy has a metal chair under it and the awning has a bench that is white.
46. The conditioner has a pink loofah next to it and the shampoo has a soap bar with lavender oil.
47. The moisturizer has a nail clipper next to it and the sunblock has a bottle of women’s fragrance.
48. The baby oil has a pair of tweezers next to it and the Vaseline has a tube of acne ointment.
49. The shower curtain has a bathroom scale beside it and the towel has a bathmat that is green.
50. The hand soap has a box of tissues beside it and the toothpaste has a hand towel that is white.
51. The pine tree has a small nest in it and the maple tree has a car that is red.
52. The willow tree has a picnic bench under it and the sycamore tree has a four-wheeler that is
yellow.
53. The oak tree has a swing on it and the ﬁr tree has a hummer that is green.
54. The birch tree has a birdhouse on it and the elm tree has a camper with green stripes.
55. The lamppost has a lost dog ﬂyer on it and the signpost has a scooter that is pink.
56. The telephone pole has advertisements on it and the cell phone tower has a minivan that is green.
57. The billboard has some rust on it and the ﬂagpole has a jeep that is black.
58. The parking meter has an out-of-order sign on it and the ﬁre hydrant has a sedan that is white.
59. The bike rack has two bikes on it and the parking sign has a Honda that is silver.
60. The table has a plaid tablecloth on it and the chair has a box that is cardboard.
61. The desk has a small lamp on it and the stool has a basket that is wicker.
62. The dining table has a centerpiece on it and the recliner has a side table that is mahogany.
63. The book has a dust jacket on it and the notebook has a cup that is white.
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64. The legal pad has ink smudges on it and the newspaper has a teacup with a saucer.
65. The textbook has post-it notes in it and the dictionary has a phonebook that is paperback.
66. The atlas has a red bookmark in it and the yearbook has a children’s book with many illustrations.
67. The newspaper has a coffee stain on it and the junk mail has a postcard with three stamps.
68. The salad bowl has saran wrap on it and the stock pot has a cake pan that is square.
69. The colander has dried lettuce on it and the Dutch oven has a pie pan that is round.
70. The frying pan has a glass lid on it and the saucepan has a cookie sheet that is rectangular.
71. The skillet has Teﬂon coating on it and the casserole pan has a roasting pan that is copper.
72. The door has a hook for keys on it and the mirror has a cactus that is small.
73. The front door has a Christmas wreath on it and the lamp has a lucky bamboo with a ribbon.
74. The garage door has a decorative handle on it and the water heater has a furnace that is broken.
75. The still-life has cobwebs on it and the portrait has a seascape with three ships.
76. The nude painting has some dust on it and the Picasso has a painting by Vincent van Gogh.
77. The yacht has a waterproof cover on it and the rowboat has a canoe that is wooden.
78. The houseboat has barnacles growing on it and the catamaran has a ferry with many passengers.
79. The toothbrush has some toothpaste on it and the comb has a jar with cotton balls.
80. The mascara has a price tag on it and the eyeliner has a box with bobby pins.
81. The mouthwash has a black cap on it and the contact lens solution has a can of shaving cream.
82. The spatula has some batter on it and the wooden spoon has a whisk that is metal.
83. The oven mitt has some burn marks on it and the garlic press has a rolling pin that is wooden.
84. The scone has lemon glaze on it and the muffin has a bagel with sesame seeds.
85. The turkey has a honey glaze on it and the gravy boat has a bowl of mashed potatoes.
86. The roast beef has some parsley garnish on it and the cherry pie has a dish of scalloped potatoes.
87. The tuna steak has skin on it and the swordﬁsh has a salmon ﬁllet that is fresh.
88. The ground beef has plastic wrap on it and the chicken breast has a steak with barbecue sauce.
89. The ground turkey has a wax paper wrapping on it and the sirloin steak has a package of pork
sausages.
90. The avocado has a purple sticker on it and the tomato has a potato with red skin.
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91. The papaya has a yellow label on it and the turnip has a yam with brown skin.
92. The cantaloupe has a white sticker on it and the honeydew has a bag with gala apples.
93. The goat cheese has a wax rind on it and the feta cheese has a bottle of olive oil.
94. The sesame oil has a yellow cap on it and the soy sauce has a bowl of fried rice.
95. The canopy has a mosquito net on it and the awning has a bench that is white.
96. The conditioner has detailed instructions on it and the shampoo has a soap bar with lavender
oil.
97. The moisturizer has a list of ingredients on it and the sunblock has a bottle of women’s fragrance.
98. The baby oil has a transparent label on it and the Vaseline has a tube of acne ointment.
99. The shower curtain has mildew on it and the towel has a bathmat that is green.
100. The hand soap has a white label on it and the toothpaste has a hand towel that is white.
101. The pine tree has big branches and the maple tree has a car that is red.
102. The willow tree has drooping branches and the sycamore tree has a four-wheeler that is yellow.
103. The oak tree has green leaves and the ﬁr tree has a hummer that is green.
104. The birch tree has peeling bark and the elm tree has a camper with green stripes.
105. The lamppost has an incandescent bulb and the signpost has a scooter that is pink.
106. The telephone pole has a concrete base and the cell phone tower has a minivan that is green.
107. The billboard has an Apple ad and the ﬂagpole has a jeep that is black.
108. The parking meter has a solar panel and the ﬁre hydrant has a sedan that is white.
109. The bike rack has a stainless steel body and the parking sign has a Honda that is silver.
110. The table has four legs and the chair has a box that is cardboard.
111. The desk has two drawers and the stool has a basket that is wicker.
112. The dining table has a glass surface and the recliner has a side table that is mahogany.
113. The book has ten chapters and the notebook has a cup that is white.
114. The legal pad has a brown binding and the newspaper has a teacup with a saucer.
115. The textbook has an online supplement and the dictionary has a phonebook that is paperback.
116. The atlas has a spiral binding and the yearbook has a children’s book with many illustrations.
117. The newspaper has a classiﬁeds section and the junk mail has a postcard with three stamps.
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118. The salad bowl has a ﬂoral pattern and the stock pot has a cake pan that is square.
119. The colander has a silicone handle and the Dutch oven has a pie pan that is round.
120. The frying pan has a non-stick coating and the saucepan has a cookie sheet that is rectangular.
121. The skillet has a ﬂat bottom and the casserole pan has a roasting pan that is copper.
122. The door has a deadbolt and the mirror has a cactus that is small.
123. The front door has a peephole and the lamp has a lucky bamboo with a ribbon.
124. The garage door has some window panels and the water heater has a furnace that is broken.
125. The still-life has a black frame and the portrait has a seascape with three ships.
126. The nude painting has a gold frame and the Picasso has a painting by Vincent van Gogh.
127. The yacht has two bedrooms and the rowboat has a canoe that is wooden.
128. The houseboat has a bedroom and the catamaran has a ferry with many passengers.
129. The toothbrush has a blue handle and the comb has a jar with cotton balls.
130. The mascara has a pink cap and the eyeliner has a box with bobby pins.
131. The mouthwash has 0.01 ﬂuoride and the contact lens solution has a can of shaving cream.
132. The spatula has a non-slip handle and the wooden spoon has a whisk that is metal.
133. The oven mitt has a plaid pattern and the garlic press has a rolling pin that is wooden.
134. The scone has chocolate chips and the muffin has a bagel with sesame seeds.
135. The turkey has lemon pepper marinade and the gravy boat has a bowl of mashed potatoes.
136. The roast beef has mushroom stuffing and the cherry pie has a dish of scalloped potatoes.
137. The tuna steak has a sesame soy marinade and the swordﬁsh has a salmon ﬁllet that is fresh.
138. The ground beef has 0.09 fat and the chicken breast has a steak with barbecue sauce.
139. The ground turkey has 0.07 fat and the sirloin steak has a package of pork sausages.
140. The avocado has green skin and the tomato has a potato with red skin.
141. The papaya has black seeds and the turnip has a yam with brown skin.
142. The cantaloupe has orange ﬂesh and the honeydew has a bag with gala apples.
143. The goat cheese has chopped rosemary and the feta cheese has a bottle of olive oil.
144. The sesame oil has vitamin E and the soy sauce has a bowl of fried rice.
145. The canopy has waterproof fabric and the awning has a bench that is white.
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146. The conditioner has argan oil and the shampoo has a soap bar with lavender oil.
147. The moisturizer has coconut oil and the sunblock has a bottle of women’s fragrance.
148. The baby oil has mineral oil and the Vaseline has a tube of acne ointment.
149. The shower curtain has blue stripes and the towel has a bathmat that is green.
150. The hand soap has vanilla fragrance and the toothpaste has a hand towel that is white.
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